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The development of  American federalism is  a  story of  contested sovereignty,  and 
those contests are fundamentally shaped by the evolving structures,  relationships, and 
understandings  of  the  constitutional  order.  This  dissertation  seeks  to  show  how  the 
American federal system is both cause and effect of political development. Even as it 
structures  legal  and  political  contestation,  American  federalism  is  shaped—even 
redefined—by such contestation. Central to the account of American federalism that I 
advance are two related arguments about the nature of the federal system. The first is that 
the  Constitution’s  definition  of  the  state-federal  relationship  is  structurally 
underdeterminate: while the Constitution constrains the set of permissible state-federal 
relationships, it fixes no single definition. Rather than establish a determinate division of 
state and national powers, the Constitution establishes a range of parameters for their 
relationship  and  sets  forth  the  legal  and  political  processes  through  which  that 
relationship is contested, defined, and revised. As a result, the American federal system 
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both  shapes  and  is  shaped  by  constitutionally  structured  politics.  Developing  an 
implication of this argument, the second argument holds that notions and definitions of 
sovereignty are structured relationally. Articulations of national power reciprocally define 
a category of state powers, just as invocation of local concerns over which states have 
authority reciprocally define national concerns over which the national government has 
authority. On this account federalism is both an independent and a dependent variable, an 
approach that shifts our focus from federalism and American political development to 
federalism in American political development. By foregrounding the underdeterminacy of 
the federal system and interrogating the constitutional construction it anticipates, we can 
glimpse  the  intertwined  contingency  and  continuity  of  American  constitutional 
development.
This dissertation is broadly divided into two parts—the first theoretical, the second 
developmental—each of which consists of two components. The resulting four chapters 
constitute  the  core  of  the  project.  The  theoretical  chapters  (Chapters  One  and  Two) 
provide a framework for understanding the federal system both in the general context of 
the  American  Constitution  and,  more  specifically,  in  contrast  with  the  separation  of 
powers.  This  framework  is  fundamentally  structured  by  the  underdeterminate 
constitutional  division  of  state  and  national  powers  and  the  consequent  need  for 
constitutional construction of the state-federal relationship. The developmental chapters 
(Chapters Three and Four) operationalize the theoretical framework developed in the first 
two chapters in two different domains: constitutional jurisprudence and a discrete episode 
of  the  political  construction  of  the  state-federal  relationship.  Taken  together,  these 
chapters are intended to illustrate the central argument of the preceding chapters: that the 
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constitutional  design  of  the  federal  system  anticipates  development  and  that  this 
development  is  inflected  by  the  institutional  logics  of  the  principal  institutions  of 
American  government.  The  dissertation  concludes  with  a  brief  reflection  on  the  two 
conceptual cornerstones of the analysis presented in the preceding chapters: constitutional 
construction and constitutional logics.  
!ix
Table of Contents
Introduction: Federalism in American Political Development 1 
American Federalism and the Boundary Question 8 
Methodological Approaches to American Federalism 9 
1. Optimal Design: Federalism as a Means to an End 9 
2. Positive Political Theory: Federalism and Competitive Interests 11 
3. New Institutional Economics: Federalism as Safeguards 14 
4. Complex Adaptive Systems: Federalism as a Constructed System 16 
5. American Political Development 19 
6. Historical-Philosophical Analysis: Federalism as a Theory of Sovereignty 21 
Response: Towards a Developmental Account of American Federalism  24 
Overview 29 
Chapter One: The Politics of Sovereignty 40 
The Structure of Sovereignty 45 
The Constitutional Logic of Federalism 46 
Preserving the Federal Bargain: Three “Levels” of Constraints 55 
(1) Level One: Explicit Bargains 57 
(2) Level Two: Institutions 59 
(3) Interlude: The States’ Rights Amendment? 64 
The Relationships of Sovereignty  67 
Level Three: The Political Sociology of Federalism 68 
Attachment and the Anti-Federalist Fear of Consolidation 75 
Attachment, Administration, and American Constitutional Development 82 
Chapter Two: Federalism and the Separation of Powers 96 
The Unifying Theory: Federalism as a Separation of Power 98 
Two Notions of Power & Two Conceptions of Separation 102 
Sovereignty, Supremacy, and Constitutional Authority 112 
The Kernel of Truth: Federalism as a Division of Power 114 
Sovereignty and the Puzzle of Constitutional Authority  116 
The Puzzle of Constitutional Authority and the Politics of Sovereignty 129 
!x
Chapter Three: Constitutional Law vs. Constitutional Logic  139 
The Constitutional Logic of Federalism & the Institutional Logic of the Judiciary  146 
The Constitutional Law of Federalism 155 
The Early Republic: 1787-1837 156 
Slavery, Secession, and Union: 1842-1873 168 
Logic, Law, and Sovereignty 189 
Constitutional Law vs. Constitutional Logic 190 
The Endogeneity of Sovereignty 196 
Conclusion 201 
Chapter Four: From Law to Governance 202 
The Political Construction of Federalism 206 
The New Deal, World War II, and the American State 216 
The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 225 
Postwar Politics 226 
The Reconstruction of American Federalism 231 
Conclusion 240 
Appendix A 250 
Appendix B 252 
Bibliography 253
!xi
List of Tables 
4.1  Federal Government Receipts and Expenditures, 1930-1950        220 
4.2 Government Employment and Compensation, Selected Years 1930-1950       224 
A1 Federal Grants to States and Localities, Selected Years 1930-1960       251
!xii
List of Figures 
2.1  Policymaking Process—Constitution           124 
2.2 Policymaking Process—Virginia Plan                      126 
4.1 Constructions of the State-Federal Relationship       210
4.2 State and Local Government Receipts, 1929-1955       222
4.3 Government Employment, 1929-1955       223
A1 State and Local Government Receipts, 1929-2015       250
A2 Per Capita Federal Government Expenditures, 1929-1955       250  
!xiii
Introduction: Federalism in American Political Development 
A central problematic of the American constitutional order, common to all federally 
organized  political  systems,  is  the  question  of  boundaries:  What  is  the  line  dividing 
national from subnational powers, and what is the logic underlying that demarcation? 
Absent a division of power or logic justifying such a division, the authoritative realms of 
action appropriate to each government would be difficult, if not impossible, to establish. 
More to the point, such a division or justifying logic is widely understood to be the sine 
qua non of a federal system.  Thus, without it, it isn’t clear what claim the system would 1
have to the designation “federal.”2
 According to the conventional definition, federalism is “a political organization in which the activities of 1
government are divided between regional governments and a central government in such a way that each 
kind  of  government  has  some  activities  on  which  it  makes  final  decisions.”  See  William  Riker, 
“Federalism,”  in  Handbook  of  Political  Science  (Fred  Greenstein  and  Nelson  Polsby  eds.)  (Addison-
Wesley,  1975),  101. In a more pithy expression of the same notion,  Jenna Bednar has identified three 
principal characteristics of federations: geopolitical division, independence, and direct effect. See Bednar, 
The Robust Federation: Principles of Design (Cambridge University Press, 2009), 18-19.
 This  is,  to  be  sure,  a  contested  proposition.  See,  for  example,  Richard  Primus,  “The  Limits  of 2
Enumeration,”  124  Yale  Law  Journal  576  (2014),  596  note  78  (dissenting  from  Rubin  and  Feeley’s 
distinction between decentralization and federalism).
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The boundary question is particularly apparent and felt especially acutely in polities, 
such as the United States, that have over the course of their existence endured significant 
changes in the distribution of powers among constituent governments.  The American 3
federal  system, for example,  is  frequently described as entailing a “balance” between 
state and federal power,  even a “delicate balance.”  What, then, if the balance is upset 4 5
with the shift  of a power or set of powers from one government to the other? Is the 
federal system “imbalanced,” out of sync with its intended structure or design? It would 
seem,  at  the  very  least,  that  each  successive  alteration  of  the  “state-federal  balance” 
would call into question the validity of the previous “balance” or its underlying rationale. 
Or is there a mechanism that allows for such changes and thus makes them reconcilable 
with the legal edifice that structures the political system? In back of all of these questions 
is a more basic inquiry: From where does this notion of “balance” come? At bottom, each 
of these interrogatives concerns the question of boundaries. Hence, any account of the 
nature,  development,  or  legitimacy  of  the  American  federal  system  must  provide  a 
response to the boundary question that makes sense of both the political institutions and 
processes established by the Constitution, as well as the epochal changes that system has 
undergone.
 See Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Harvard University Press,  1998);  and Robert 3
McCloskey, The American Supreme Court (5th ed.) (University of Chicago Press, 2010), especially 35-52 
and 91-204.
 See,  e.g.,  Gregory  v.  Ashcroft,  501  U.S.  452,  459  (1991)  (O’Connor,  J.,  majority)  (“If  this  ‘double 4
security’  is  to  be  effective,  there  must  be  a  proper  balance  between  the  States  and  the  Federal 
Government.”)
 Gregory v.  Ashcroft,  501 U.S.  452,  460 (O’Connor,  J.,  majority)  (“The Federal  Government holds a 5
decided advantage in this delicate balance[.]”), which is then cited in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 
144, 159 (O’Connor, J.,  majority); see also Wyeth v. Levine,  129 S.Ct. 1187, 1205 (2009) (Thomas, J., 
concurring)  (“[I]n  order  to  protect  the  delicate  balance  of  power  mandated  by  the  Constitution,  the 
Supremacy Clause must operate only in accordance with its terms.”).
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Intimately connected to—indeed, entailed by—the boundary question is the question 
of  sovereignty:  Which  governmental  level  possesses  ultimate  decisional  authority  on 
those  matters  within  governmental  purview?  According  to  one  quite  prominent 
interpretation, the “Framers split the atom of sovereignty,” creating a political order in 
which  “citizens  would  have  two political  capacities,  one  state  and  one  federal,  each 
protected from incursion by the other.”  The result of this political fission was a system of 6
dual sovereignty in which each level of government was sovereign with respect to certain 
objects. Based on this theory of sovereignty, the proper boundary line between state and 
national powers can be identified and, as was the case in the context of this account, 
enforced. Recent efforts to judicially enforce this conception of the federal boundary have 
revealed both the pervasiveness of sovereigntist rhetoric and the difficulty of formulating 
a stable account of the sovereign attributes or prerogatives of governmental levels.  These 7
difficulties,  in  turn,  have  produced  an  understandable  impatience  with  the  utility  of 
sovereignty as an organizing or foundational principle of the American federal system. 
 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), 838 (Kennedy, J., concurring).6
 For the pervasiveness of sovereignty rhetoric, see, e.g., Federal Maritime Commission v. SOU, 535 U.S. 7
743 (2002) (“By guarding against encroachments by the Federal Government on fundamental aspects of 
state sovereignty, such as sovereign immunity, we strive to maintain the balance of power embodied in our 
Constitution and thus to ‘reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.’”) This phenomenon is 
especially apparent in pro-state sovereign immunity decisions. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 
517 U.S.  44 (1996);  Alden v.  Maine,  527 U.S.  706 (1999);  College  Savings  Bank v.  Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999); and Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, 528 
U.S. 62 (2000). As is explored below, sovereignty exhibits many of the characteristics of what Jack Balkin 
has termed “nested” or “conceptual oppositions.” See Balkin, “Deconstruction’s Legal Career,” 27 Cardozo 
Law  Review  101  (2005);  and  “Nested  Oppositions,”  Faculty  Scholarship  Series,  Paper  281  (1990) 
(available at http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1280&context=fss_papers). 
As  for  the  difficulty  of  generating  a  stable  account  of  essential  or  traditional  sovereign  attributes, 
compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) and Garcia v. San Antonia Metropolitan 
Transit  Authority,  469 U.S.  528 (1985),  marking the interval  in which the Court  attempted to apply a 
framework  predicated  on  the  states’ “traditional  governmental  functions”  to  determine  the  scope  of 
permissible congressional regulation. 
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After all, if talk of sovereignty serves only to obscure rather than illuminate, why not 
dispense with it altogether? To wit, recent accounts of “Our Federalism” have sought to 
cabin questions of sovereignty, with some going as far as to call for a reconceptualization 
of the American federal system “[s]horn of the traditional trappings of sovereignty and 
separate spheres, detached from the notion that state autonomy matters above all else, 
[and] attentive to the rise of national power and the importance of national politics.”8
We  must  be  careful  to  acknowledge  that  the  result  of  the  sovereignty  centered 
approach, whether of the atom splitting or states’ rights variety, was not (or not merely) 
the creation of two opposing sovereigns. It  was, rather, the creation of two sovereign 
capacities  of  the  People.  This  rendering  reveals  the  doubly  complicated  nature  of 
sovereignty in the American constitutional order. On one hand, the competing sovereign 
claims of governments state and national must be resolved; and on the other, both of 
those claims must be reconciled with the foundational sovereignty of the people. Even as 
sovereignty  signifies  the  ultimate  rule  of  the  people—Lincoln’s  “political  community 
without  a  political  superior” —it  also  signifies  governmental  actors  with  “no  hight 9
enforcement agency—no political superior.”  This can be considered either the problem 10
or the promise of sovereignty in the American federal system. Assertions of governmental 
sovereignty, at either level, are always susceptible to objection by the sovereign people. 
Similarly,  sovereign  “prerogatives”  of  one  governmental  level  are  threatened  by 
infringements from the opposing level. Accordingly, a satisfactory account of the nature 
 Heather Gerken, “Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview,” 123 Yale Law Journal 1889 (2014), 8
1890.
 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in The Collected Works of 9
Abraham Lincoln, Roy P. Basler (ed.) (Rutgers University Press, 1953), 433.
 Sotirios A. Barber, The Fallacies of States’ Rights (Harvard University Press, 2012), 152.10
!4
and development of the American federal system must address the tensions that result 
from a political order that seeks to meaningfully realize popular sovereignty while also 
according sovereign status to the claims made on the people’s behalf by both the national 
and state governments.
This dissertation is motivated by the conviction that extant accounts of the nature and 
development  of  the  American  federal  system  fail  to  satisfy  one  or  both  of  the 
requirements identified above. To be more precise, by and large they offer a theoretically, 
analytically, or historically unsatisfactory response to the boundary question, the question 
of sovereignty, or both. These failures, moreover, are quite often linked. As noted above, 
certain accounts of  sovereignty strongly imply (if  not  entail)  certain responses to the 
boundary question. And conversely, certain notions of jurisdictional boundaries in the 
federal  system lead to  particular  notions  of  sovereignty.  As I  explain  below,  it  is  no 
coincidence that for the most part federalism scholarship has eschewed a developmental 
orientation,  for  the  prevailing  static  notions  of  jurisdictional  boundaries  and 
governmental  sovereignty  render  questions  of  development  and  change  matters  of 
incorrect, even unfaithful, interpretation. 
To be understood properly the American federal system must be studied as a dynamic 
and not a static system of self-government. In turn, such a perspective forces us to take 
stock of  the ways in which the federal  system itself  has changed over  the course of 
American political history, even as it has fundamentally shaped the course of that history. 
For too long federalism has been the independent variable in examinations of American 
politics,  conditioning political  phenomena but not itself  being a product of those and 
other forces. Federalism is both an independent and a dependent variable, both a cause 
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and  an  effect  of  American  political  development.  In  short,  we  must  be  at  least  as 
concerned  with  federalism in  American  political  development  as  we  have  been  with 
federalism and American political development. It is for this reason that the questions to 
which this dissertation is addressed—that of nature and development—are best thought of 
not as distinct questions but as inextricably connected dimensions of one question.
Central  to  the  account  of  American  federalism  that  I  advance  are  two  related 
arguments  about  the  nature  of  the  federal  system.  The first  is  that  the  Constitution’s 
definition of the state-federal relationship is structurally underdeterminate. By this I mean 
that, while the Constitution constrains the set of permissible state-federal relationships, it 
fixes no single definition.  Nowhere is the state-federal relationship comprehensively or 11
exhaustively explicated. Rather than establish a determinate state-federal relationship, the 
Constitution (1) establishes a range of parameters for the relationship, and (2) sets forth 
the legal and political processes through which that relationship is contested, defined, and 
revised.  As  a  result,  the  American  federal  system  both  shapes  and  is  shaped  by 
constitutionally structured politics. This is the principal reason why, as noted above, the 
state-federal  relationship  is  simultaneously  a  product  and  a  cause  of  political 
development. The second central argument picks up on an implication of the first. If the 
state-federal  relationship  is  contested  within  constitutional  parameters  and  that 
contestation  is  an  inherent  feature  of  constitutional  politics,  then  sovereignty  in  the 
 I  employ this notion of underdeterminacy—as well  as the term itself,  instead of “indeterminacy” or 11
“ambiguity”—in conformity with others who have addressed the question of the nature of constitutional 
powers  and the  degree  of  textual  constraint.  See,  e.g.,  Mariah  Zeisberg,  War Powers:  The  Politics  of 
Constitutional  Authority  (Princeton  University  Press,  2015),  5  note  23.  For  a  discussion  of 
underdeterminacy and its relation to related terms like “vagueness” and “ambiguity,” see Ralf Poscher, 
“Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation,” Oxford Handbook on Language and Law (Oxford 
University Press, 2011) (Lawrence Solum and Peter Tiersma eds.). 
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American order  has  two fundamental  characteristics.  First,  sovereignty is  constructed 
and, second, it is constructed relationally. This is the case because the contestation and 
elaboration of the state-federal relationship is a function of dialogue between and among 
institutionally embedded political actors. Constructions of sovereignty—of the scope and 
location of ultimate decisional authority—identify which institutions are empowered to 
act in certain ways and, by implication, which institutions are not. More fundamentally, 
these constructions identify how, with respect to legitimate exercises of constitutional 
authority, political institutions relate to one another. In this way, my account emphasizes 
the  relational  component  of  the  state-federal  relationship.  The  second  fundamental 
characteristic  follows  from  the  first:  Sovereignty  and  the  related  notion  of  limited 
government are endogenous to the constitutional order. This means that the state-federal 
relationship is the product of constitutionally structured politics, a direct consequence of 
the underdeterminacy of the federal system. The title of this dissertation, “The Politics of 
Sovereignty,” seeks to encapsulate the dynamism and conflict inherent in the American 
federal  system  while  also  foregrounding  the  enduring  salience  of  its  structural  and 
relational components. In the remainder of this Introduction I provide an overview of the 
dissertation. In the part that immediately follows, I identify and respond to the dominant 
methodological  approaches  to  the  study  of  American  federalism,  with  the  goal  of 
clarifying and justifying the approach taken here. The subsequent section then limn the 
contours of the arguments I advance in the four chapters that constitute the substantive 
core of the dissertation.
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American Federalism and the Boundary Question 
While there are many ways to organize the robust body of literature on the American 
federal  system,  it  is  advantageous  for  present  purposes  to  use  as  a  lens  the  answer, 
whether explicit or implicit, to the boundary question. In a recent review essay, Jenna 
Bednar  employs  such  a  schema,  identifying  four  forms  of  federalism  research:  (1) 
Optimal Design, (2) Positive Political Theory, (3) New Institutional Economics, and (4) 
Complex Adaptive Systems.  To situate this  dissertation in the extant  scholarship on 12
American federalism,  it  is  necessary to  include literatures  and methodologies  beyond 
those Bednar discusses. Thus, I’ve adapted that framework not only to include a wider 
body of relevant literature but also to include a fifth and sixth methodological approach: 
(5) American Political Development, and (6) normative theorizing about the nature of 
sovereignty and governmental boundaries in the federal system, which I term Historical-
Philosophical Analysis.
In the first section that follows I review the methodological approaches, identifying 
the central premises, presuppositions, and exemplars of each. I then critically evaluate 
these  approaches  in  the  second  section,  assessing  their  strengths  and  weaknesses.  A 
review  of  relevant  scholarship  reveals  that,  from  the  standpoint  of  the  theoretical 
framework outlined above, most accounts of American federalism fall short on at least 
one of three discrete but related counts: (1) they deny or ignore the underdeterminacy of 
the federal structure, (2) they are ahistorical, or (3) they are insufficiently solicitous of the 
role  of  politics  in  the  nature  and  development  of  the  federal  system.  But  two 
methodological approaches—American Development and Complex Adaptive Systems—
 Jenna  Bednar,  “The  Political  Science  of  Federalism,”  Annual  Review  of  Law  and  Social  Science 12
7:269-288 (2011).
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are  consistent  with  the  principles  of  underdeterminacy  and  developmental  analysis 
entailed by a sound understanding of the federal system. As such, they are best suited for 
answering  the  question  posed  at  the  outset  of  the  Introduction:  How has  the  federal 
system shaped and been shaped by American political and constitutional development? 
Methodological Approaches to American Federalism 
This  section  reviews  six  different  approaches  to  the  study  of  federal  systems. 
Although  there  is  considerable  overlap  among  the  approaches  and  their  associated 
literatures,  they  are  nonetheless  distinguishable  on  the  basis  of  their  fundamental 
understanding of (a) what a federal system is, and (b) how a federal system should be 
studied.  As  a  result,  these  approaches  are  fairly  conceived  of  as  the  six  dominant 
methodological  orientations  in  federalism  scholarship,  all  of  which  take  as  their 
animating inquiry the boundary question or the nature of sovereignty in federal systems.  
1. Optimal Design: Federalism as a Means to an End  
According  to  the  optimal  design  approach,  federalism is  a  means  to  achieving  a 
desired  end.  A properly  designed federal  system is  one  that  sufficiently  achieves  the 
stipulated end. The precise nature of that end (or those ends) varies from observer to 
observer.  For  William Riker  and  John  Jay,  writing  as  Publius,  it  is  security  both 13 14
 Riker, Federalim: Origin, Operation, Significance (Little, Brown, 1964).13
 See especially The Federalist, No. 9. 14
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foreign and domestic.  For Jenna Bednar,  John Kincaid,  and Daniel Ziblatt,   it  is 15 16 17
economic  stability  or  performance.  For  James  Madison,  writing  as  Publius,  it  is  the 
protection of individual rights.  In this he is joined by Michael Zuckert, Randy Barnett, 18
and, more broadly, the line of thinkers associated with the negative (or natural) rights 
approach to American constitutionalism.  In other of his writings Madison argued that a 19
well-designed federal  system could  yield  representative  outcomes  congruent  with  the 
governmental levels to be represented: local interests could be generated at the state level 
and general  interests  at  the  national.  Examples  could  be  multiplied  further,  but  the 20
aforementioned suffice to establish the point that there are numerous political ends for 
which it has been argued that federalism can be a means. 
Though the putative political, social, and economic ends differ, these accounts are 
united in their approach to federalism as an independent variable. The federal system is 
the condition that influences the outcome of a dependent variable—the end or ends under 
consideration. In some studies the question of federalism’s influence is slightly different. 
 Bednar, The Robust Federation.15
 Kincaid, “Values and Value Tradeoffs in Federalism,” Publius 25(2):29-44 (1995).16
 Ziblatt,  Structuring  the  State:  The  Formation  of  Italy  and  Germany  and  the  Puzzle  of  Federalism 17
(Princeton University Press, 2006).
 The Federalist, No. 51. But see also No. 10 (arguing that rights are best secured in an extended republic 18
in  which  the  formation  of  factions  is  more  difficult  than  in  a  smaller  republic).  For  a  contemporary 
exposition  of  this  argument,  see  Ilya  Somin,  Democracy  and  Political  Ignorance:  Why  Smaller 
Government  is  Smarter  (Stanford  University  Press,  2013).  For  an  in-depth  treatment  of  the  question 
whether (and when) federalism protects individual rights, see Owen Lipsett, “The Failure of Federalism: 
Does Competitive Federalism Actually Protect Individual Rights?” 10 Journal of Constitutional Law 643 
(2008).
 See  Michael  P.  Zuckert,  The  Natural  Rights  Republic:  Studies  in  the  Foundation  of  the  American 19
Political  Tradition  (University  of  Notre  Dame  Press,  1997);  and  Randy  Barnett,  Restoring  the  Lost 
Constitution (Princeton University Press, 2007).
 Madison, The Federalist, Nos. 37 and 39.20
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Instead of  approaching federalism as an optimization mechanism, it  is  deployed as a 
structural or environmental condition that influences outcomes in specific policy arenas 
or for particular demographic groups. This is readily apparent from the titles in this genre
—Mettler’s Dividing Citizens: Gender and Federalism in New Deal Public Policy  and 21
Miller’s The Perils of Federalism: Race, Poverty, and the Politics of Crime Control  are 22
two illustrative  examples.  Additionally,  the  focus  on optimal  design has  led  some to 
invert the inquiry, looking instead for the suboptimal consequences of federalism. Thus, 
to  cite  just  one  such  work,  Craig  Volden  has  shown  how  in  situations  with  high 
heterogeneity of government services and low subnational efficiency in service provision, 
both  levels  of  government  engage  in  service  provision,  frequently  leading  to  greater 
levels  of  spending  and  taxation  than  would  be  necessary  under  single-government 
provision.  For  the  Optimal  Design  approach,  then,  federalism  is  conceived  of 23
principally as a means to achieving certain ends. Accordingly, the federal system is the 
(or one of the) independent variable(s) and is of interest mainly for the ways in which it 
influences governmental performance with respect to stipulated dependent variables. 
2. Positive Political Theory: Federalism and Competitive Interests  
Positive Political  Theory (PPT) approaches the distribution of authority in federal 
systems not as the independent variable but as the dependent variable, itself the result of 
 Suzanne  Mettler,  Dividing  Citizens:  Gender  and  Federalism  in  New  Deal  Public  Policy  (Cornell 21
University Press, 1998).
 Lisa  Miller,  The  Perils  of  Federalism:  Race,  Poverty,  and  the  Politics  of  Crime  Control  (Oxford 22
University Press, 2008).
 Craig C. Volden, “Intergovernmental Political Competition in American Federalism,” American Journal 23
of Political Science 49(2):327-342 (2005).
!11
political  and  economic  phenomena.  As  Bednar  writes,  reflecting  on  Parikh  and 
Weingast’s 1997 study, PPT begins from the premise that “the distribution of authority is 
not a sterile line but instead represents the distribution of power, and power is the stuff of 
politics.”  The result is an understanding of federal systems as the rules that structure 24
coordination  problems,  problems  whose  solutions  define  a  distribution  of  state  and 
federal authority. As intimated by the centrality of coordination problems, this approach 
is  heavily informed by economic approaches to political  analysis,  principally rational 
choice and noncooperative game theory.  25
It is important to acknowledge that for PPT a federal system is treated as a collection 
of authority distributions. Granting the basic premise of PPT, it would be improper—even 
unintelligible—to claim that  “federalism is  x,”  where  x  is  a  distribution of  state  and 
federal  power.  This  is  so  because  there  are  numerous  policy  spaces  and  political-
economic interactions encompassed by the federal system, from which it follows that the 
distributions of authority in a particular federal system are functions of the dynamics 
appropriate to particular political and economic issues. Hence, it would be more proper to 
say that for issue x, the authority distribution is governed by f(x), where f(x) defines the 
factors that bear on the behavior of governmental and relevant private actors that, in turn, 
yields  an  authority  distribution relevant  to  x.  The focus  for  PPT are  the  products  of 
politics—i.e., differentiated authority distributions—not its causes—i.e.,  the overarching 
rules that structure the federal system under examination. 
 Bednar,  “The  Political  Science  of  Federalism,”  275.  Sunita  Parikh  and  Barry  R.  Weingast,  “A 24
Comparative Theory of Federalism: India,” 83 Virginia Law Review 1593 (1997).
 Bednar, id., 275. See, e.g., Ellinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for 25
Collective Actions. (Cambridge, 1990). 
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Among  the  principal  insights  identified  by  this  approach  is  the  recognition  that 
governmental actors in federal systems will frequently face incentives to free ride, act 
non-cooperatively,  or  otherwise  violate  authority  boundaries  dividing  levels  of 
government. In the American context this insight appeared as early as 1787 when, in his 
“Vices of  the Political  System of  the United States,”  James Madison argued that  the 
signal weakness of the Articles of Confederation was the possibility—and, therefore, the 
likelihood—that  absent  effective  institutional  mechanisms  it  would  often  be  in  the 
interest  of  subnational  governments to violate their  commitments or  obligations (e.g., 
financial requisitions and troop commitments) to the national government.  Overcoming 26
this obstacle would require the establishment of a national government strong enough to 
enforce the commitments of subnational governments and empowered to act directly on 
citizens rather than having to work through the states.  This approach has also led to 27
insights  about  the  prospects  of  and  conditions  favorable  for  cooperation  between 
governmental levels following the establishment of a competent central authority.  In 28
contrast to the Optimal Design approach, for Positive Political Theory federalism is the 
(or a) dependent variable, and the central object of analysis is the authority distribution 
produced by the behavior of rationally motivated political and economic actors. 
 On this, and particularly the examples cited, see Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked 26
States: The Meaning of the Founders’ Constitution (Cambridge University Press, 2005).
 The Federalist, Nos. 23-29.27
 For  a  sampling  of  the  considerable  literature  on  cooperative  federalism,  see  Heather  K.  Gerken, 28
“Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,” 124 Harvard Law Review 4 (2009), sources cited in note 15.
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3. New Institutional Economics: Federalism as Safeguards  
Whereas  the  Positive  Political  Economy  approach  focuses  on  the  authority 
distributions produced by interactions of rationally motivated governmental actors, the 
New Institutional Economics approach is concerned with the institutions that regulate 
those interactions and the incentives faced by political actors. Put differently, and in the 
terms of the literature produced by this approach, New Institutional Economics is most 
concerned with the institutions and processes that safeguard the federal system. It is these 
safeguards that ostensibly preserve the boundaries of the system. Such safeguards can 
take  the  form  of  either  “carrots”  (i.e.,  incentives  for  compliance)  or  “sticks”  (i.e., 
penalties  for  noncompliance),  and  both  forms  require  mechanisms  that  “trigger”  the 
safeguard’s  operation.  As  Filippov,  Ordeshook,  and  Shvetsova  argue,  three  central 29
“levels”  of  safeguards  (or  constraints)  can  be  identified.  The  first  level  entails 30
“constraints that correspond in part to explicit bargains among federal subjects over the 
allocation of authority between them and the federal center, and other limits on their and 
the center’s actions.”  These protections consist of clear textual commitments identifying 31
the extent of and limitations on the powers granted and prohibited, as well as promises 
guaranteeing autonomy in certain spheres. Level-two constraints encompass institutional 
structures and arrangements,  both of which “define[] the national state,  its  relation to 
federal subjects, and its relation to the ultimate sovereign, the people.”  Finally, level-32
 Bednar, “The Political Science of Federalism,” 278.29
 Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova, Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-30
Sustaining Federal Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 33-41.
 Id., 36.31
 Ibid.32
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three  constraints  are  the  values—political,  cultural,  and  ideological—that  serve  to 
buttress the federal system. 
A prominent  safeguard,  as  common  as  it  is  significant,  is  a  constitutional  court 
empowered  to  preserve  the  federal  bargain  by  reviewing  acts  of  both  governmental 
levels.  Indeed, it was the perceived aggrandizement of the Supreme Court, owing in no 33
small part to its exercise of this review power, that led Alexander Bickel to raise the 
specter  of  the “countermajoritarian difficulty,” the shadow of which has loomed over 
modern  constitutional  theory.  Nevertheless,  the  literature  on  the  American  federal 34
system has, since Herbert Wechsler’s seminal 1954 article on the “political safeguards of 
federalism,”  focused  disproportionately  on  structural  safeguards—the  institutional 
features of the political order through which subnational interests are incorporated into 
the national decision-making process.  This argument runs directly counter to the court-35
as-safeguard argument, because it identifies structural reasons why judicial review of the 
federal system isn’t needed and, indeed, shouldn’t be desired.  Following Wechsler, and 36
 See Jenna Bednar and William Eskridge, “Steadying the Court’s Unsteady Path: A Theory of Judicial 33
Reinforcement of Federalism,” 68 Southern California Law Review 1447 (1995); Richard E. Johnston, The 
Effect  of  Judicial  Review  on  Federal-State  Relations  in  Australia,  Canada,  and  the  United  States 
(Louisiana  State  University  Press,  1969);  and  Alec  Stone  Sweet,  “Constitutional  Courts,”  in  Oxford 
Handbook of Comparative Constitutional Law (Oxford University Press,  2012), 816-830. See also The 
Federalist, No. 78.
 Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch (Bobbs-Merrill, 1962). On this last point, see Mark A. Graber, “The 34
Countermajoritarian Difficulty: From Courts to Congress to Constitutional Order,” Annual Review of Law 
and Social Science 4:361-384 (2008).
 Wechsler,  “The Political  Safeguards  of  Federalism:  The Role  of  the  States  in  the  Composition and 35
Selection of the National Government,” 54 Columbia Law Review 543 (1954)
 See  especially  Jesse  H.  Choper,  Judicial  Review and  the  National  Political  Process:  A Functional 36
Reconsideration of the Role of the Supreme Court (University of Chicago Press, 1980). 
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responding to the objections his argument provoked,  a number of scholars have sought 37
to identify other safeguards of the federal system, including political parties  and the 38
separation of powers.  Still others, echoing the level-three constraint of Filippov et al., 39
have argued for popular safeguards of the federal system, consisting in the attachments, 
commitments, and values of the electorate. Despite their many differences, the works that 
comprise this body of literature are united in their treatment of federalism as a system 
that, for divergent reasons, must in some way be supervised and maintained, either by 
political actors or, more often, political institutions. 
4. Complex Adaptive Systems: Federalism as a Constructed System  
The  three  methodological  approaches  discussed  above  all  presuppose  a  relatively 
limited timeframe in which the relevant political phenomena occur. For studies motivated 
by the Positive Political Theory approach, for instance, the interval is usually only as long 
as the interactions that produce the relevant authority distributions. And for much of the 
Optimal Design literature, the interval is more or less irrelevant, as it is the performance 
relative to the stipulated political end or social good that is of greatest interest. Moreover, 
insofar  as  federalism  is  treated  as  an  independent  variable—as  it  largely  is  for  the 
Optimal Design and New Institutional Economics approaches—the distribution of state-
 See, e.g., John C. Yoo, “The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,” 70 Southern California Law Review 37
1311 (1997) and Saikrishna B. Prakash and John C. Yoo, “The Puzzling Persistence of Process-Based 
Federalism Theories,” 79 Texas Law Review 1459 (2001).
 Larry D. Kramer, “Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism,” 100 Columbia 38
Law Review 215 (2000) (opposing judicial review to protect the states from Congress on the grounds that 
political parties and national party politics preserve federalism).
 Bradford R. Clark, “Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of Federalism,” 79 Texas Law Review 1321 39
(2001).
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federal authority or the rules structuring the federal system enter into the analyses only as 
causes, not consequences, of the examined political processes. 
It  is  towards  these  last  characteristics  and  tendencies  that  the  fourth  approach, 
Complex  Adaptive  Systems,  is  directed.  As  Bryan  Jones  describes  it,  “Complex 40
adaptive systems consist of a large number of diverse components, or agents, that interact 
and that produce an aggregate output behavior.”  This approach is founded on a twofold 41
recognition.  First,  that  “system  properties  emerge  that  are  not  predictable  when  the 
analysis is confined to the linear aggregation of individual components.”  And second, 42
that federal systems do not rest in equilibrium. Violations of jurisdictional boundaries—in 
consequence or intention—are not the exception to the rule; they are the norm. Federal 
systems, therefore, must be approached as systems, not as a collection of independently 
operating parts. Moreover, changes to the federal boundaries must be endogenized. That 
 For  general  background,  see  John  Miller  and  Scott  E.  Page,  Complex  Adaptive  Systems  (Princeton 40
University Press, 2007); and Jason Brownlee, “Complex Adaptive Systems,” Complex Intelligent Systems 
Laboratory,  Technical  Report  0703021  (available  at  http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?
doi=10.1.1.70.7345&rep=rep1&type=pdf).  In  the  legal  literature,  see  J.B.  Ruhl,  “The  Fitness  of  Law: 
Using Complexity Theory to Describe the Evolution of Law and Society and Its Practical Meaning for 
Democracy,” 49 Vanderbilt Law Review 1407 (1996); and Greg Todd Jones, “Dynamical Jurisprudence: 
Law as a Complex System,” 24 Georgia State Law Review 873 (2008). 
Though left unacknowledged by Bednar, the Complex Adaptive Systems approach has already been 
used  to  great  effect  in  political  science  research.  For  example,  see  Elinor  Ostrom,  Understanding 
Institutional Diversity (Princeton University Press, 2005). There Ostrom writes, in a passage particularly 
relevant to the study of federal systems, “Polycentric systems are themselves complex, adaptive systems 
without one central authority dominating all of the others” (284). See also Bryan D. Jones and Frank R. 
Baumgartner, The Politics of Information: Problem, Definition, and the Course of Public Policy in America 
(University  of  Chicago  Press,  2015),  especially  chapter  1;  and  “From  There  to  Here:  Punctuated 
Equilibrium to the General Punctuation Thesis to a Theory of Government Information Processing,” The 
Policy Studies Journal 40(1):1-19 (2012).
 Bryan  D.  Jones,  Politics  and  the  Architecture  of  Choice:  Bounded  Rationality  and  Governance 41
(University  of  Chicago Press,  2001),  6.  It  is  important  to  note  that  Jones’s  usage  is  directed  towards 
“human behavior in formal complex institutions” (ix; i.e., human organizations), though not necessarily 
federal systems (i.e., governmental organizations).
 Bednar, “The Political Science of Federalism,” 280.42
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is, accounts of the federal system must treat the line dividing governmental levels as both 
a cause and an effect of political phenomena. Federalism is both an independent and a 
dependent variable, a product as much as a source of American political development. 
Though the implications of this approach haven’t been fully brought to bear on the 
study of the American federal system, its influence is nonetheless readily apprehensible. 
Indeed, it is more prevalent than is suggested by Bednar’s review. There is a long, though 
not necessarily well travelled, avenue of inquiry in the American political thought and 
development literatures that acknowledges the contested nature of the federal system and, 
as a result, its openness to redefinition and change. Thus, in his study of The Federalist, 
David Epstein could write, “While the Constitution does enumerate the objects of the 
central government, the partition between states and nation will not be as much a legal 
issue as a political one.”  For Keith Whittington, “[f]ederalism is best thought of not as a 43
specified  intermediate  position  between  confederation  and  nation,  but  rather  as  a 
continuing  tension  contained  within,  and  created  by,  the  founding  document.”  The 44
consequence,  drawing  on  Whittington’s  work  elsewhere,  is  that  the  contours  of  the 
federal system are defined through constitutional construction, “the method of elaborating 
 Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist (University of Chicago Press, 1984), 53. This argument 43
draws on The Federalist, Nos. 17, 29, 35, 37, 45, and 46.
 Whittington, “The Political Constitution of Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification Debate 44
as  an  Illustration  of  Informal  Mechanisms  of  Constitutional  Change,”  Publius  26(2),  1.  The  passage 
continues: “Partly because of that ambiguity, the resolution of that tension is a political, and not merely a 
legal task that has fallen on subsequent generations since the founding...Although the foundations for the 
ultimate structure are taken as given, political actors must bring external values and interests to bear in 
order  to  add specificity  to  an inherently  indeterminate  text  and change received understandings of  its 
implications.  Such  political  efforts  do  not  merely  reshuffle  the  administration  of  intergovernmental 
relations, but construct the principled configuration of federalism within which such political debates can 
then take place” (1-2; emphases added).
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constitutional  meaning  in  the  political  realm.”  In  the  most  developed  work  in  this 45
tradition,  Edward  Purcell  offers  an  impressive  dissection  of  the  “doubly  blurred, 
fractionated,  instrumental,  and  contingent  nature  of  the  constitutional  structure,”  a 46
structure that resists the imposition of a determinate relationship between the national and 
state governments. The common thread uniting these analyses is the observation that the 
state-federal relationship is a feature of the political order that both shapes and is shaped 
by the politics the Constitution structures.
5. American Political Development  
According to its most prominent exponents, American Political Development (APD) 
is  guided by the  theoretical  insight  that  “because a  polity  in  all  its  different  parts  is 
constructed historically, over time, the nature and prospects of any single part will be best 
understood within the long course of political formation.”  Central to this approach is the 47
commitment that development is a defining characteristic of politics. Moreover, for this 
approach there is a very specific notion of political development: “Political development 
is  a  durable  shift  in  governing authority.”  Politics,  then,  for  the  American Political 48
Development approach is irreducibly temporal and inherently developmental. As such, 
 Whittington, Constitutional Construction (Harvard University Press, 1999), 1.45
 Purcell, Federalism, Originalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise (Yale University Press, 46
2007),  6.  David  Brian  Robertson  presents  a  similar  interpretation  of  the  federal  system,  noting  the 
“unsettled dividing line between state and national power” that “left the ensuing boundary disputes for 
future politicians to work through.” See Federalism and the Making of America (Routledge, 2012), 34.
 Orren and Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge University Press, 47
2004), 1. As they write elsewhere, American Political Development “grapples with what we describe as the 
historical construction of politics, and with political arrangements of different origins in time operating 
together” (x).
 Ibid., 123.48
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those seeking to explain political  phenomena must  attend assiduously to the ways in 
which political institutions persist through time, change over time, and are constructed by 
political time.
The emphasis of APD on “shift[s] in governing authority” as a fundamental unit of 
political analysis would, at first blush, seem particularly well suited to the examination of 
the boundary question in the context of the American federal system, particularly in light 
of the argument about underdeterminacy and development presented at the outset of this 
Introduction.  More  to  the  point,  we  should  expect  this  kind  of  work  from  a 
methodological approach that accords such importance to the temporal dimensions of 
political  analysis.  It  is,  therefore,  more  than  a  little  surprising  that  federalism  has 
remained largely under-theorized and exempt from developmental analysis. In their 2004 
survey of the emergent disciplinary focus, Karen Orren and Stephen Skowronek have 
surprisingly little to say about the treatment of federalism in the extant literature, largely 
because there is little work to discuss. Where it is discussed, it is presented in a strikingly 
static way, as if the federal system were exempt from the fundamental theoretical insight 
of  APD.  Broadening  the  focus  to  include  works  that  treat  more  general  aspects  of 49
temporality and politics, we find a similar state of affairs. Paul Pierson’s Politics in Time, 
for example, identifies federalism as a promising subject of future inquiry, reflecting the 
 See, e.g., id., 10, 86, 115, 131, and 190.49
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general dearth of work that takes seriously the relevance of the dynamics he highlights—
path dependence, positive feedback, sequencing, and layering—to federal systems.50
6. Historical-Philosophical Analysis: Federalism as a Theory of Sovereignty  
The body of  work most  conspicuous in  its  absence from Bednar’s  review is  that 
which approaches the federal system as embodying a theory of sovereignty on the basis 
of  which  the  boundary  question  can be  addressed.  These  theories  of  sovereignty  are 
derived  and  explicated  through  either  historical  or  philosophical  methods,  or  some 
combination of the two. Accordingly, for present purposes the literature characterized by 
this approach can be categorized as employing a methodology of Historical-Philosophical 
Analysis.  The distinguishing feature of this  approach is  the conception of the federal 
system as expressing a definitive theory of political power and its organization, which 
theory  is  articulated  by  the  constitutional  text  and  made  manifest  by  the  institutions 
established by the Constitution. It is against this theory that interpretations or applications 
of the federal system can be evaluated and conclusions of their accuracy reached. 
Despite  their  common  methodological  approach,  works  in  this  vein  posit 
interpretations  of  the  American  federal  system  that  exist  in  some  tension  with  one 
another. Sotirios Barber, for example, has argued that the “true constitutional federalism” 
is “Marshallian federalism,” which “insists that national power is plenary and denies that 
 Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton University Press, 50
2004), 162. See also Pierson, “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” 
Studies in American Political Development 14(1):72-91 (2000). Pierson’s article appears as the lead piece 
in a forum that includes quite relevant pieces from Robert Jervis,  Kathleen Thelen, and Amy Bridges. 
While there are important differences between and among the contributing authors, they are united in the 
belief that temporal processes are fundamentally important to political and social analysis. 
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the states can use their powers to check the pursuit of national ends.”  “Clashes with the 51
states  are  irrelevant,”  Barber  argues,  so  long  as  Congress  is  pursuing  legitimate 
constitutional goods.  This is a federalism that both affirms limited national aims and 52
denies states’ rights against the national government.  The nature of Barber’s account—53
the explication of  a  coherent  philosophical  and legal  description of  the constitutional 
regime—is revealed also by the counterarguments he addresses, states’ rights federalism 
and process federalism, both of which posit a contrary overarching theory of sovereignty 
in  the  federal  system.  Barber’s  strategy  reveals  a  central  commitment  of  Historical-
Philosophical Analysis literature, namely that “it takes a theory to beat a theory.”  The 54
salient  assumption  of  this  approach  is  that  there  exists  a  single,  definitive  theory  of 
sovereignty in the American federal system, a true  interpretation of the constitutional 
regime. 
As identified by Barber’s argument in behalf of Marshallian federalism, states’ rights 
and process federalism are two alternative theories of sovereignty. For the states’ rights 
theorist, the boundary question is resolved by the states’ possession of certain inviolable 
 Barber, The Fallacies of States’ Rights, 47.51
 Sotirios Barber, The Fallacies of States’ Rights, 6. Barber’s understanding of the federal system both 52
follows  from  and  extends  his  welfarist  interpretation  of  the  Constitution,  according  to  which  the 
government established by the Constitution must be understood primarily from the perspective of the ends 
it was created to achieve. See Barber, Welfare and the Constitution (Princeton University Press, 2005), 
chapters 2 and 5; On What the Constitution Means (Johns Hopkins University Press,  1986); and “The 
Fallacies of Negative Constitutionalism,” 75 Fordham Law Review 651 (2006).
 Barber, The Fallacies of States’ Rights, 8 (Figure 1).53
 The first instance of this assertion in the legal literature appears in Richard Epstein, “Common Law, 54
Labor Law, and Reality: A Rejoinder to Professors Getman and Kohler,” 92 Yale Law Journal 1435 (1983), 
at 1435.
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political  capacities  and  jurisdictional  prerogatives.  In  contradistinction,  process 55
federalism maintains that national power is plenary so long as the states have been able to 
participate in the decision-making processes as defined by the Constitution.  For others 56
the  federal  system established  by  the  Constitution  is  characterized  by  an  absence  of 
constitutional  principles  guaranteeing any particular  distribution of  political  powers.  57
Thus, in his reflection on the history of the federal system, Charles Black concludes that 
there is no legal substance to American federalism.  While seemingly eschewing any 58
overarching theory of federalism, this too is a theory of political sovereignty, simply one 
that grounds ultimate political authority in popular endorsement and not determinative 
legal axioms.  59
The debate over the “true” understanding of constitutional federalism has of late been 
reinvigorated  by  the  publication  of  a  symposium  in  the  Yale  Law  Journal,  each 
contribution of which was written to probe and advance the proposition that “federalism 
 For a sampling of the primary sources related to this position, see Alpheus T. Mason, The States Rights 55
Debate: Antifederalist and the Constitution (2nd ed.) (Oxford University Press, 1972). For the historical 
salience of the states’ rights position, see Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, 
States’ Rights, and the Nullification Crisis (Oxford University Press, 1989); and Forrest McDonald, States’ 
Rights and the Union: Imperium in Imperio, 1776-1876 (rev. ed.) (University Press of Kansas, 2000).
 See sources cited supra  notes 37, 38, 40, and 41. The categorization of this literature as both New 56
Institutional Economics and Historical-Philosophical Analysis illustrates the fundamental truth that these 
approaches are more about methodological emphases than mutually exclusive presuppositions.
 Black, “On Worrying About the Constitution,” 55 University of Colorado Law Review 469 (1984). See 57
also Black, Perspectives in Constitutional Law (Prentice Hall, 1970), 25-29.
 Charles Black, “On Worrying About the Constitution,” id. Edward Purcell would endorse this conclusion 58
but, crucially, for different reasons than Black. See, Purcell, Federalism, Originalism, and the American 
Constitutional Enterprise (Yale University Press, 2007), 201.
 Black, ibid. See also H. Jefferson Powell, “The Oldest Question of Constitutional Law,” 79 Virginia Law 59
Review 633 (1993). 
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is the new nationalism.”  To wit, Heather Gerken, in the culmination of a years long 60
effort,  announced the arrival of a “descriptive and normative account [of federalism] 61
that  is  deeply  nationalist  in  character.”  While  written  explicitly  in  the  context  of  a 62
particular  era  of  state-federal  relations,  these  pieces  are  nonetheless  aimed  towards 
advancing a new theory of constitutional federalism. Though at times divided in the most 
fundamental and consequential respects, the Historical-Philosophical Analysis literature 
is characterized by a commitment to understanding the federal system as embodying a 
coherent theory of sovereignty and state-federal relations. 
Response: Towards a Developmental Account of American Federalism  
It would be an exaggeration to claim that the methodological orientations discussed 
above are all wrong. What’s more, it would be wrong to do so, because each picks up on 
some indispensable feature of the federal system. The problem is not that they are flawed 
but that they are incomplete. Though these approaches recognize and pursue important 
dimensions of the American federal system, they either disregard other important features 
or fail  to make good on their methodological commitments. The problems with these 
approaches fall under two heads, both of which follow from rejecting or disregarding the 
 Gerken, “Federalism as the New Nationalism: An Overview,” 123 Yale Law Journal 1889 (2014), at 60
1889.  The  Symposium  includes  the  following  pieces:  Jessica  Bulman-Pozen,  “From  Sovereignty  and 
Process  to  Administration and Politics:  The Afterlife  of  American Federalism”;  Heather  Gerken,  “The 
Loyal Opposition”; Abbe Gluck, “Our [National] Federalism”; Alison L. LaCroix, “The Shadow Powers of 
Article I”; and Cristina M. Rodríguez, “Negotiating Conflict Through Federalism: Institutional and Popular 
Perspectives.”
 Heather  K.  Gerken,  “The  Loyal  Opposition,”  123  Yale  Law Journal  1958  (2014);  “Uncooperative 61
Federalism,” 118 Yale Law Journal 1256 (2009); “Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,” 124 Harvard 
Law Review 4 (2010); “Federalism(s),” 53 William & Marry Law Review 1549 (2012); and “Exit, Voice, 
and Disloyalty,” 62 Duke Law Journal 1349 (2013).
 Gerken, supra note 62, 1890.62
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underdeterminacy  of  the  federal  system.  Two  approaches,  American  Political 
Development and Complex Adaptive Systems, avoid these problems in theory, though, as 
well  shall  see,  the  practical  applications  of  these  approaches  have  yet  to  produce  a 
satisfactory  account  of  the  development  of  American  federalism.  Correcting  these 
practical shortcomings and realizing the benefits of the methodological approaches best 
suited to the American federal system would require pursuing a research agenda along the 
lines of that proposed and pursued in this dissertation. 
The first problem is that for four of the approaches surveyed federalism is treated as 
the independent  variable.  Of these,  three explicitly endorse such treatment,  while  the 
remaining approach does so in violation of its methodological commitments. To start, the 
Optimal Design and New Institutional Economics literatures both conceive of federalism 
as  a  feature  of  politics  (or  the  political  environment)  that  conditions  governmental 
performance on stipulated metrics. This is most apparent in the Optimal Design literature. 
Consider, for example, Baumgartner and Jones’s treatment of the post-New Deal federal 
system, in which they conclude that the portion of subnational budgets devoted to certain 
purposes  are  significantly  impacted  by  federal  grant-in-aid  programs.  This  study  is 63
deeply important, but no mention is made of the epochal changes in the legal, political, 
and social foundations of the federal system over the nearly five decades they examine. 
As a result, it can help us understand only part of the federal system, namely its role in 
conditioning political outputs. 
Unlike the  Optimal  Design approach,  New Institutional  Economics  does  not  start 
from the premise that federalism is an independent variable. Rather, it begins with the 
 Frank R.  Baumgartner  and Bryan D.  Jones,  Agendas and Instability  in  American Politics  (2nd ed.) 63
(University of Chicago Press, 2009), 216-234.
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institutions  and  processes  that  safeguard  the  federal  system.  Nevertheless,  the 
consequences of the latter are the same as those of the former. This is the case because, to 
the extent New Institutional Economics is concerned with safeguarding a federal system, 
it presupposes a certain kind or substance of federalism that is to be preserved. Thus, 
though it may do so only implicitly, New Institutional Economics treats federalism as an 
independent variable and is, as a result, unable to account for changes in the configuration 
of state and federal powers as well as the significance of those changes for the safeguards 
examined. This is precisely the objection that has been made to the Wechslerian approach 
to political safeguards, and the recognition that has motivated attempts to resurrect that 
approach.  For  studies  in  the vein of  the Historical-Philosophical  Analyses  approach 64
there is less of a concern with government performance or political outputs; thus, the 
dependent-independent variable framework may not be apt. Nonetheless, to the extent 
that an overarching theory of jurisdictions or boundaries is posited—which is precisely 
what this approach sets out to do—the effect is the same. The “true” or appropriate state-
federal relationship is stipulated and various phenomena are evaluated on that basis, thus 
leaving little room for the incorporation of changes to the federal system. Most often, 
variations  in  state  and  federal  powers  are  interpreted  as  failures  to  approximate  the 
correct understanding of the federal system.  65
For  all  three  of  these  approaches,  treating  the  federal  system as  an  independent 
variable—as something that structures but is not itself structured by political processes—
 The most  prominent  instance  of  this  is  Larry  Kramer,  “Putting  the  Politics  Back  into  the  Political 64
Safeguards  of  Federalism.”  But  also  see  Bradford  Clark,  “Separation  of  Powers  as  a  Safeguard  of 
Federalism.”
 See, e.g., Barber, The Fallacies of States’ Rights, chapters 4-6.65
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precludes the recognition or incorporation of changes in the nature of the federal system. 
It  is  precisely  this  shortcoming  that  American  Political  Development  is  ostensibly 
intended to remedy. For studies in this tradition, political development is the cornerstone 
of the methodology. But as intimated in the earlier discussion of APD, this commitment 
has not been faithfully applied. The leading APD treatments of federalism fall into the 
independent  variable  problem outlined  above.  For  instance,  Robertson’s  suggestively 
titled Federalism and the Making of America forcefully recognizes the underdeterminacy 
of  the  federal  system but  then  proceeds  in  a  manner  similar  to  the  Optimal  Design 
literature, showing how federalism structured political, social, and economic outcomes 
and accepts only out of necessity the drastic changes in the state-federal relationship. 
Where this error is avoided, as in some of Whittington’s work,  the interval examined is 66
too  brief  to  truly  make good on the  recognition  that  constitutional  underdeterminacy 
anticipates iterated political constructions of the federal system in which later episodes 
are, to a great extent,  constrained and shaped by earlier episodes. While he has done 
yeoman’s  work illustrating how underdeterminacy shaped the Nullification Crisis,  his 
study covers just three years (1830-1833), thus posing as many questions as it answers. 
Hence,  the  analytical  and  explanatory  merits  identified  by  the  methodological 
commitments of American Political Development have yet to be realized. 
The second problem concerns the imposition of an exogenous definition of the state-
federal  relationship,  a  flaw  closely  related  to  treating  the  federal  system  as  the 
independent variable. As when federalism is an independent variable, federalism as an 
exogenous  definition  makes  the  empirical  reality  of  changes  to  the  state-federal 
 See Whittington, “The Political Constitution of Federalism” and Constitutional Construction, 72-112.66
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relationship difficult to incorporate and assess on terms consistent with the approach. As 
just noted this is most apparent in the Historical-Philosophical Analysis literature, for 
which such a definition is the principal focus. Faced with understandings that conflict 
with the proffered definition,  this approach tends to treat  such variations as just  that: 
deviations from the proper legal, political, or historical meaning. Seeking to avoid such 
judgments, some of this literature has opted for framework understandings of the federal 
system  that  identify  broad  parameters  of  permissibility  and  legality.  This  is  an 67
improvement over rigid exogenous definitions, but in practice these studies still haven’t 
faced  up  to  the  reality  of  the  federal  system’s  inherent  underdeterminacy  and  the 
consequent need for political elaborations of the state-federal relationship. 
A principal consequence of constitutional underdeterminacy, identified most clearly 
by the commitments of the Complex Adaptive Systems approach, is that the definition of 
both  the  state-federal  relationship  and  the  theory  of  sovereignty  that  supports  it  are 
endogenous to the constitutional order. In this connection it would seem that the Positive 
Political Theory approach rests on solid methodological foundations, as it is characterized 
by a focus on the authority distributions that are produced by  political and economic 
behavior. While this is undoubtedly true, it is true in only a limited sense because for PPT 
studies the interval under consideration is often quite short and episodic, thus obscuring 
the dynamics of contestation and political-economic definition that the approach is based 
on.  This  is  where  the  methodological  aspirations  of  American  Political  Development 
supply a necessary corrective. Granting that the federal system is underdeterminate and 
 See, e.g., Alison LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Harvard University Press, 67
2008) (treating federalism as a political  inheritance from the seventeenth and eighteenth century);  and 
Charles Black, supra note 59 (eschewing determinative principals in the development of the federal system 
while yet maintaining structural constants). 
!28
that,  as a result,  the state-federal  relationship is  produced through political  processes, 
APD’s  focus  on  the  irreducibly  developmental  nature  of  political  institutions  and 
phenomena forces us to expand the horizons of our inquiry to take account not just of 
episodic contestations of the distribution of authority in the federal system but also of 
how those episodes are connected to each other and how earlier episodes influence later 
episodes. 
Reflecting on the broad literature engaging American federalism and the dominant 
methodological approaches used therein, it is thus clear that only the Complex Adaptive 
Systems  and  American  Political  Development  approaches  incorporate  into  their 
methodological  commitments  the  underdeterminacy  of  the  federal  system  and  the 
consequent endogeneity of sovereignty and specifications of the state-federal relationship. 
Nonetheless,  these  virtues  haven’t  yet  resulted  in  a  developmental  account  of  the 
American federal system directed towards elucidating the consequences of constitutional 
underdeterminacy. As I’ve tried to show, this is a failure of extant American Political 
Development  scholarship;  and,  as  Bednar  admits,  Complex  Adaptive  Systems is  still 
more  of  an  impulse  in  the  literature  than  a  refined  and  coherently  employed 
methodology.  Hence, the necessary work still remains to be done. The following section 68
outlines how such an endeavor is undertaken in this dissertation. 
Overview 
The balance of this dissertation consists of two components. The first is theoretical, the 
second developmental. Each of these components, in turn, is subdivided into two distinct 
 Bednar, “The Political Science of Federalism,” 280-282.68
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parts.  The  theoretical  component  seeks  to  provide  a  description  of  the  nature  of  the 
American federal system, a prerequisite for any account of the ways in which federalism 
has  shaped  political  development.  The  first  theoretical  part  attempts  to  explicate  the 
underdeterminate and, as a result, inherently relational nature of American federalism. 
The second part  then seeks  to  situate  federalism in  the  broader  context  of  American 
constitutionalism by engaging in a dialogical comparison with the separation of powers at 
the  national  level.  The  developmental  component  of  the  dissertation  pursues  the 
implications of the theoretical arguments by examining how the underdeterminacy of the 
federal  system  has  influenced  constitutional  and  political  development.  Like  the 
theoretical  component,  the  developmental  component  consists  of  two  separate  parts. 
While  the first  charts  the jurisprudential  development  of  the state-federal  relationship 
over the first century of American constitutional history, the second examines a discrete 
episode of the political construction of the state-federal relationship. Taken together, these 
components comprise the four substantive chapters of this work. In the paragraphs that 
follow  I  briefly  describe  the  arguments  advanced  in  each  chapter,  with  the  goal  of 
identifying the set of concerns that unifies them.
A satisfactory account of the development of the American federal system must begin 
with  a  defensible  account  of  the  nature of  that  system,  even acknowledging,  as  I’ve 
suggested, that its nature is in part a result of political development. Thus, in Chapter One 
I  offer  an  account  of  the  constitutional  logic  of  American  federalism.  In  brief,  that 
account focuses on the structural underdeterminacy of the federal system established by 
the  Constitution  and  the  consequent  centrality  of  relationships  between  both  (a) 
governmental  levels  and  (b)  governments  and  their  citizens.  Because  there  is  no 
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constitutionally established line of  jurisdiction that  comprehensively defines state  and 
national  powers,  rights,  and roles,  the appropriate  distinctions must  be made through 
constitutional politics. In turn, these distinctions hinge on the answers to two questions, 
both of which concern the relational dimensions just identified. First, what is the nature of 
the relationship between the states and the national government? And second, how do 
citizens relate to each level of government that represents them? The answers to these 
questions—the  first  arrived  at  through  political  contestation  and  the  second  both 
expressed through and shaped by that contestation—determine the precise contours of the 
state-federal relationship. In this way, my argument emphasizes the relational dimensions 
of the state-federal relationship, a point this chapter is intended to explain and defend. 
To adequately describe the constitutional logic of federalism, this chapter proceeds in 
three steps. I begin by evaluating the constitutional text in order to defend the central 
claim that the federal system is underdeterminate and thus anticipates contestation over 
the proper scope and location of political power. This requires evaluating the state-federal 
relationship as set forth by the Constitution and, on that basis, identifying the parameters 
of  the  federal  system.  It  must,  in  other  words,  identify  which questions  of  state  and 
national  power  are  legally  settled  and  which  remain  open  to  legitimate  contestation. 
Second, sources contemporaneous to the founding are adduced to demonstrate that the 
underdeterminacy of the federal system was apprehended at the time of the Constitution’s 
framing and ratification, serving as a virtue for some and a vice for others. By bringing 
Federalist  and Anti-Federalist  sources  into  conversation with  each other,  I  argue that 
critics  and supporters  of  the  Constitution alike  acknowledged that  the  distribution of 
power in the federal system was far from determinate and, moreover, depended crucially 
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on popular sentiments. This discussion identifies a common point of emphasis between 
Publius and leading Anti-Federalists, namely the people’s attachment to (or confidence 
in) their governments. However, while attachment figured prominently in their debates, 
Federalists  and  Anti-Federalists  ascribed  to  fundamentally  different  views  of  popular 
attachment  that  had  similarly  fundamental  significance  for  their  assessments  of  the 
federal  system.  Chapter  One  concludes  with  the  identification  of  the  contingent 
foundations of the federal system—concrete factors grounded in governmental capacity 
and political  culture that shape the state-federal relationship.  It  is  these variables that 
serve as the basis for the analytical model that is employed in Chapter Four to evaluate an 
episode of constitutional and political development.
A defense of the underdeterminate nature of American federalism immediately raises 
questions  about  how  the  federal  system  fits  into  the  broader  constitutional  order. 
Moreover,  the  underdeterminacy  of  the  federal  system  would  seem  to  parallel  the 
underdeterminacy of the separation of powers at the national level. The obvious question, 
then, is, in what ways are the federal system and the separation of powers similar and in 
what respects do they differ? And further, what are the consequences of these similarities 
and differences? Chapter Two aims to engage and ultimately answer those questions by 
means of a dialogical comparison of federalism and the separation of powers. Doing so 
not  only  clarifies  the  distinctive  nature  and  challenges  of  the  federal  system.  It  also 
presents  an  opportunity  to  assess  the  prospects  of  securing—or,  more  accurately, 
producing—constitutional authority where the constitutional text is not fully determinate. 
A comparison of the federal system and the system of separated powers at the national 
level  reveals  two notions  of  political  power  and,  as  a  result,  two conceptions  of  the 
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separation  thereof.  There  is,  on  the  one  hand,  a  negative  notion  of  political  power, 
according to which all political power is liable to abuse and must therefore be properly 
divided.  On  the  other  hand,  there  is  a  positive  notion  that  is  oriented  towards 
incorporating the fundamental values of liberal constitutionalism (national and domestic 
security,  individual  rights,  and  democratic  governance)  into  the  exercise  of  political 
power. Whereas the positive notion is directed towards the use  of political power, the 
negative notion is directed towards preventing its abuse. In turn, these notions of political 
power undergird divergent notions of why political power should be separated. While the 
negative notion supports a view of the wholesale separation of powers among political 
institutions to prevent tyrannical abuses (which I refer to as the division of power), the 
positive notion supports a view that subdivides power across governing institutions in 
order  to  give  expression  to  the  polity’s  fundamental  value  commitments.  While 
federalism can serve the purposes of the negative notion of political power and the view 
of separated power that it supports, I argue in this chapter that it cannot serve those of the 
positive notion or its attendant view of separated powers. This is the case because, unlike 
the governing institutions at the national level, state and national institutions do not stand 
as  equals  in  relation  to  one  another.  Rather,  their  interactions  are  shaped  by  the 
constitutional  commitment  to  national  supremacy and the deeply-rooted (though non-
constitutional) commitment to state sovereignty, both of which preclude the deliberative 
interactions  and  responsive  relationships  required  by  the  positive  notion  of  political 
power.  Fully  mounting  this  argument  requires  recourse  to  recent  scholarship  on 
constitutional authority, which is animated by a recognition of the same constitutional 
underdeterminacy that underlies this inquiry. 
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The  foundational  claim of  this  dissertation  is  that  the  structure  and  nature  of  the 
federal  system  have  decisively  shaped  and  been  shaped  by  American  political  and 
constitutional development. The difficulty, however, is not in making this claim but in 
justifying it. Moreover, because I argue in the theoretical chapters that the federal system 
anticipates  constitutional  development,  our  focus  should  correspondingly  shift  to 
developments  subsequent  to  the  ratification of  the  Constitution.  Hence,  the  third  and 
fourth  chapters  engage  different  aspects  of  political  and  constitutional  development 
related to the federal system. The focus of Chapter Three is constitutional interpretation 
over roughly the first century of the American Republic (1787-1873). There I offer an 
account of federalism jurisprudence that demonstrates how the underdeterminacy of the 
federal system has shaped both the course and the substance of judicial interpretations of 
the state-federal relationship. The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate the consequences 
of  judicial  engagement  with  constitutional  underdeterminacy.  Moreover,  I  hope  to 
illustrate how, in the hands of the judiciary, the structural underdeterminacy of the federal 
system induces a distinctively relational mode of reasoning, according to which state and 
national  powers  are  understood  in  relation  to  each  other,  implicitly  or  explicitly 
delimiting  each  other,  with  each  level  of  government  shaping  the  powers  of  and 
limitations on the other. While the American federal system has been characterized as 
relational  and a relational account of federalism jurisprudence has been called for,  69 70
there has yet to be an extended defense of this claim or presentation of such an account. 
 See, for example, Charlton C. Copeland, “Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism Through a 69
Relational Lens,” 19 William & Mary Bill of Rights Journal 511 (2011); and David Fontana, “Relational 
Federalism: An Essay in Honor of Heather Gerken,” 48 Tulsa Law Review 503 (2012).
 Heather Gerken, “Comment—Slipping the Bonds of Federalism,” 128 Harvard Law Review 85 (2014), 70
113-119.
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By showing how the constitutional logic of federalism shaped judicial interpretations of 
the federal system, this chapter is also intended to demonstrate that the jurisprudence of 
federalism and, by implication, constitutional law more broadly are species of political 
development,  phenomena  inscribed  in  the  compass  of  constitutional  politics  that  are 
structured by the institutional and operational logics of the judiciary.
The dual claims that the underdeterminacy of the federal system induces a relational 
mode of reasoning and that judicial engagement with the federal system produces a logic 
of federalism distinct from the constitutional logic are both supported by an examination 
of federalism jurisprudence over the first  century under the Constitution (1787-1873). 
Examining  Supreme  Court  decisions  (and  broader  judicial  developments)  from  the 
Marshall Court into Reconstruction we encounter two clear modes of reasoning, both of 
which  are  relational  in  form.  The  first  reasons  about  the  federal  system  from  the 
standpoint of national sovereignty, defining the powers attendant to national supremacy 
and only then identifying the state powers that  remain.  Conversely,  the second mode 
reasons from the standpoint of state sovereignty, articulating a sphere or jurisdiction of 
state power and, on that basis, defining national power. For both, identifying the bounds 
of permissibility in a federal system requires fleshing out the relationship between state 
and nation; that, in turn, requires reasoning inferentially from the constitutional text and 
the  relationships  it  establishes.  A different  developmental  dynamic  emerges  in  the 
jurisprudence preceding and immediately after the Civil War. Here the focus was not only 
on the relationship between state and national governments but also on the relationships 
between both levels of governments and American citizens. The cases analyzed in this 
chapter necessarily take place in political time and, in virtue of being legal decisions, they 
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must  take  account  of  previous  decisions  and  at  least  attempt  to  produce  a  coherent 
jurisprudence. This means that the resulting logic of federalism bears the marks of both 
modes of reasoning, the result of which is a single, ostensibly coherent expression of 
federalism’s meaning.71
The  crucial  difference  between  the  constitutional  logic  of  federalism  and  the 
judicialized logic that emerged in this period is that whereas politicians could treat the 
state-federal relationship as underdeterminate, many judges did not. More importantly, 
though, and irrespective of any one judge’s intentions,  iterated legal disputes and the 
attendant  rise  of  constitutional  doctrine  served  to  exacerbate  the  development  of 
determinate understandings of the federal system. The Constitution established a federal 
system in which the line between the national and state governments was incomplete and 
underdeterminate; it did not answer every question about the precise scope or extent of 
state and national power. But when a federal question came before the apex constitutional 
court, the answer could not be incomplete or underdeterminate. It had to be definitive, 
and it  had to be deduced from consistent constitutional principles.  In the eyes of the 
Marshall and Taney Courts, questions of state and federal power called for answers that 
identified categories of governmental power appropriate to each level; they called for an 
adumbration of what each part of the compound republic could and could not lawfully 
do. The codification of national citizenship in the Fourteenth Amendment added another 
 It is only very rarely that the Court declares that a previous decision was not only wrong but wrong the 71
day it was decided. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. at 578 (2003) (declaring that the Court’s decision 
in Bowers “was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today”). Even in these instances, 
though, there is a clear imperative to articulate a single, definitive constitutional meaning. The decisions 
that were always wrong were wrong because they did not comport with the proper interpretation of the 
provision in question. This, as I argue at greater length in Chapter Two, is characteristic of an approach to 
the Constitution that seeks determinacy from the constitutional text, an approach induced in part by the 
institutional logic of the judiciary.
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relational dimension to the state-federal relationship. The affirmation of a citizen-state 
relationship separate and apart from the several states had wide ranging consequences for 
both  the  structural  relations  between  governmental  institutions  and  the  salience  of 
citizens’ attachment in the federal system. The new logic of federalism produced by these 
developments, I ultimately argue in Chapter Three, was the direct result of the interaction 
of the institutional logic of the judiciary with the constitutional logic of federalism.
While  judicial  engagement  with  the  federal  system  illustrates  one  aspect  of 
federalism’s development, it nevertheless tells only part of the story. The implications of 
constitutional  underdeterminacy  extend  beyond  the  precipitation  of  legal  cases  that 
present questions about the permissible scope of state and national power. Indeed, the 
implications pervade legislative and executive politics organized around the extent and 
application of political power. If there is merit to the argument that the underdeterminacy 
of  the  federal  system anticipates  contestation  and  requires  specification  of  the  state-
federal relationship, then our attention must turn also to the political episodes in which 
the  state-federal  relationship  is  contested  and  defined.  By  examining  an  episode  of 
political contestation over the scope and location of governmental power, we can gain a 
more subtle understanding of the ways in which the federal system has been understood 
and reinterpreted over the course of American political  history.  What is  the extent of 
national power under the Constitution? By what are national and state powers limited? 
What  value(s)  or  end(s)  is  the  federal  system  supposed  to  serve?  Answers  to  these 
questions can be found in debates over the nature, requirements,  and purposes of the 
American federal system. These are the questions Chapter Four aims to address.
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The  episode  under  consideration  here  is  the  Commission  on  Intergovernmental 
Relations  (CIR),  which was convened by President  Eisenhower in  1953 to  study the 
proper roles of and divisions between levels of government.  While the Commission’s 
work took place over just two years (1953-1955), it  must be considered as a late act 
within a much longer drama of state building and constitutional change. To this end, I 
situate the CIR and the questions it engaged within the context of the period running from 
the  beginning  of  the  New  Deal  through  the  Second  World  War  and  into  post-war 
American politics. During this roughly two decade period, both the role of the national 
government and the broader constitutional order in which it was embedded underwent 
epochal changes. Within the context of the approach to American federalism outlined in 
Chapters One and Two, these changes touched each of the contingent foundations of the 
federal system. What’s more, given the temporal proximity of the New Deal and the War, 
political  contestation over the “New Deal settlement” was largely deferred until  after 
war’s  end.  As a  consequence,  many New Deal  programs and wartime expansions  of 
federal power—along with the new state-federal relations they inaugurated—were able to 
consolidate and become entrenched before their desirability and legality were seriously 
tested in the political arena. Building on the analysis of the contingent foundations of the 
federal system presented in Chapter One, I construct a model of federalism that can be 
used to evaluate political and constitutional development. This model identifies two broad 
categories of variables—those rooted in governmental capacity and political culture—the 
modulation of which structures the social, political, and legal context in which the state 
federal relationship takes shape.
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The CIR was proposed by President Eisenhower as a way to both placate resurgent 
conservative critics of national power and to take stock of the profound changes to the 
constitutional  order  wrought  by  the  New Deal  and  Second  World  War.  Drawing  on 
sources from the Commission’s archive at the Eisenhower Presidential Library, I argue 
that through its work and in the report it ultimately produced, the CIR reconstructed the 
federal system, elaborating a vision of the proper roles of governmental levels in an era of 
expanded, administrative national governance. It was, at bottom, a vision that prioritized 
the ends of good governance over legally specified distributions of authority. This shift 
from legal divisions of power to the desiderata of governance in the post-New Deal, post-
War American state demonstrates how legislative and executive institutions interact with 
the underdeterminacy of the federal system. As such, it stands as a particularly illustrative 
example of the political—as opposed to exclusively judicial—construction of the state-
federal relationship.   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Chapter One: The Politics of Sovereignty 
 In his Edward Douglass White Lectures, delivered in 1968 at the Louisiana State 
University, Charles Black presented a critique of American constitutional interpretation 
that, though nearly half a century old, still warrants serious consideration.  His point of 1
departure was the observation that in attempting to answer constitutional questions we 
have opted for an interpretive method that seeks to derive meaning and direction from the 
constitutional text. This is, in his words, “the method of purported explication or exegesis 
of the particular textual passage[.]”  The “particular-text style”  forces those in search of 2 3
constitutional guidance to focus on texts that are “in form directive of official conduct, 
rather than…those that declare or create a relationship out of the existence of which 
inference could be drawn.”  In its place, he outlined and advanced an inference-based 4
 The arguments presented in this chapter are a version, at times modified, of the arguments advanced in 1
Connor M. Ewing, “Structure and Relationship in American Federalism: Foundations, Consequences, and 
‘Basic Principles’ Revisited,” 51 Tulsa Law Review 689 (2016).
 Id., 7.2
 Id., 8.3
 Ibid.4
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interpretive methodology, one “sounding in the structure of federal union, and in the 
relation of federal to state governments.”  Black’s emphasis on structure and inference 5
has had a profound impact on constitutional reasoning, serving, for example, as a model 
for one of the six modalities of constitutional interpretation identified by Philip Bobbitt in 
his seminal work, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution.  6
 It is no coincidence that Black’s discussion of structural inference and relational 
interpretation took the federal system as a primary object of consideration. Not only is the 
text-based method he critiques prevalent in federalism jurisprudence, but the state-federal 
relationship is also, perhaps, the constitutional example par excellence of the need to 
draw inferences from structure and relationship. To fully appreciate the force and 
potential of the analytical posture Black advocated, we must do more than provide 
correctives to instances in constitutional law of the absence of such reasoning. Indeed, we 
must reorient our focus and shift from the interpretive domain of constitutional law to the 
larger realm of constitutional politics, in which law is inscribed. Though Black reasoned 
from legal disputes centered on specific textual provisions to the relevant structures and 
relationships that clarify the questions presented, the nature of the American polity can 
also be glimpsed if we reverse that order and begin with the structures and relationships 
fundamental to the constitutional order. Thus reversed, the goal becomes to arrive at a 
clear understanding of our constitutional regime, so that interpretations of our 
constitutional text can proceed on a reliable foundation.  
 Id., 11.5
 Philip Bobbitt, Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford University Press, 1984). See 6
especially 74-92 for his discussion of the structural modality and 77-80 for his direct engagement with 
Black’s arguments in Structure and Relationship.
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 Implicit in the idea of a written constitution is a notion of defined government, of 
explicit declarations that establish guidelines for the legitimate use of political power and 
enumerate the proper objects, purposes, and means of legislation and regulation.  In 7
republican governments, those enumerations and limitations are intended to manifest the 
sovereignty of the people by identifying them, rather than those who govern, as the 
ultimate source of political authority. While the people are sovereign, they select 
representatives to exercise sovereign political power over the polity. But this presents a 
complication. Even as sovereignty in a constitutional democracy signifies the ultimate 
rule of the people—Lincoln’s “political community without a political superior” —it also 8
signifies governmental actors with “no higher enforcement agency—no political 
superior.”  Making sense of sovereignty in a constitutional democracy requires coming to 9
terms with the tension between the sovereignty of the people and the sovereignty of the 
people’s government(s). As a result, constitutional politics are characterized by what 
could be called a politics of sovereignty—the patterns of political behavior and discourse, 
the relationships between and among governments and citizens, and the institutional 
 This formulation, specifically the choice of “defined government” instead of “limited government” or 7
some other formulation, is intended to set to the side questions about the nature of constitutional 
limitations. While the argument presented here certainly bears on those questions, a full treatment is 
beyond the scope of this inquiry, though one dimension of the debate is considered below. For a recent and 
particularly cogent colloquy on the meaning of “limited government,” as well as a survey of the broader 
debate of which it is a part, compare Richard Primus, “The Limits of Enumeration,” 124 Yale Law Journal 
576 (2014) (arguing that the internal limits canon, which holds that “the powers of Congress must always 
be construed as authorizing less legislation than a general police power would,” is wrong) and Kurt T. Lash, 
“The Sum of All Delegated Power: A Response to Richard Primus, ‘The Limits of Enumeration,’” Yale Law 
Journal Forum, Dec. 22, 2014 (rejecting Primus’ central contention on the basis that “the constitutional 
text, reasonably interpreted, communicates that the sum of all actual delegated federal power amounts to 
something less than all possible delegated power”).
 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in The Collected Works of 8
Abraham Lincoln (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953), 433. 
 Sotirios A. Barber, The Fallacies of States’ Rights (Harvard University Press, 2012), 152.9
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interactions that give structure and substance to debates over the scope and location of 
government power. 
 The nature of a constitutional regime’s politics of sovereignty is largely the function 
of the structure of its political institutions and the relationships between the government 
and the people. In federal systems, the politics of sovereignty are fundamentally shaped 
by the presence of two levels of government—national and subnational—that each 
purport to act on behalf of the people they represent. For federal regimes the perennial 
question of politics—what should government do?—is complicated by a further question 
of specification: which government should do those things?  As David Epstein notes in 10
his study of The Federalist, the only unqualifiedly national component of the “partly 
federal, and partly national”  Constitution that Madison identifies in Federalist 39 is the 11
“government’s ‘operation’ on individuals.”  As a consequence, in the American 12
constitutional order “men have two masters, although each is only a master with respect 
to its own ‘objects.’”  Moreover, as we see in both Publius’ case for the Constitution and 13
the Anti-Federalists’ response, there was neither a clear nor comprehensive division of 
powers between the states and the national government. Rather than establish a 
determinate state-federal relationship, the Constitution set forth the legal and political 
 In his study of federalism and American political development, Federalism and the Making of America 10
(Routledge, 2012), David Brian Robertson presents a cogent analysis of this aspect of the American federal 
system. See, e.g., 1 and 8-9. 
 Jacob E. Cooke (ed.), The Federalist (Wesleyan, 1961), 39:257 (Madison). [Hereinafter citations to The 11
Federalist will follow this template. The essay number will be cited, followed by a colon and the page 
number of the text referenced or quoted; in instances where the author is not mentioned in-text, the name 
will be included parenthetically in the citation.] 
 David F. Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist (University of Chicago Press, 1984), 51.12
 Id., 51-52.13
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processes through which that relationship would be contested, defined, and revised. The 
federal system is fundamentally underdeterminate: the Constitution fixes no single 
division of power between levels of government but instead permits a range of potential 
state-federal relationships within permissible constitutional bounds. The 
underdeterminacy of American federalism inheres principally in the structural 
configuration of governing institutions and the relationships between citizens and their 
respective governments.  14
 In this chapter, I offer an account of the American federal system organized around its 
structural and relational components and develop an initial delineation of the politics of 
sovereignty of the American constitutional order. That account and the politics it 
structures, I argue, are necessarily dynamic, resisting the static conceptions and 
synchronic analyses that dominate judicial and, to a lesser extent, academic treatments of 
the topic. Understanding this account of American federalism requires reasoning 
inferentially and relationally, a recognition with increasing, though still limited, 
prominence in the academic literature.  I begin by setting forth the structural 15
components and institutional arrangements of the federal system. A review of the 
constitutional logic of federalism and the mechanisms designed to preserve the federal 
bargain illustrate the causes and consequences of the underdeterminacy that I argue 
 I employ this notion of underdeterminacy—as well as the term itself, instead of “indeterminacy” or 14
“ambiguity”—in conformity with others who have addressed the question of the nature of constitutional 
powers and the degree of textual constraint. See especially Mariah Zeisberg, War Powers: The Politics of 
Constitutional Authority (Princeton University Press, 2013), 5 n. 23. For a discussion of underdeterminacy 
and its relation to related terms like “vagueness” and “ambiguity,” see Ralf Poscher, “Ambiguity and 
Vagueness in Legal Interpretation,” Oxford Handbook on Language and Law, (Lawrence Solan and Peter 
Tiersma eds.) (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 For the most direct and elaborate development of this argument, see Heather K. Gerken, “Slipping the 15
Bonds of Federalism,” 128 Harvard Law Review 85 (2014). 
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characterizes the federal system. I then examine the notion of “attachment” in both the 
The Federalist and the writings of several prominent Anti-Federalists. I argue that the 
attachment of the people—their connections and commitments to a government—is a 
crucial determinant of the configuration of state and national power, which configurations 
are made possible by federal underdeterminacy. Extending this argument about popular 
attachment, I conclude by sketching a model of constitutional development based on the 
preceding argument. In particular, I identify two broad categories of variables, rooted in 
political culture and administrative capacity, that act as determinants of the federal 
system, structuring the distribution of powers between state and nation. 
The Structure of Sovereignty 
 American federalism is often described as consisting in a “balance” between state and 
national power, a “balance” that reflects the intentions of the founders and, as such, 
should provide a normative guide for constitutional interpretation.  This, then, provides a 16
useful starting point and theoretical alternative for my argument. The goal of this section 
is to advance a contrary understanding of the federal system. Indeed, I argue that the 
balance model is the theoretical antipode to what the Constitution establishes—a two-
level federal system with an underdeterminate division of political power, the result of 
which is a contested jurisdictional line between the national and state governments. I start 
 See, e.g., National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2661 (2012) (Scalia, 16
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, J.J., dissenting) (“the federal balance is too essential a part of our constitutional 
structure and plays too vital a role in securing freedom for us to admit inability to intervene”); and Davis v. 
Monroe County Board of Elections, 526 U.S. at 654-655 (1999) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“the Spending 
Clause power, if wielded without concern for the federal balance, has the potential to obliterate distinctions 
between national and local spheres of interest and power”). For an academic development of this 
understanding, see Myron T. Steele and Peter I. Tsoflias, “Realigning the Constitutional Pendulum,” 77 
Alabama Law Review 1365 (2014).
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by describing the underdeterminate division of political power in the federal system, 
which I term the constitutional logic of federalism. I then address a number of protections 
intended to preserve the federal bargain in light of federal underdeterminacy. Finally, I 
conclude with a brief discussion of the Tenth Amendment, which is often interpreted as 
precluding the underdeterminacy that is central to the account of the federal system I 
offer. 
The Constitutional Logic of Federalism 
 To begin understanding the logic of American federalism, we can begin by asking a 
foundational question: What does the Constitution constitute? The Preamble declares, 
“We the People…do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of 
America,” signaling that the charter will govern the collective endeavors of the several 
states. The unstated premise is that the states themselves are not formally constituted by 
the Constitution. Rather, they are recognized as extant political bodies and are treated as 
such throughout the Constitution. Unlike other federal systems in which the powers, 
responsibilities, and legal rights of the subnational governments are enumerated, the U.S. 
Constitution addresses the states and their future role largely by implication or in relation 
to the operation of the new national government. The states appear in the constitutional 
text as (inter alia) constituent members of the Union;  preexisting governmental entities 17
and the structure of extant legal political communities;  regulators of federal elections;  18 19
 U.S. Constitution, Preamble. 17
 Id., Art. I, Sec. 2 and Sec. 3.; Art. III, Sec. 2.18
 Id., Art. I, Sec. 4; Art. II, Sec. 1., as originally ratified and as amended by Am. XII. 19
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units whose mutual relations and, in some cases, specific decisions are subject to federal 
regulation and oversight;  and bodies whose autonomy is limited by virtue of their 20
membership in the Union.  States are also recognized as jointly contributing to a militia 21
subject to national control, future members of the Union whose admission is subject to 
federal permission,  and governments whose “Republican Form” and security against 22
invasion would be guaranteed by the Union.  Finally, states are explicitly recognized as 23
key components of the process of amendment and their territorial integrity and 
representation in the Senate are protected.  The national government, by contrast, was 24
literally—and in a way that doesn’t similarly apply to the states—constituted by the 
Constitution. Its fundamental institutions were structured, its powers enumerated, its 
purposes outlined, and its restraints specified. Setting aside the much controverted 
question of whether the act of ratification constituted a national people, we can 
nonetheless clearly see that it did constitute a national government in a political context 
where sovereign states already existed and would continue to exist, in some modified 
status.  The question, then as it is now, is how the national government would stand in 25
relation to the states.  
 Id., Art. I, Sec. 8, cl. 3., and Sec. 9 (regarding the “Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of 20
the States now existing shall think proper to admit”); Art. III, Sec. 2. and Am. XI; Art. IV, Secs. 1 and 2. 
 Id., Art. I, Sec. 10.21
 Id., Art. IV, Sec. 3.22
 Id., Art. IV, Sec. 4. 23
 Id., Amendment V and Art. IV, Sec. 3.24
 See Kurt Lash, “The Sum of All Delegated Power,” 183-189 for a review of the dominant theories of 25
federalism and the place and understanding of sovereignty therein.
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 This may seem like a self-evident point, but it is in fact deeply consequential. Because 
the states exist in the Constitution largely by implication, their political functions taken as 
granted, we can identify a crucially important feature of the federal system’s design—its 
underdeterminate dispensation of political power between the states and the national 
government. Consider the two options available to the Convention. The first was to 
comprehensively divide state from national power, drawing a clear jurisdictional line 
between the two levels and, in so doing, to create a determinate state-federal relationship. 
But that is emphatically what the Convention did not do, for reasons of both possibility 
and efficacy. For one, such an endeavor would have been impossible. The delegates could 
not have identified every possible political contingency and specified the proper political 
authority and process appropriate to each. And even if they could have done so, the 
political divisions at the Convention would have frustrated attempts to agree on the 
specified authority and processes for each contingency. Second, it would have been 
counterproductive to seek a determinate state-federal relationship. The very “stability and 
energy” the convention sought to combine with “the inviolable attention due to liberty, 
and to the Republican form”  required the ability to address contingencies in the most 26
effective and appropriate manner, instead of relying on the foresight of a convention that 
could not have comprehended the political demands of the future. The latter had been the 
failing of the Articles of Confederation, and it left the “Government of the United 
States…destitute of energy.”  27
 The Federalist, 37:233 (Madison).26
 Id., 15:93 (Hamilton).27
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 The locus classicus for the argument against legal determinacy is Federalist 37. There 
Madison discusses the “arduous…task of marking the proper line of partition, between 
the authority of the general, and that of the State Governments.”  After comparing the 28
difficulties faced by the Convention to those faced by “the most acute and metaphysical 
Philosophers”  and “the most sagacious and laborious naturalists,”  he concludes,  29 30
All new laws, though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the 
fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less obscure and 
equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of 
particular discussions and adjudications. Besides the obscurity arising from the 
complexity of objects, and the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium 
through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other, adds a fresh 
embarrassment…Here then are three sources of vague and incorrect definitions; 
indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the organ of conception, 
inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas.  31
The problem of “vague and incorrect definitions” is one that pervades law. Moreover, it is 
a problem that affects constitution makers especially acutely, because they must cope 
with these obscurities and imperfections in the context of crafting fundamental law—the 
law that will structure future lawmaking. 
 Perhaps, though, this could be thought Publian dissembling. It would, after all, 
benefit those who favor national over state power to claim that it was impossible to 
clearly distinguish national from state objects. If so, then the guise of impossibility could 
facilitate the establishment of expansive national power. But the truth is that Federalist 
No. 37 was (at least) the second time this argument had appeared. After completing the 
 Id., 37:234.28
 Id., 235.29
 Ibid.30
 Id., 236-237.31
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draft constitution, the delegates transmitted a letter to Congress introducing their 
handiwork. There they admitted, “It is at all Times difficult to draw with Precision the 
Line between those Rights which must be surrendered and those which may be 
reserved[.] And on the present Occasion this Difficulty was encreased [sic] by a 
Difference among the several States as to their Situation[,] Extent[,] Habits[,] and 
particular Interests.”  To add a final complication, as Edward Purcell observes, the 32
imprecise division of state and federal power was reinforced by the fact that “the 
Constitution conceived of both levels of government as counterpoised forces protecting 
the same vague and contested values—liberty, property, and republicanism.”  Hence, the 33
contention that the constitutional division of state and national power is underdeterminate 
is supported by both the testimony of members of the Constitutional Convention and the 
purposes they conceived both levels of government as serving. 
 But even still, Madison’s description of the inherent challenges of lawmaking could 
be far from the consensus view of the time. There could, after all, have been others who 
dissented from the view expressed by the Convention and accordingly believed that it 
was possible to define the “line of partition” between governments with greater precision 
than Madison thought feasible. This is doubtless true, which highlights a crucially 
important philosophical division at the time. As Saul Cornell has argued, the ratification 
debates revealed “a profound epistemological gulf separating elite Federalist from 
 See Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (1911), II:584.32
 Edward A. Purcell, Jr., Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise (2007), at 33
191. 
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popular Anti-Federalist views of language.”  This gulf cut to the core of the nature and 34
requirements of political constitutions: 
Elite Federalists generally accepted an essentially Lockean understanding of the 
limits of language and the inevitability of semantic instability. Popular Anti-
Federalist ideology viewed language more naively and attributed ambiguity, 
vagueness, and other textual failings in the Constitution to a deliberate effort by 
Federalists to craft a document that could be more easily twisted and 
manipulated by legal elites and their allies among the well born.  35
The existence of this disagreement between the Constitution’s advocates and its 
opponents supports the case being made here, which is that the belief expressed by those 
principally responsible for writing and defending the Constitution is congruent with the 
constitutional text. Constitutional underdeterminacy, a facet of which is included in 
Cornell’s “semantic instability,” is an inescapable feature of constitutions. Though he 
identifies the ways in which “politics contaminated language,”  what Cornell doesn’t 36
address is the fact that this phenomenon is doubly exacerbated by federalism—first by 
extending the realm of people among which disagreements about constitutional meaning 
could take root, and second by multiplying the number of governments empowered to act 
in their name(s).  
 Saul Cornell, “Constitutional Meaning and Semantic Instability: Federalists and Anti-Federalists on the 34
Nature of Constitutional Language,” American Journal of Legal History 56:21-28 (2016), 26.
 Ibid.35
 Id., 23.36
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 Rather than attempt to specify the exact set of points at which state power yields to 
national power (or, perhaps importantly, vice versa ), the delegates to the Constitutional 37
Convention opted for grants of power and restrictions thereon. To wit, the Constitution 
enumerates the powers of the national government,  identifies explicit restrictions on 38
both national  and state power,  and specifies the requirements of interstate conduct.  39 40 41
Additionally, the national government was endowed with the “executive Power” and 
“judicial Power,” housed, respectively, in the office of the president and the federal 
courts. The result was a federal government possessed of the inherent powers of national 
sovereignty—preservation of national security, superintendence of interstate conflict, 
management of the national economy, and the conduct of foreign diplomacy. At the same 
time, states maintained “most of the policy tools for governing everyday American 
life,”  including the powers to regulate local commerce, to ensure local peace, and to 42
preserve and further local welfare. 
 There is reason to believe that the directionality of this point is important. Consider, for example, an 37
articulation of the state-federal relationship that begins from the perspective of national power. The 
jurisdictional line would be found at the outer edge established by the full scope of the powers that the 
Constitution grants to the national government. If, however, the analysis is reversed, and state power is the 
starting point, then the jurisdictional line would be found at the edge of the full extent of the states’ powers, 
as expressed in their constitutions and the traditional body of police powers. Unless these two analyses can 
be said to establish the same jurisdictional line, then it seems reasonable to conclude that the directionality 
of the analysis is consequential for the contours of the state-federal relationship. Here we see the 
significance of the relational dimensions of the state-federal relationship, a point alluded to by Gerken, 
“Slipping the Bonds of Federalism,” 113-119. The causes and consequences of this dynamic are taken up in 
Chapter Three. 
 U.S. Constitution., Art. I, Sec. 8; Art. III, Sec. 3; and Art. IV, Secs. 3 and 4.38
 Id., Art. I, Sec. 9.39
 Id., Art. I, Sec. 10.40
 Id., Art. IV, Secs. 1 and 2.41
 Robertson, Federalism and the Making of America, at 32. 42
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 The result of the Convention’s labors was a mélange of exclusively national, 
exclusively state, and concurrently exercised powers. Though defined in broad strokes, 
the compound republic was characterized by underdeterminacy, as there was not an 
exhaustive division between state and federal power nor a clear jurisdictional line drawn 
between the two. This meant that the “true meaning” of the state-federal relationship 
could not be arrived at through legal analysis or constitutional interpretation. Rather, it 
was an essentially political, and thus contested, question. As David Epstein argues, 
“While the Constitution does enumerate the objects of the central government, the 
partition between states and nation will not be as much a legal issue as a political one.”  43
Coupled with the underdeterminacy of the federal system, the inherently political nature 
of the state-federal relationship meant that the division of powers between levels of 
government could reflect the will of the people. “If…the people should in future become 
more partial to the federal than to the State governments,” Madison argued in The 
Federalist No. 46, then “they ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their 
confidence where they may discover it to be most due.”  In this passage, Madison 44
stresses that only superior administration could bring about this transfer of partiality, a 
point that is examined more closely below. But unless this capacity of the people was to 
be illusory, there had to be a means by which the people’s partiality, or attachment, could 
be meaningfully registered. By allowing for the jurisdictional line to be subject to 
 Epstein, The Political Theory of The Federalist, 53.43
 The Federalist, 46:317.44
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political negotiation and construction responsive to these changes in public support, the 
underdeterminacy of the federal system did exactly that.  
 Two specific constitutional provisions underscore the underdeterminacy of the state-
federal relationship, and the consequent need for an inferential and relational conception 
of American federalism. The first is the Necessary and Proper Clause, which makes clear 
that the Constitution’s identification of congressional powers mustn’t be read as an 
exhaustive enumeration. Rather, there are powers undefined by the Constitution that are 
nonetheless legitimate exercises of national power. To be sure, this clause leaves many 
questions unanswered, including whether it is an independent grant of power and whether 
it should be read as conjunctive or not. But that is precisely the point. Not only does the 
clause point to lawful powers beyond those explicitly granted, its formulation raises 
further questions about the extent of national legislative power. The Necessary and Proper 
Clause makes clear that the national government possesses discretionary power that, of 
its nature, can permit only description and not enumeration. 
 The second provision is the Supremacy Clause, which declares that the Constitution, 
its laws, and treaties “shall be the supreme Law of the Land,”  and that state judges are 45
bound by that supreme law. Consider what makes this clause consequential, that is, what 
prevents it from being “mere surplusage.”  If the Constitution’s division of power was 46
exhaustive, then this clause would be superfluous; it would follow as a matter of logic 
that the national government was supreme in the instances it was granted power and not 
 U.S. Constitution., Art. VI, Sec. 2. 45
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 174 (1803).46
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supreme where the states were granted power. In other words, there would be no 
questions occasioned by state-federal relations that a determinate division of power could 
not resolve because all such relations would be comprehended by a determinate federal 
system. But if the Supremacy Clause is to serve anything more than a merely hortative 
function it is because the Constitution’s definition of the federal system is not 
determinate, thus making the clause necessary in order to address those instances to 
which the text does not reach but federal supremacy is nonetheless intended to apply. 
Equally important, the Supremacy Clause explicitly identifies the actors and bodies of 
law relative to which national supremacy is to be understood. Rather than simply assert 
the superiority of the national government, the Supremacy Clause indicates that the 
supremacy of federal law—whatever exactly that meant—would necessarily develop and 
be properly understood in relation to state governments. 
Preserving the Federal Bargain: Three “Levels” of Constraints 
 The underdeterminate federal system described above casts new light on a question 
central to the Convention and ratification debates: Which level of government stands to 
gain from an underdeterminate definition of the state-federal relationship? The Anti-
Federalist critique of the Constitution (about which more below) focused on the threat of 
consolidation they saw in the institutions established and powers granted by the 
document. For their part, the Federalists had the exact opposite fear. As Publius argued in 
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(inter alia) Federalist Nos. 17, 31, and 45,  it was at least as likely that the states would 47
encroach on the national government, and the national government would be comparably 
ill-equipped to rebuff state encroachments. Both camps were united by the concern that 
the federal bargain reached at the Convention would not hold. Thus, two closely related 
questions are presented. First, what kind of protections does the Constitution provide for 
the federal system? And second, what specific protections does it provide? Both of these 
questions bear heavily on the political processes that the underdeterminate federal system 
structures and the political contestation that, in turn, shapes that system. 
 To answer the first question, we can advert to the identification, made by Filippov, 
Ordeshook, and Shvetsova, of three “levels” of constraints employed to preserve federal 
systems.  The first level entails “constraints that correspond in part to explicit bargains 48
among federal subjects over the allocation of authority between them and the federal 
center, and other limits on their and the center’s actions.”  These protections consist of 49
clear textual commitments identifying the extent of and limitations on the powers granted 
and prohibited, as well as promises guaranteeing autonomy in certain spheres. Level-two 
constraints encompass institutional structures and arrangements, both of which “define[] 
 See The Federalist, 17:106 (Hamilton: “It will always be far more easy for the State governments to 47
encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State 
authorities.”); 31:198 (Hamilton: “It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State governments to 
encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon 
the rights of the State governments.”); and 45:310 (Madison: “We have seen, in all the examples of ancient 
and modern confederacies, the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the members, to despoil 
the general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself 
against the encroachments…[A]s the States will retain, under the proposed Constitution, a very extensive 
portion of active sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded.”).
 See Mikhail Filippov, Peter C. Ordeshook, and Olga Shvetsova, Designing Federalism: A Theory of Self-48
Sustainable Federal Institutions (Cambridge University Press, 2004), 33-41.
 Id., 36.49
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the national state, its relation to federal subjects, and its relation to the ultimate sovereign, 
the people.”  Finally, level-three constraints are the values—political, cultural, and 50
ideological—that serve to buttress the federal system. Though Filippov et al. focus on the 
operation of these values in elites, I follow Sanford Levinson and, as we shall see below, 
James Madison in interpreting these level-three protections as being constitutionally 
grounded in the people. Employing these distinctions we can address the second question, 
concerning what specific protections are provided by the Constitution. The balance of this 
section focuses on the first two levels, while level-three protections are treated in the 
following section. 
(1) Level One: Explicit Bargains
 Just as dividing state from federal powers cannot be an exact science, distinguishing 
level-one from level-two protections can at times be challenging because textual 
exhortations often accompany structural guidelines and institutional arrangements 
frequently incorporate a textual promise. Moreover, as Filippov et al. note, level-two 
protections serve in part to sustain level-one promises: “no Level I clause or provision 
can be of much consequence unless fortified by a second level of rules and procedures.”  51
Nonetheless, several level-one protections can be identified in the Constitution. The first, 
which has already been discussed, is the Article VI Supremacy Clause. There we see the 
declaration that the Constitution and federal law are supreme, though no structural 
provisions accompany that claim. The clause stops short of “confer[ring] authority on any 
 Ibid. 50
 Filippov et al., Designing Federalism, 73; see also 36-37.51
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specific level or branch to say definitively what the Constitution meant when disputes 
arose.”  Another such protection is offered by the Tenth Amendment, which states that 52
all powers not delegated or prohibited are reserved to the states or to the people.  I 53
discuss this amendment at greater length below, so it will suffice for present purposes 
simply to note that it serves principally a declaratory, as opposed to directly institutional 
or procedural, purpose.  
 The Preamble to the Constitution could plausibly serve as a level-one constraint as 
well. An argument to this effect would hold that the Preamble articulates the ends for 
which the national government was established and, as such, should guide the 
interpretation of national powers vis-à-vis state powers. Finally, a set of level-one 
protections can arguably be found in the grants of “legislative,” “executive,” and 
“judicial” powers in the opening sections of Articles I, II, and III, respectively. On this 
argument, those grants of power would be understood to identify the types of power of 
which national power partakes and would invite distinctions between these national 
powers and the parallel but distinct powers of the several states. But defending this 
argument, along with level-one justifications for the other examples cited, requires 
resources beyond those supplied by the Constitution’s text alone. That is, it requires 
 Purcell, Originalism, Federalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise, 141. Purcell goes on to 52
argue that the Oath Clause (U.S. Constitution., art. VI, § 3) “rather plausibly suggested that all [state and 
federal officials] were equally responsible for interpreting and enforcing the new charter. Such a 
compromise promised little but future contestation” (id.).
 By similar logic, the 9th Amendment serves as a level-one constraint on the federal system. Making this 53
argument, however, requires a fair amount of historical exposition and more space than is available here. 
For the most developed versions of this argument, see Kurt Lash, The Lost History of the Ninth Amendment 
(2009) and “The Inescapable Federalism of the Ninth Amendment,” 93 Iowa Law Review 801 (2008). 
Lash’s argument for the federalism-regarding purposes of the 9th Amendment poses a sharp challenge to its 
principal application in American constitutional law, privacy jurisprudence. For Lash’s engagement with 
this issue, see “Inkblot: The Ninth Amendment as Textual Justification for Judicial Enforcement of the 
Right to Privacy,” 80 University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue 219 (2013).
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precisely the kind of structural and relational inference that Charles Black observed was 
largely forsaken in American constitutional law. And though there are strong arguments 
for the constitutional significance of the provisions cited here, the fact remains that they 
have been frequently neglected in favor of provisions that are either more clearly 
directive or minimize the degree of inferential reasoning required to reach an 
authoritative conclusion.   54
(2) Level Two: Institutions 
 It was precisely this weakness of level-one protections that motivated Madison’s 
argument against “parchment barriers” in Federalist 48. Rather than rely on mere textual 
declarations, “which appears to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most 
of the American constitutions,” it was necessary to devise “some more adequate 
defense…for the more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the government.”  55
As regards the federal system, such defenses come in the form of at least four level-two 
constraints: the rules of representation in the national legislature, the federal courts, state 
management of federal elections, and the state militia power. Starting with the first of 
these, the so-called Great Compromise reached at the Convention brought a mix of 
proportional and state-based representation to the national government. In the House of 
 Of the provisions discussed here, the clearest example of this phenomenon is likely the Preamble, with 54
the Tenth Amendment being a close second. The least clear example is ostensibly the Supremacy Clause, as 
ubiquitous as it is in the case law treating conflicts between state and federal laws. But even these instances 
illustrate the point being advanced here. For it is rarely enough to simply point to the Supremacy Clause as 
conclusive proof of a federal law’s legitimacy. Instead, the clause is more often cited as a trump card, 
played after it has been shown that the federal law or action in question was a legitimate exercise of a 
national power, which in turn requires recourse to more clearly directive provisions. 
 The Federalist, 48:333.55
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Representatives the rule of representation was People-as-Union, according to which the 
Union was defined as a popular constituency.  On this rule, the national People was the 56
object of representation. The rule in the Senate was States-as-Union, by which the states 
were identified as the units of representation. Consequently, the representation of 
individual citizens in the upper chamber was tied to their status as citizens of the several 
states, and not primarily as members of a national constituency. The equal representation 
of the states is buttressed by the guarantee, in Article V, that “no State, without its 
Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.” The Senate’s advice and 
consent powers on presidential appointments and treaties serves also to ostensibly inflect 
these exercise of national power with the input of the states.  
 The combination of rules of representation in Congress meant that the national 
legislative process would, in effect, model a virtual negotiation between the two objects 
of representation: the national People and the several states. Though the Senate is 
arguably the most significant component of state influence in the national government, it 
is important to recognize the ways in which undue state influence was avoided. Three 
such features that are commonly cited are the state legislatures’ lack of the powers to 
recall senators and to control senatorial salaries (both of which would have enabled them 
 It is important, though, to note the significance of the states here too, as state boundaries still structure 56
the apportionment of House seats and, as a result, House districts. See U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 2 and 
Amend. XIV, Sec. 2. This point is made by Michael W. McConnell in “The Redistricting Cases: Original 
Mistakes and Current Consequences,” 24 Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy 103 (2000-2001), 111 
(“But even the House of Representatives, the members of which supposedly represent ‘the People,’ not 
states, flunks the ‘one person, one vote’ test.”). Hence, it is understandable why this point would increase in 
salience in direct proportion to the emphasis on meeting the standard, set out in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 
533 (1964), of “one person, one vote.” See also Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963), 379-381. 
Nonetheless, the distinction between the States-as-Union and the People-as-Union still stands because it 
rests on the presence or absence of mediation between citizens and their representatives, not the relative 
weight of citizens’ votes for their representatives. My thanks to Mariah Zeisberg for pressing this point. 
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to punish disobedience or non-cooperation), as well as the Senate’s six-year term of 
office (which meant that many senators would be in office longer than the state officials 
that appointed them).  Each of these proposals was debated and defeated at the 57
Constitutional Convention, though they have enjoyed continued support as auxiliary 
safeguards for state influence over the course of American political history. 
 Second, the Constitution grants to the states the power to manage national elections. 
According to Section 2 of Article I, the qualifications for voting in elections for the 
House of Representatives are determined by the states’ qualifications for their most 
numerous legislative branch. Until the passage of the 17th Amendment state legislatures 
were also empowered to choose the senators that would represent them.  Though the 58
states were given the power to determine the “Times, Places, and Manner” of elections 
for the House and Senate, the Constitution also granted Congress the power to “make or 
alter such Regulations, except as to the Place of Chusing Senators.”  As regards the 59
election of the president, Article III empowers the state legislatures to determine how 
their electors will be appointed. Though these provisions have been altered significantly 
over the course of American history—most notably by the 15th, 17th, and 19th 
Amendments—the states nonetheless retain the power and a considerable amount of 
autonomy to influence the manner in which national representatives are elected. 
 The third level-two protection is the federal judiciary, which is endowed by Article III 
with the “judicial Power of the United States” and, by implication from the Supremacy 
 See Sanford Levinson, Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance (2012), 311.57
 U.S. Constitution., Art. I, Sec. 3.58
 Id., Art. I, Sec. 4.59
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Clause, is empowered to enforce the state-federal relationship established by the 
Constitution. However, the efficacy of this protection for preserving state power depends 
on the degree to which the Constitution determinately defines the federal system. For if 
there is a non-negligible degree of underdeterminacy, as I’ve argued there is, then the 
federal judiciary’s power to police the boundaries of that federal system merely begs the 
question of what those boundaries are. From the standpoint of state power this concern is 
enhanced by the fact that, despite its powers of enforcement, the judiciary is still a 
national judiciary. Unlike the system proposed by the New Jersey Plan, according to 
which state courts would have effectively served as the lower federal courts, the 
Constitution gives the national government full control—from appointment to 
confirmation to salary—over the federal judiciary. Moreover, depending on how it is 
interpreted, Article III either permits or requires Congress to establish lower federal 
courts, a debate that would quickly emerge in the First Congress and persist for decades 
to come. The very same reasons that underlay the Anti-Federalist opposition to the Senate 
could be applied to the federal court system. As Alison LaCroix convincingly argues in 
her study of the origins of American federalism, through its rejection of Madison’s 
proposed national veto and subsequent adoption of the Supremacy Clause, the 
Convention opted for a markedly judicial resolution of conflicts over the federal 
system.  To the extent the federal judiciary expressed the views of the governmental 60
level of which it was a part, the courts offered little comfort to those skeptical of the 
protections the Constitution offered to state autonomy and power. That the structure and 
 Alison LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Harvard University Press, 2008), 60
132-174.
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jurisdiction of the federal judiciary emerged as a hotly contested issue between 
Federalists and Jeffersonian Republicans in the early national period illustrates the 
centrality of these matters to the distribution of powers between levels of government. 
 The fourth, and for our purposes final, level-two constraint on the federal bargain is 
the states’ ability, implied by several provisions of the Constitution, to maintain a militia. 
Article I, Section 8 grants Congress the power to “call[] forth the Militia” and to “provide 
for organizing, arming, and disciplining” it when called into the “Service of the United 
States.” Additionally, Article III identifies the president as the Commander-in-Chief not 
only of the “Army and Navy of the United States,” but “of the Militia of the several 
States, when called into the actual Service of the United States.” And, of course, there is 
the Second Amendment, which prefaces its recognition of the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms with the enigmatic declaration, “A well regulated Militia, being necessary 
to the security of a free State[.]” Though these provisions grant the national government a 
considerable measure of control over the state militias and clearly foresee some possible 
form of cooperative relationship, the more important point is that they recognize the very 
existence of state militias, implicitly condoning the continuation of these state-based 
military forces. Indeed, far from repudiating the role of violence in the federal system, the 
Second Amendment goes as far as to underscore the legitimacy of armed resistance in 
defense of liberty. Despite the shift of power over the militia from the states to the 
national government brought about by the Constitution, it’s important to remember that 
the militia was widely seen as a prophylactic against the oppression made possible by a 
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standing army organized and maintained by the national government.  What’s more, the 61
congressional debate over what would become the Second Amendment seems to reveal a 
widespread agreement that, in the words of Roger Sherman, “the States, respectively, will 
have the government of the militia, unless when called into actual service[.]”  Taken 62
together, the constitutional provisions recognizing the state militia power identify armed 
resistance as not only a possible but also a licit recourse in event of federal overreach. 
And, like so much else in the Constitution, the definitions of the terms on which the use 
of the militia power would depend are left unelaborated. 
(3) Interlude: The States’ Rights Amendment?
 Given its importance, both legally and historically, for claims of state power, the 
Tenth Amendment merits separate consideration. The traditional constitutional prooftext 
for states’ rights claims,  the Tenth Amendment can plausibly be read to preclude (or at 63
least significantly weaken) the argument for federal underdeterminacy that I have 
advanced. With its reservation of powers to the states, the argument runs, the Tenth 
Amendment creates a zero-sum distribution of powers between the states and the national 
government, removing any uncertainty about the jurisdictional line separating the two. 
 See, for example, The Federalist No. 46, where Madison argues that any standing army raised by the 61
national government would be offset by a militia orders of magnitude larger. In the debates over 
amendments to the Constitution in the First Congress, Elbridge Gerry gave voice to this understanding, 
saying, “What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of 
liberty.” 1 Annals of Congress: The Debates and Proceedings in the Congress of the United States 
(Washington, D.C.: Gales & Seaton, 1834), 1:778 (August 17, 1789)
 Roger Sherman, id., 779 (August 17, 1789).62
 See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding unconstitutional the Fair 63
Labor Standards Act as applied to state employees); and New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) 
(holding the “take title” provision of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act 
unconstitutional for, in part, violating the Tenth Amendment).
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On this head, two points are relevant. The first is that, for all the rhetorical fodder the 
amendment can provide advocates of state power, it actually does nothing to clarify the 
specific dimensions of the state-federal relationship. In fact, consistent with my analysis 
of the constitutional logic of federalism, by recognizing “powers not delegated…nor 
prohibited”  it acknowledges that there are aspects of the state-federal relationship that 64
are not captured by the Constitution’s text. Moreover, as Levinson argues, the amendment 
“provides no clue at all as to what precisely is assigned to the national government or 
prohibited to the states[.]”  This recognition in no way clarifies the extent—to say 65
nothing of the scope of legitimate application—of federal powers granted by the 
Constitution, which would seem to be the true ground of contention in debates that center 
on the Tenth Amendment.  
 The second point concerns the significance of the amendment’s final clause. After 
recognizing that there are powers beyond those delegated to the national government and 
prohibited to the states, the amendment concludes that those undefined powers “are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” While most arguments in the states’ 
rights vein place emphasis on the reservation to the states, it must be remembered that 
those undefined powers are also reserved to the people. The addition of “the people” to 
the analysis of the state-federal relationship not only underscores the popular basis of 
republican government; it also foregrounds, but does not resolve, the question of where 
the people stand in relation to both levels of government. For example, the meaning 
 U.S. Constitution, Amendment X.64
 Levinson, Framed, 309.65
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would be quite different if the amendment concluded with “reserved to the States 
respectively, that is to the people,” a formulation that would have equated the people in 
their political capacity with the states. Similarly, it could have read “reserved to the States 
respectively, and not to the people,” which would have implied that the division of power 
is a zero-sum enterprise, with every addition to national power coming at the expense of 
an otherwise state-possessed power.  
 Both of those alternative formulations are markedly different from what the Tenth 
Amendment actually says, what it means, and the political realities it underscores. For 
Joseph Story, the amendment served as “a mere affirmation of what, upon any just 
reasoning, is a necessary rule of interpreting the constitution.”  As he argues in his 66
Commentaries,  
“Being an instrument of limited and enumerated powers, it follows irresistibly, 
that what is not conferred, is withheld, and belongs to the state authorities, if 
invested by their constitutions of government respectively in them; and if not so 
invested, it is retained BY THE PEOPLE, as a part of their residuary sovereignty.”  67
 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States; with A Preliminary Review of the 66
Constitutional History of the Colonies and States, before the Adoption of the Constitution (1991 [1833]), 
3:752.
 Ibid. (emphasis in original). Significantly, this passage is followed by a discussion of the nature of 67
powers delegated to government. After recounting the efforts in Congress to add the word “expressly” to 
the original draft of the Tenth Amendment, Story writes, “On that occasion it was remarked, that it is 
impossible to confine a government to the exercise of express powers. There must necessarily be admitted 
powers by implication, unless the constitution descended to the most minute details. It is a general 
principle, that all corporate bodies possess all powers incident to a corporate capacity, without being 
absolutely expressed” (752-753).
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Here Story emphatically identifies the people as the foundation of political power, the 
ultimate sovereign who in a federal system delegates all political power.  On this 68
reading, the Tenth Amendment pays homage to Madison’s arguments in The Federalist 
Nos. 37 and 46 by gesturing towards the people’s role in shaping the contours of the 
state-federal relationship. But the addition of the people to the state-federal equation 
raises a host of further questions. Where do the people fit into the process by which the 
state-federal line is contested? How does the presence of two fundamentally different 
governments affect the political meaning of a decision to support one over the other? 
What does it even mean in a federal system to choose one government over the other? It 
is to these questions that I now turn. 
The Relationships of Sovereignty  
 We have seen thus far that the constitutional division between state and federal 
powers is underdeterminate and that, as a result, the precise contours of the state-federal 
relationship are subject to contestation, adjustment, and revision. We can now turn and 
inquire into the significance of these facts. Put more precisely, the question now before us 
is, why is this underdeterminacy and relational contestation relevant to an inquiry into the 
nature and development of the federal system? Answering this question takes us from the 
first component of our analysis—the structure and institutional arrangement of the federal 
 This interpretation echoes James Wilson’s argument, voiced at both the Constitutional Convention and 68
the Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, that denying the people the ability to delegate power to the general 
government is tantamount to allowing the subordinate States “to dictate to their superiors…to the majesty 
of the people[.]” See The Founders’ Constitution, 1:8:18 [citation notes the volume, chapter, and document 
number that correspond to the on-line version, which can be found at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/
founders/tocs/toc.html].  
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system—to the second component, the relationships between the two levels of 
government and their citizens. Those relationships are the subject of the following 
discussion. I begin with an examination of what Sanford Levinson has called the 
“political sociology of federalism,”  focusing specifically on the concept of 69
“attachment” in Publius’ arguments in behalf of the Constitution. In the second section, I 
broaden the focus to inquire into the substance of the Anti-Federalists’ treatment of 
“attachment.” Taken together, these two sections reveal that, despite important 
differences concerning their understanding of the nature of attachment, Federalists and 
Anti-Federalists alike saw it as a crucial component of the underdeterminate federal 
system. Whereas Federalists acknowledged citizens’ prevailing attachment to state 
governments and argued that it was a central though not inalterable, limit on federal 
power, Anti-Federalists feared that the creation of a national government would provide a 
new object of attachment whose very presence would undermine state power, over time 
leading to an increasingly centralized, if not wholly consolidated, government. 
Level Three: The Political Sociology of Federalism 
 Even before Publius published the first essay in the series that would become The 
Federalist, the Constitutional Convention’s proposal was attacked for presenting to the 
people a “consolidated government,” that is, one “whose natural, perhaps inevitable 
tendency would be to annihilate the state governments or reduce them to 
 See Levinson, Framed, 318; see also “Union and States’ Rights 150 Years after Sumter: Some 69
Reflections on a Tangled Political and Constitutional Conundrum,” in Union & States’ Rights: A History 
and Interpretation of Interposition, Nullification, and Secession 150 Years After Sumter, Neil H. Cogan 
(ed.) (University of Akron Press, 2013).
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insignificance.”  Typical of this genre of critique is The Federal Farmer’s contention in 70
his first essay, where he argues,  
The plan of government now proposed is evidently calculated totally to change, 
in time, our condition as a people. Instead of being thirteen republics, under a 
federal head, it is clearly designed to make us one consolidated government…
The plan proposed appears to be partly federal, but principally however, 
calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated government.  71
This fear was echoed in the essays of Brutus,  Agrippa,  and the Impartial Examiner,  72 73 74
as well as Robert Yates and John Lansing’s letter to the governor of New York, 
“Objections to the Federal Constitution.”  It was also a common critique in the state 75
ratifying conventions. For example, in the Pennsylvania convention, John Smilie argued 
that “it is fair and reasonable to infer, that it was in contemplation of the framers of this 
system, to absorb and abolish the efficient sovereignty and independent power of the 
several States, in order to invigorate and aggrandize the general government.”  In 76
Virginia’s convention, Patrick Henry made the same argument, illustrated by reference to 
the Constitution’s opening claim to speak in the name of a single national People: 
I rose yesterday to ask a question, which arose in my own mind. When I was 
asked the question, I thought the meaning of my interrogation was obvious: The 
fate of this question and America may depend on this: Have they said, we the 
States? Have they made a proposal of a compact between States? If they had, it 
 The Founders Constitution, 1:8.70
 Letter I, id., 1:8:12.71
 See, e.g., Essays I and XI, in The Anti-Federalist: An Abridgment of the Complete Anti-Federalist 72
(Herbert Storing ed., 1985), 108-117 and 162-167. [Hereinafter Storing, The Anti-Federalist.]
 See, e.g., Essays IV and VI, id. 234-236 and 238-240.73
 See letter of 5 March 1788, id., 286-291.74
 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution, 2nd ed. 75
(Jonathan Elliot ed., 1863), 1:480-482.
 The Founders’ Constitution, 1:8:16.76
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would be a confederation: It is otherwise most clearly a consolidated 
government.  77
In short, the debate over the Constitution quickly coalesced around the fear that, in either 
the short or the long term, the power of the states would be eroded while that of the 
national government would increase pari passu.  
 How could Publius respond to this accusation? Early in The Federalist, Hamilton 
engaged the consolidation charge, arguing that the federal government’s attempt to usurp 
the powers of the states “would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory.”  But his 78
argument in behalf of the Constitution ultimately rested on conjecture about the 
disposition of national representatives—“I confess I am at a loss to discover what 
temptation the persons intrusted [sic] with the administration of the general government 
could ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that description.”  Later in The 79
Federalist Madison identified the national and federal components of the “compound 
republic” (No. 37), explained how the proposed Constitution conformed to republican 
principles (No. 39), and provided a general defense of the powers delegated to the 
national government (Nos. 41-43). Nonetheless, as the excerpt from The Federal Farmer 
attests, fears of consolidation persisted. And so in Essays 45 and 46, Madison presents his 
case for why states will have the advantage over the national government, in the hope of 
rendering the Anti-Federalists’ charges of consolidation baseless. The lynchpin of 
Madison’s argument is found in No. 46, where he writes,  
 Id., 1:8:38. 77
 The Federalist, 17:106.78
 Ibid.79
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Many considerations, besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to 
place it beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the people will 
be to the governments of their respective States. Into the administration of these a 
greater number of individuals will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater 
number of offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of these, 
all the more domestic and personal interests of the people will be regulated and 
provided for. With the affairs of these, the people will be more familiarly and 
minutely conversant. And with the members of these, will a greater proportion of 
the people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and of family 
and party attachments; on the side of these, therefore, the popular bias may well 
be expected most strongly to incline.  80
The conceptual anchor of this argument is Madison’s emphasis on the “attachment of the 
people,” a relationship of familiarity, connection, and trust that will prevent the national 
government from encroaching on the states. 
 Sanford Levinson has described Madison’s argument in The Federalist No. 46 as “one 
of political sociology and not one based on the raw text of the Constitution, which 
scarcely supports in an unequivocal way a reading of significantly limited national 
powers.”  He presents Madison’s argument about attachment as maintaining that 81
“ordinary citizens will naturally identify with their state governments and view the 
national government as a fairly remote and possibly mistrusted identity.”  In other 82
words, relative to the national government, the state governments will be larger, better 
known to the people, and more able to directly benefit more people than the national 
government. As such, they will be the objects of their trust and allegiance. The people 
will identify with their state governments and, for that reason, they will resist attempts to 
transfer power to the relatively unknown and remote federal government. 
 The Federalist, 46:316.80
 Levinson, Framed, 246 (emphasis in original).81
 Id., 247.82
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 In evaluating Madison’s argument in No. 46, it is critically important to recognize the 
basis for his contention that states needn’t fear consolidation. Rather than rest his 
argument on Filoppovian level-one or level-two protections of the federal bargain, like 
those discussed in Part I, Madison invoked level-three protections: the cultural and 
ideological values of the people. Of the five state advantages over the federal government 
that he identified in Federalist 45, three were rooted in the sentiments or commitments of 
the people: “the weight of personal influence,” “the predilection and probable support of 
the people,” and “the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures of 
each other.”  Incidentally, the remaining two—“the immediate dependence of the one on 83
the other” and “the powers respectively vested in them”—are directly connected to the 
degree of determinacy of the federal system, which in light of my argument at the outset 
of this chapter would call into question how strong these state advantages actually are.  
 At the end of the day, Madison argued, constitutional text and institutional design 
only go so far.  Within the broad parameters established by the Constitution, many of the 
details of the state-federal relationship would depend on which government enjoys the 
attachment of the people. And precisely because there is underdeterminacy in the federal 
system, the people would be able to choose which government to trust, or, put slightly 
differently, which government to entrust with the power to act on its behalf. In this way, 
underdeterminacy supplies the conditions necessary for the people’s attachment to be 
politically consequential. As Josh Chafetz has argued, “[T]he balance of powers between 
the federal government and the states must remain to some degree indeterminate. If there 
 The Federalist, 45:311. 83
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is no indeterminacy, then there is no possibility for conflict; and if there is no possibility 
for conflict, then there is no opportunity for the people to choose their champion.”  84
Chafetz’s use of “indeterminacy” here is synonymous with my use of underdeterminacy 
throughout this chapter. (And as I, among several others have argued, underdeterminacy 
is the more accurate term for the phenomenon under investigation.)  We can, therefore, 
condense his argument as follows: because there is underdeterminacy, conflict is 
inevitable; and because conflict is inevitable, the people will be able to choose which 
government to attach itself to. Accordingly, subject to legal and popular limitations the 
national and state governments will act where the people deem proper, and the state-
federal relationship will reflect these determinations. Federal underdeterminacy and the 
variable constitutional authority that results from the people’s attachment are reciprocal 
features of the American federal system.  85
 Though Levinson identifies only The Federalist No. 46 in his discussion of the 
political sociology of American federalism, the concept and consequences of the 
“attachment of the people” pervade The Federalist. In his seminal study, The Political 
Theory of The Federalist, David Epstein connects the notion of attachment to Madison’s 
discussion in The Federalist No. 37 of the “proper line of partition” between the state and 
federal governments, arguing that that line would be “determined by the degree to which 
 Josh Chafetz, “Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers,” 120 Yale Law Journal 1084 84
(2011), 1093. 
 Variable constitutional authority along these lines is a central emphasis of Mariah Zeisberg’s work. See, 85
generally, War Powers. See also Zeisberg, “Constitutional Fidelity and Interbranch Conflict,” 13 The Good 
Society (December 2004), 24-30. For a similar, though ultimately distinct, notion of variable authority, see 
Wayne Moore, “Variable Constitutional Authority: Madisonian Founding Perspectives,” 2 American 
Political Thought 217 (2013).
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the people are or become attached to one or the other.”  Epstein grounds Madison’s 86
contention that the states will have the advantage over the national government to, at least 
in part, an argument made in The Federalist No. 17. There Hamilton identifies the states’ 
“administration of criminal and civil justice” as the source of the “one transcendent 
advantage belonging to the province of the State governments.”  Not only is the states’ 87
administration of justice carried out in close physical proximity to the people, but it is 
also responsible for the protection of their lives and property. Both of these 
considerations would serve to remind the people of the importance, even necessity, of 
their state governments. 
 But, as one might expect knowing Hamilton’s confidence in an energetic national 
government, there is more to this argument than is perhaps apparent on the first reading. 
For in the course of his assurances that states will benefit more than the federal 
government from the peoples’ attachment, he identifies the principal qualification to the 
states’ advantage. After asserting that affections decrease “in proportion to the distance or 
diffusiveness of the object,” he concludes that local governments will be the object of the 
people’s stronger bias. But appended to that conclusion is a profoundly consequential 
condition: “unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much better 
administration of the latter [i.e., the government of the Union].”  Here Hamilton not only 88
opens the door to the possibility that the people’s attachment may shift to the new 
national government; he also identifies the process by which that shift can happen. The 
 The Political Theory of The Federalist, 52.86
 The Federalist, 17:107.87
 Ibid.88
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national government can, in effect, win over the people by doing well what it is charged 
with doing. Ten essays later, Hamilton again picks up this line of reasoning, candidly 
admitting that many of the Federalist essays have presented “reasons…to induce a 
probability that the general government will be better administered than the particular 
governments.”  And because there is, he argues, no justification for the opinion that the 89
general government will be administered worse than the state governments, “there seems 
to be no room for the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the people.”  90
In other words, there is no reason to believe that the national government could not out-
perform the state governments and, as a consequence of and in combination with the 
prevailing sentiments of the people, attract their attachment. While it is true that the 
people’s extant attachments to the states could persist, a beneficial and, in time, respected 
national government could change that. And with that change could come theretofore 
uncontemplated configurations of the state-federal relationship.  91
Attachment and the Anti-Federalist Fear of Consolidation 
 Lest one get the impression that Publius’ treatment of attachment is a function more 
of an idiosyncratic or biased (collective) mind than of broader conceptual or discursive 
importance, we can also look to the Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution. Recourse 
 Id., 27:172.89
 Id., 27:171.90
 Given Publius’ anonymity at the time of publication, it wasn’t likely that the authors’ arguments would be 91
interpreted through the specific lens of their reputations or, as in the case of Madison and Hamilton, known 
ambivalence—and, at times, antipathy—towards state governments. But it is nonetheless remarkable that in 
an essay (which itself is part of a larger enterprise) devoted to convincing skeptics of the Constitution’s 
merits, Publius forthrightly acknowledged the logical implications of the argument about attachment and 
the potentialities of the federal system.
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to the Anti-Federalists is helpful also for emphasizing that the argument I am advancing 
is not an argument about original intent, nor one that unnecessarily privileges the writings 
of a single individual (Madison or Hamilton) or writer (Publius). Rather it seeks to 
understand the logic of the political system established and regime inaugurated by the 
Constitution, and cites as illustration and support those who “saw best and farthest.”  92
Moreover, by looking to the arguments of both parties to the debate over ratification, we 
can identify the central points of agreement between the two as well as the rationale 
underlying their disagreements. Indeed, when we look to the Anti-Federalists we find a 
more nuanced and compelling understanding of attachment than is presented in The 
Federalist. And for good reason. While Publius’ discussions were concerned only with 
stasis—the peoples’ attachments were and would upon ratification remain with their state 
governments—writers like The Federal Farmer, Brutus, and Agrippa were forced to deal 
with the possibility of choice presented by the proposed Constitution. With the addition of 
another government that acted directly on individuals, state governments would have to 
compete for the peoples’ allegiances and would always be under threat of losing their 
attachment. There would, in other words, be competition between governments for the 
support of the people and, as a consequence, the power to act in the people’s name. 
Accordingly, they were forced to argue developmentally, painting a picture not only of 
what the Constitution would do in the short term but also of what kind of regime it would 
create over the long run. For this reason, while the variability of constitutional authority 
 Gordon Wood, The Idea of America: Reflections on the Birth of the United States (Penguin Books, 2011), 92
128. I cite this characterization well aware that Wood believes it was the Anti-Federalists, and not the 
Federalists, who best understood the political world to come and the consequences of the constitutional 
regime they opposed. Indeed, as I argue below, seeing farthest was not only a substantive merit of much 
Anti-Federalist argumentation; it was also a practical necessity. 
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is implied in Publius’ treatment of attachment, it is a central concern of the Anti-
Federalist critique of the federal system established by the Convention.  93
 We can begin to understand the Anti-Federalist notion of attachment by identifying an 
important area of common ground they shared with Publius. Both groups saw the 
attachment of the people as a central concern of statecraft and, by extension, as a crucial 
determinant of the contours of the state-federal relationship. Thus, for example, John 
Smilie’s argument that “the attachment of the citizens to their government and its laws is 
founded upon the benefits which they derive from them” parallels Hamilton’s argument 
in The Federalist No. 17 about attachment following the quality of government 
administration. Additionally, Brutus’ claim that every government must be supported 
either by force or “by the people having such an attachment to it”  is echoed by 94
Madison’s pairing in The Federalist No. 46 of attachment and the power to maintain a 
militia as guarantors of state autonomy.  Finally, there is Centinel’s belief that “time and 95
habit” give “stability and attachment…to forms of government,”  which mirrors 96
Madison’s belief, expressed at the Convention, that attachments of association and 
 Though beyond the scope of this essay, it should at least be noted that a comprehensive assessment of the 93
relevance of attachment to the understanding of the Convention’s proposal would have to connect both 
Publius’ and the Anti-Federalists’ arguments back to the records of the federal convention. A cursory review 
of the Convention proceedings only underscores the discussion presented here, and several relevant 
episodes from the Convention are thus adduced. It also reveals that, in contrast to (many of) the ratification 
debates, attachment frequently appears in connection with the question of what influences the allegiances 
of representatives and how political structures and requirements can exploit or avoid those influences as 
desired. See, e.g., the debate on 9 Aug., Farrand, Records, 2:230-242. 
 Brutus, No. IV (29 Nov. 1787); see also Federal Farmer, Essay XVIII (25 Jan. 1788). Both in Storing, 94
The Anti-Federalist.
 Here, after postulating that a regular army wouldn’t number more than “twenty-five or thirty thousand 95
men,” Madison writes: “To these would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of citizens 
with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common 
liberties, and united and conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence.” The 
Federalist, 46:321. 
 Centinel, No. 1 (5 Oct. 1787), in The Complete Anti-Federalist (Herbert Storing ed., 1981), 1:137. 96
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knowledge constitute a government’s “greatest strength and support.”  Examples could 97
be multiplied further, but those cited here suffice to establish the point that for Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists alike, the attachment of the people was a deeply consequential 
component of the design and operation of government.  
 Here as elsewhere, though, the two groups disagreed in the particulars. The 
Federalists saw attachment as principally a function of effective governance, which had 
been undermined by the state governments so beloved by the Anti-Federalists. As Herbert 
Storing has described this position, “A government that can actually accomplish its 
resolves, that can keep the peace, protect property, and promote the prosperity of the 
country, will be a government respected and obeyed by its citizens.”  But for the Anti-98
Federalists, attachment was the product of support freely given, of a confidence borne of 
knowledge of and proximity to one’s governors. The extended republic proposed by the 
Constitution threatened the ability of individuals to gain such knowledge by increasing 
the distance between them and their government. Accordingly, it threatened the 
possibility that attachment could be freely given. This was, to the Anti-Federalist mind, a 
critical defect of the Constitution, because there was only one alternative to voluntary 
attachment: force.   99
 Madison, 23 June, Farrand, Records, 1:392. Incidentally, this quotation comes not from Madison’s own 97
notes, but the records kept by Robert Yates, further emphasizing the conceptual and linguistic 
commonalities between the authors of The Federalist and their contemporaries.
 Herbert Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For: The Political Thought of the Opponents of the 98
Constitution (1981), 43. 
 In his study of Anti-Federalist thought, Storing identifies three “fundamental considerations” that 99
underlie the defects of the large republic. Its inability to “enjoy a voluntary attachment of the people to the 
government and a voluntary obedience to the laws” is listed first (What the Anti-Federalist Were For, 16).
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 We therefore see in the Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution an almost constant 
pairing of voluntary attachment and the coercive force of a central government, framed 
by the argument that the extended republic undermines the prerequisites of voluntary 
attachment. We’ve already seen the thrust of Brutus’ argument on this point, but its 
centrality to his and other Anti-Federalists’ opposition to the Constitution merits further 
attention. In his first essay he writes,  
Men who, upon the call of the magistrate, offer themselves to execute the laws, 
are influenced to do it either by affection to the government, or from fear; where 
a standing army is at hand to punish offenders, every man is actuated by the latter 
principle, and therefore, when the magistrate calls, will obey…The body of the 
people being attached, the government will always be sufficient to support and 
execute its laws, and to operate upon the fears of any faction which may be 
opposed to it, not only to prevent an opposition to the execution of the laws 
themselves, but also to compel the most of them to aid the magistrate; but the 
people will not be likely to have such confidence in their rulers, in a republic so 
extensive as the United States, as necessary for these purposes.  100
Obedience by force or voluntary attachment—those are the two available sources for the 
support and assistance that all governments depend on to implement their laws. But, as 
Richard Henry Lee argued, a consolidated nation “cannot be governed in freedom.” 
Whereas at the state level “opinion founded on the knowledge of those who govern, 
procures obedience without force,” the extended republic obliterates that opinion by 
diminishing the requisite knowledge, “and force then becomes necessary to secure the 
purposes of Civil society[.]”  101
 Brutus, No. I, in Storing, The Anti-Federalist, 115.100
 Richard Henry Lee, letter to Samuel Adams, 8 August 1789, The Letters of Richard Henry Lee (1914), 101
2:496. Though this letter is cited and discussed in Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, 16-17, it is 
attributed to a letter of 28 April 1788, with the recipient unknown.
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 We’ve seen that the Anti-Federalists’ treatment of attachment is a constitutive part of 
a broader critique of the extended republic. But the argument I’m advancing here requires 
more than that, namely it must show that their treatment of attachment is bound up in the 
nature of the federal system. That is, that the Anti-Federalist critique is not just about the 
size of the nation to be governed by the Constitution, but also the structure of the federal 
system proposed to govern it. To the opponents of the Constitution, it was clear that the 
federal system as structured by the Constitution fundamentally changed the economy of 
attachment. Where there was once voluntary attachment to a known and physically 
proximate government, there would be a transactional attachment with a far-off 
government—an allegiance rooted in the things government does and provides, not freely 
given support flowing from knowledge of one’s governors. Moreover, the federal system 
changed the calculus of attachment. In addition to trafficking in another currency of 
allegiance, the mere existence of an additional layer of government would destabilize the 
states by offering an exit option. If states didn’t merit the support of their citizens, under 
the Constitution the latter could punish the former not only by electing national-level 
representatives to assume erstwhile state duties but also by electing state-level 
representatives more favorable to national power or policies. States would now have to 
compete for the people’s support, and they would have to do so on the national 
government’s terms.  
 I conclude this section with a brief comment on the relationship between the 
substance and practical imperatives of the Anti-Federalist critique of the Constitution. 
Reading the Anti-Federalist responses to the Convention’s proposal, one is struck by their 
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predictive, almost prophetic tones. Theirs was not so much an appraisal of what the 
Constitution does in the immediate or short term as it was an attempt to understand and 
describe what the Constitution would do—to government, to society, and even to 
individual citizens. They were acutely aware that “the Constitution is much more than a 
constitution of government,”  that it would define both the ends towards which 102
government was oriented and the means by which those ends would be pursued; as a 
result, it would constitute the people as much as their government. They saw not only the 
alterations to American governance posed by the Constitution, but the subsequent 
changes that those alterations would beget. Hence, they argued not that ratification of the 
Constitution would immediately institute a consolidated government but that it was 
“calculated ultimately to make the states one consolidated government,”  and that, 103
“although the government reported by the convention does not go to a perfect and entire 
consolidation, yet it approaches so near to it, that it must, if executed, certainly and 
infallibly terminate in it.”  The Federalists, on the other hand, faced a different 104
imperative, to assure those skeptical of national power that the Constitution did not create 
an unnecessarily powerful federal government. Accordingly, they focused on the many 
things that the Constitution would not immediately change, foremost among which was 
the vast body of state powers that, for reasons of popular attachment and government 
capacity, would for the time being remain with the states. It was left to the Anti-
 Barber, Fallacies, 174. 102
 Federal Farmer, Essay I, in Storing, The Anti-Federalist, 37.103
 Brutus, No. I, id., 110.104
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Federalists to identify and explain how even those could in time be changed by the 
government proposed by the Constitution.   
Attachment, Administration, and American Constitutional Development 
The foregoing characterization of the federal system established by the Constitution 
captures the defining features of American federalism: the underdeterminacy of the state-
federal relationship and its related dependence on the attachment of the people. While the 
contours of the state-federal relationship were not explicitly defined by the constitutional 
text, its parameters were nonetheless identified and demarcated. Those contours, 
furthermore, are shaped by the people’s support for and confidence in each level of 
government, as well as their relative assessments of the two. As a result, the range of 
possible state-federal relationships is constrained but not fully specified by the 
constitutional text, and is embedded in the politics of a given moment. The elaboration or 
construction of the state-federal relationship is, therefore, a function of constitutionally 
structured politics and is both the responsibility of elected officials and a natural 
consequence of their efforts to pursue the ends of good governance.  It is, therefore, 105
appropriate to think of the federal system as a constitutional disharmony, a component of 
the regime that “generates a dialogical process that may result in changes in identity that, 
however significant, only rarely culminate in a wholesale transformation of the 
constitution.”  Federalism is proleptic of constitutional development—it structures, 106
 See, generally, Keith E. Whittington, Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and Constitutional 105
Meaning (Harvard University Press, 1999).
 Gary J. Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity (Harvard University Press, 2010), 326.106
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anticipates, and precipitates conflict over constitutional meaning and, as a consequence, 
constitutional identity.  107
While this understanding of the federal system directly conflicts with an interpretive 
approach that seeks legal determinacy from the Constitution on the question of the state-
federal relationship, it is broadly consistent with the work of a number of scholars who 
see federalism “as a continuing tension contained within, and created by, the founding 
document.”  What is less common, though, is the recognition that this feature of the 108
American constitutional order induces particular kinds of debates and certain 
developmental dynamics. As to the former, the state-federal relationship becomes a 
product of constitutional politics, something that both structures and is produced by 
debates over the proper meaning or desirable manifestation of the system of governance 
established by the Constitution.  As to the latter, the underdeterminacy of the federal 109
system privileges certain variables the development, augmentation, and modulation of 
which bear heavily on the nature of the federal system. While perhaps not as explicit as 
recurring patterns of politics, these variables (or determinants) nonetheless highlight 
 The argument presented here is an abridgment of Parts II and III of Connor M. Ewing, “Structure and 107
Relationship in American Federalism: Foundations, Consequences, and ‘Basic Principles’ Revisited,” 51 
Tulsa Law Review 689 (2016). 
 Keith E. Whittington, “The Political Constitution of Federalism in Antebellum America: The 108
Nullification Debate as an Illustration of Informal Mechanisms of Constitutional Change,” Publius 26(2): 
1. See also Edward Purcell, Jr., Federalism, Originalism, and the American Constitutional Enterprise (Yale 
University Press, 2007), 6; and David Brian Robertson, Federalism and the Making of America (Routledge, 
2012), 34.
 Though it is not the focus of this inquiry and there is not sufficient space to adequately address the 109
matter, it is nonetheless critical to note that this description is not intended to exclude judicial engagements 
with the federal system. Courts, as much as legislatures and executives, are affected by the 
underdeterminacy of the federal system, and their behaviors are influenced accordingly. In this way, 
judicial interpretations of federalism are not apart from but a species of the processes described here. This 
is the basic argument advanced in Chapter Three. For the development of a different component of this 
argument, one that critically evaluates commonly used tools of constitutional and statutory interpretation, 
see Ewing, “Structure and Relationship,” 712-728. 
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aspects of governance and political institutions that have the potential to shape 
constitutional meaning.  Taken together, these induced characteristics give both shape 110
and substance to constitutional development. 
The constitutional logic of federalism outlined here is, I believe, the best 
understanding of the system of government inaugurated by the Constitution. Moreover, it 
is the conception of the federal system that Publius elaborates and defends in The 
Federalist, a fact that is somewhat remarkable. After all, critics of the Constitution 
alleged that the scheme of government set forth thereby would result in the 
“consolidation of the United States, into one government.”  This was due in large part 111
to the “vast extent of the United States” and what that extent would require, namely the 
use of coercion or force and the consequent diminution of liberty.  Their fear, in brief, 112
was that the distribution of powers between the states and the national government would 
not hold, that the latter would in time “necessarily absorb the state legislatures and 
judicatories.”  As Storing explains, “The Anti-Federalists stood…for federalism in 113
opposition to what they called the consolidating tendency and intention of the 
 For an overview of the developmental mechanisms employed by scholars in the field of political 110
development, see Paul Pierson, Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis (Princeton 
University Press, 2004); and “Not Just What, but When: Timing and Sequence in Political Processes,” 
Studies in American Political Development 14(1):72-91 (2000). See also Karen Orren and Stephen 
Skowronek, The Search for American Political Development (Cambridge University Press, 2004).
 Cato, Letter III, 25 Oct. 1787, The Essential Antifederalist, ed. W.B. Allen and Gordon Lloyd (Rowman 111
& Littlefield, 2002), 27. See also Agrippa, Letter IV, 3 Dec. 1787, id., 122.
 Brutus, Essay I, 18 Oct. 1787, id., 102. According to Brutus, this consolidation was “in the 112
contemplation of the framers” of the Constitution. Citing the provision in Article I, Sec. 4 that empowered 
Congress to “make or alter [electoral] regulations,” he argued that it was only a matter of time before “the 
state legislatures drop out of sight from the necessary operation of the government, then Congress are to 
provide for the election and appointment of representatives and senators” (id.).
 Brutus, Essay I, id., 102.113
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Constitution—the tendency to establish one complete national government, which would 
destroy or undermine the states.”  114
In the analysis of the political sociology of federalism we saw that Publius’ response 
to the consolidation charge entailed adverting to considerations of political culture, 
specifically to the people’s affective posture toward each level of government. We can 
now go one step further, following Publius’ argument as it traced the attachment of the 
people to its foundation in government performance and administration. Recall that this 
was a theme that emerged early in The Federalist, where Hamilton suggested that, despite 
natural advantages possessed by the states, the attachment of the people would be 
influenced by how the governments of the union discharged the duties with which they 
were entrusted. More specifically, Hamilton argued that the states would possess “the 
greater degree of influence…if they administer their affairs with uprightness and 
prudence[.]”  This conditional advantage, buttressed by the principle of human nature 115
that “affections are commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the 
object,” would persist “unless the force of that principle should be destroyed by a much 
better administration of” the national government.  But it wasn’t until later in the 116
ratification debate, when Madison engaged the consolidation charge directly, that this 
argument was spelled out in greater and more practical detail. As we’ve already begun to 
see, the attachment of the people is not free-standing; nor does it exist in a vacuum. It is, 
rather, grounded in political facts and circumstances connected most immediately to the 
 Herbert Storing, What the Anti-Federalists Were For, 10.114
 The Federalist, 17:106.115
 Id., 17:107.116
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performance of government. Poor or unsuccessful administration will do little to 
preserve, much less cultivate or increase, popular support. The quality of governmental 
administration, in turn, depends on the ability of each government to capably acquit itself, 
which is principally a matter of government capacity. Without the requisite powers, 
resources, or institutions, there is little hope for successful administration. We see, 
therefore, a direct causal line connecting government capacity, running through 
administration, to the attachment of the people.  
Madison mounts this argument in The Federalist Nos. 45 and 46 alongside the 
argument about attachment discussed in the previous section. There he undertakes to 
answer the question of whether the powers granted to the national government will “be 
dangerous to the portion of authority left in the several States.”  Instead of legal 117
restrictions or constitutional impediments—about whose efficacy he was less than 
optimistic—Madison adverted to a collection of practical facts and forces that underlie 
the ability of the national and state governments “to resist and frustrate the measures of 
each other.”  In No. 45, he lists “the immediate dependence of the one [government] on 118
the other,” “the weight of personal influence which each side will possess,” “the powers 
respectively vested in them, “the predilection and probable support of the people,” and 
“the disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating measures of each other.”  Each 119
of these considerations, Madison averred, had persuaded him that it was more likely that 
the states could encroach on the federal government than vice versa. In No. 46, he again 
 Id., 45:308.117
 Id., 46:317.118
 Id., 45:311.119
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cites the national government’s dependence on the state governments, the 
“prepossessions of the people on whom both will depend,” and the “disposition” or bias 
that members of both governments will have towards local matters.  He adds in this 120
essay four more considerations, arguing that the states will employ more people than the 
national government, will control “a greater number of offices and emoluments,” will 
regulate and provide “all the more domestic and personal interests of the people,” and 
will possess more and better connections with the people.  121
Madison’s elucidation of the federal system established by the Constitution was made 
necessary by its underdeterminacy. He and other proponents of the Constitution, whether 
in the pages of New York newspapers or the ratifying conventions in the several states, 
could not easily point to a precise definition of the state-federal relationship; nor could 
they identify a clear statement of the jurisdictional line dividing the states from the 
national government. Nonetheless, Publius was remarkably candid about this fact and 
even its potential to lead to the aggrandizement of the new national government. 
Referencing Hamilton’s argument in No. 27, Madison provides in No. 46 a passage that 
is indispensable for understanding the nature of the governmental system established by 
the Constitution: 
If therefore, as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future become 
more partial to the foederal [sic] than to the State governments, the change can 
only result, from such manifest and irresistible proofs of a better administration, 
as will overcome all their antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people 
ought not surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where they 
may discover it to be most due: But even in that case, the State governments could 
 Id., 46:319.120
 Id., 46:316.121
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have little to apprehend, because it is only within a certain sphere, that the 
foederal [sic] power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously 
administered.  122
Here Madison not only acknowledges the malleability of the federal system but suggests 
that the distribution of power between levels of government—a consequence of the 
variable partiality, or attachment, of the people—would reflect and respond to 
administrative competence. He doesn’t, however, go as far as Hamilton did in No. 27, 
where Hamilton forthrightly states that there’s little reason to believe that the states will 
have an advantage over the national government.  Rather, the reassurance that Madison 123
has for those who feared consolidation is that there are natural limitations to the things 
that the federal government can administer well. Such limitations are reflected in his 
litany of state advantages. If one grants all of these things, it is not implausible to 
conclude that the reach of the national government would be substantially limited.  124
 But in matters of politics, “the nature of things” is bound to change. It may, indeed, 
not be too much to say that in politics the nature of things is change. This is precisely 
what the Anti-Federalist writers surveyed here feared—that the proposed Constitution 
would bring about radical changes or, in the case of those changes for which it was not 
directly responsible, would bring about undesirable results in the different circumstances 
 Id., 46:317.122
 Id., 27:172-173.123
 There is an argumentative thread running throughout Federalist and Anti-Federalist writings that 124
connects the attachment or confidence of the people to the things they ask government to do. As goes the 
former, so goes the latter. So having previously suggested that the people may well become more or better 
attached to the national government than to their respective state governments, Publius was pushed to 
identify an intervening variable that would disrupt or confound the causal connection between attachment 
and governmental responsibility. We encounter in The Federalist Nos. 45 and 46 the development of this 
argument, with Madison citing administrative capacity as a limitation on national power.
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that lay ahead of the country. For their part, Federalists acknowledged the necessity of 
change: a new frame of government was needed to make the states adequate to the 
challenges of the day, as well as for the future they could obtain under prudent, energetic, 
and well-structured governance. In this respect, the Constitution’s invocation of “our 
Posterity” was much more than rhetorical embellishment; it was a concern embedded in 
the structures and processes it would establish. At the Constitutional Convention and 
throughout the ratification debates, change and the future circumstances it would bring 
about were at the very center of discussion. Hence the significance of the fact that each 
safeguard identified in Nos. 45 and 46 is a contingent fact of politics and political culture 
at the time of the founding. Accordingly, the bases for state advantage over against the 
national government—the foundation for limited national powers in the sense urged by 
Anti-Federalists—were similarly contingent, phenomena that were conditional upon the 
facts of a given political context and are not true by virtue of necessity or constitutional 
meaning. Madison’s argument is one that sounds in both political culture and 
administration, which, as we’ve seen from the reasoning throughout The Federalist, are 
intertwined and mutually dependent. In this argument we can identify a number of 
concrete variables or determinants, corresponding to the categories of political culture 
and administration, that bear on the distribution of power in the federal system. In the 
domain of political culture there are four: personal influence, the attachment of the 
people, the posture of each government towards the other, and the number and quality of 
connections between the people and their governments. There are five more in the 
domain of administration and government capacity: intergovernmental dependence, the 
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powers vested in each government, the employment levels of both governments, the 
extent of governmental positions and salaries, and the regulation of “domestic and 
personal” matters.  
 The question critical observers of the American constitutional order are invited to ask
—the question Anti-Federalists persistently pressed—is, what happens to the federal 
system if these determinants change? What will be the consequences for the structure and 
operation of the federal system if these variables shift in favor of the national 
government? For a long time, the possibility of such changes was so inconceivable that 
the questions just posed were little more than abstract hypotheticals. The national 
government simply lacked the capacity and the revenue to administer programs that 
would significantly alter these dimensions of political life. And, as Madison and 
Hamilton were at pains to convince their readers, despite their shortcomings and failures 
the states nonetheless enjoyed robust popular attachment. But in time, each of these 
dimensions would undergo significant changes, in some cases tipping the balance in 
favor of the national government and in others complicating the picture of the federal 
system presented in The Federalist. Of course, these changes wouldn’t necessarily move 
in only one direction. Just as the national government could win the attachment of the 
people, so could state governments. The crucial point is that the determinants in which 
the state-federal relationship was rooted were bound to change. These changes would 
prompt questions about the correspondence between the Constitution’s commitment to 
federal governance and the prevailing constellation of government powers and 
institutions, as well as the degree of popular support and confidence. What should federal 
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governance look like in an era of expanded national power and capacity? What should be 
the limits on the reach of the federal government when it can do much more than 
originally conceived? And what would be the consequence if Madison’s suggested 
possibility became a reality and the people became more partial to the national 
government than to the state governments? 
We would do well by way of conclusion to step back from the substantive dimensions 
of Publius’ depiction and the Anti-Federalists’ criticisms of the federal system and 
observe its formal qualities. The difference between the two goes beyond a conflict 
between “strict” and “loose” construction of constitutional powers and provisions, 
distinctions that wouldn’t become relevant until after the Constitution entered into 
force.  Those terms, after all, concern that application of constitutional provisions, 125
whereas the ratification debates concerned their desirability. In many ways, the debate 
between Federalists and Anti-Federalists was pre-interpretive. One searches in vain for a 
debate over the semantic particularities of specific terms that, following ratification, 
would become the subject of significant disagreement. This is not to say that textual 
meaning did not enter the ratification debates. But when it did, the focus was less on the 
precise legal meaning of operative terms as it was on what the general meaning of the 
 See, for example, Saul Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in 125
America, 1788-1828 (University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 188; David M. O’Brien, “Reflections on 
Courts and Civil Liberties in Times of Crisis,” 3 Journal of the Institute of Justice and International Studies 
11, 12 (2003); and Simeon D. Fess, The History of Political Theory and Party Organization in the United 
States, (Ginn and Company, 1910), 12-13.
!91
proposed powers and processes augured for the organization of politics and society.  126
Indeed, there is not much of a difference between the two groups in how they evaluated 
the proposed Constitution. In order to reach the normative question, they had to first 
resolve the empirical question. That is, they confronted the necessity of determining what 
the Constitution proposed and what it was likely to cause before they could have a 
discussion of the desirability of that nature and those consequences. 
A better term for the form of the arguments offered by Federalists and Anti-
Federalists is diagnostic. Like a physician seeking to understand the systemic 
ramifications of a structural or operational change in the body, the Constitution’s 
supporters and critics alike sought to elucidate the essential nature, central changes, and 
defining commitments of a new system of government. This approach, which Jeffrey 
Tulis and Nicole Mellow describe as oriented around constitutional logics, was 
principally concerned with the questions of “what the Constitution meant, what its words 
implied, and what its structure portended in broad nonnormative, empirical terms.”  127
Their enterprise was not constitutional interpretation, as it has largely come to be 
understood in the American tradition, but the explication of constitutional logics. It is 
precisely this difference that Charles Black highlighted when he contrasted the “particular 
text style” that dominates American constitutional interpretation with an approach that 
seeks to identify institutions and relationships from which substantive commitments and 
 A good example of this is the debate between Anti-Federalists (as exemplified by the arguments of 126
Richard Henry Lee and “Timoleon”) and leading Federalists (particularly Gouverneur Morris, James 
Wilson, and James Madison) over the general welfare clause. See Peter Zavodnyik, The Age of Strict 
Construction, A History of the Growth of Federal Power: 1789-1861 (Catholic University Press, 2007), 
18-22.
 Tulis and Mellow, “The Anti-Federal Appropriation,” American Political Thought: A Journal of Ideas, 127
Institutions, and Cultures 3(1):157-166 (Spring 2014), 161. 
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defining logics can be inferred. Where the two groups disagreed was on the question of 
whether the logics identified and the changes they would bring about were good or bad. 
But there was broad agreement on both what those logics were and what they would 
entail. In the case of the relationship between the states and the new national government, 
this logic was characterized by an underdeterminate division of powers and the 
consequent possibility of adjustments to that relationship that responded to changes in 
political culture and government capacity. 
The analysis presented here, though, suggests something slightly different from what 
Tulis and Mellow observe about the debate between Federalists and leading Anti-
Federalists. In the course of their examination of the debate over federalism, they 
conclude, “The structural properties of the regime are much more determinative of real 
power, and, correctly, the Anti-Federalists saw precious little structural support for states 
in the Constitution.”  While the sources covered in this chapter supply ample support 128
for the second part of this statement, the argument presented here points in an importantly 
different direction from the first part. I’ve argued that it is the contingent foundations of 
the federal system, in conjunction with the structural properties of the constitutional 
regime, that are constitutive of the state-federal relationship. The foundations of the state-
federal relationship lie in political culture and administrative capacity, which differ from 
the composition of the Senate, the power of the national government over the state 
militias, and the lack of explicit reservations of robust state power—all of which are cited 
by Tulis and Mellow as structural properties of the regime. While the determinants 
 Id., 163.128
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identified here have structural consequences and ramifications, it is essential to keep 
them distinct from strictly structural properties. Though this qualification doesn’t 
diminish the force of Tulis and Mellow’s central contention that Publius’ victory came at 
the expense of consequential rhetorical concessions to critics of national power—
concessions that were subsequently appropriated by those who lost the ratification debate
—it nonetheless highlights the fact that The Federalist offers a remarkably candid 
assessment of the foundations of national and state power under the Constitution. It is, 
moreover, an assessment that is impervious to Anti-Federal appropriation, in that the 
determinants Publius identifies are actual facts about the world rather than rhetorical 
expositions of the form of government established by the Constitution. By shifting the 
focus from structural properties to contingent facts of politics, Publius put the future 
contours of the state-federal relationship squarely in the domain of political and 
constitutional development. If persuasive, then, the argument advanced in this chapter 
suggests that it is not only the structural properties of the constitutional regime that 
determine political power. Rather, an accurate and complete account of the constitutional 
logic of federalism must include the contingent determinants rooted in political culture 
and administrative capacity identified here. Consequently, investigations of political 
development—of durable changes in governing authority—must attend not only to 
structural transformations but also to modulations in political culture and government 
capacity and the consequences those shifts have for the structural properties of the 
constitutional order. And because such modulations were destined to occur—either by 
concerted effort or exogenous changes—the state-federal relationship would be both a 
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cause and an effect of American constitutional development, provoking political change 
even as it would be remade through politics.   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Chapter Two: Federalism and the Separation of Powers 
 Students of American politics are often taught that there are three fundamental 
components of the political system established by the Constitution: the separation of 
powers, checks and balances, and federalism. But as they are examined the distinctions 
between these components quickly become clouded and difficult to maintain. For 
instance, the separation of powers is conventionally explained as a way political 
institutions check and balance one another. Similarly, federalism is frequently portrayed 
as one way in which power is separated in the constitutional system, with the states and 
the national government checking and balancing each other.  At the heart of this 1
confusion is a misunderstanding of the basic nature and purpose of the divisions between 
the levels of government, on the one hand, and the coordinate political branches, on the 
other. In this chapter, I seek to clarify this misunderstanding by responding to the 
 A perusal of various introductory textbooks to American politics is sufficient to establish this point. For a 1
few notable examples, see Joseph M. Bessette et al., American Government and Politics: Deliberation, 
Democracy, and Citizenship (Wadsworth, 2012), 31-96; Theodore J. Lowi et al., American Government: 
Power and Purpose (13th ed.) (W.W. Norton, 2014), 48-103; and Samuel Kernell and Gary C. Jacobson, 
The Logic of American Politics (2nd ed.) (CQ Press, 2003), 30-99. 
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argument that federalism is a separation of powers, which attempts to make a virtue of 
unifying the three components mentioned above. But beyond addressing this argument 
there is a larger goal, which is to clarify the differences between the division of 
governmental levels and the separation of powers in the national government. This is 
particularly necessary because, as the last chapter anticipated and this chapter will make 
explicit, federalism and the separation of powers are both characterized by 
underdeterminacy. 
 I begin by introducing the “unifying theory”—the argument that federalism is a 
separation of power. I then present a distinction between the two notions of power 
entailed by this argument, notions that, in turn, serve as foundations for two different 
conceptions of why power is separated in a constitutional system. These I refer to as the 
division of power and the separation of powers. Returning to the fundamental premises of 
the unifying theory, I argue that while it accurately captures some aspects of how 
federalism functions in the American constitutional order, it ultimately fails because of 
the nature of the relationships between state and national institutions. The failure of the 
unifying theory is rooted in what I call the puzzle of constitutional authority, by which I 
mean that so long as state sovereignty is asserted over against national power, and 
national supremacy must therefore be invoked, state-federal relations cannot produce the 
deliberative and authority-enhancing benefits of the separation of powers among national 
governing institutions. But enabling these interactions to generate such benefits would 
require surrendering either state sovereignty as it has been understood for much of 
American history or national supremacy as it has developed over the same period. I 
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conclude by arguing that the puzzle of constitutional authority can be provisionally and 
contingently resolved through constructions of the state-federal relationship, 
constructions that are rooted in the defining features of the federal system discussed in 
the last chapter—the underdeterminate division of power between levels of government, 
and the consequent centrality of political culture and governmental capacity to the 
elaboration of the state-federal relationship.  
The Unifying Theory: Federalism as a Separation of Power 
 A paradigm example of the argument that federalism is a separation of powers is 
Bruce Peabody and John Nugent’s attempt to offer a “unifying theory” of the separation 
of powers.  In their article, Peabody and Nugent argue that “both the scholarship and 2
jurisprudence on separated powers is marked by its inconsistency and lack of synthesis,”  3
which for them provides an occasion to advance an understanding of separated powers 
that is both “synthesized and inclusive.”  Given the explicitness of their goal and 4
comprehensiveness of their argument, Peabody and Nugent’s article will serve as the 
main point of reference for my discussion of the analogy between federalism and the 
 Bruce G. Peabody and John D. Nugent, “Toward a Unifying Theory of the Separation of Powers,” 53 2
American University Law Review 1 (2003) [hereinafter, Peabody and Nugent, “Unifying Theory”].
 Id., 4. See also Bruce G. Peabody and Scott E. Gant, “The Twice and Future President: Constitutional 3
Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment,” 83 Minnesota Law Review 565 (1999), 625.
 Peabody and Nugent, “Unifying Theory,” 5. 4
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separation of powers, though other arguments will be adduced where relevant to the 
elaboration of what, for ease of reference, I will refer to as the unifying theory.  5
 After surveying the scholarly landscape of separation of powers debates, Peabody and 
Nugent fault the dominant schools of thought—post-Nixon critiques, effects-based 
analyses, and architectonic approaches—for being insufficiently integrated, improperly 
structured by a judicial-legal framework, and ignorant of vital features of the separation 
of powers.  To remedy these defects they attempt to build on extant theories by advancing 6
five underemphasized components of the American separated powers system, the first of 
which involves “expand[ing] the dominant understanding of the constitutional separation 
of powers to include the ‘vertical’ separation of powers between state government and the 
national government.”  Thus, the principal component of Peabody and Nugent’s unifying 7
theory of the separation of powers is the designation of “federalism as a separation of 
power.”  8
 On what considerations is this designation founded? Peabody and Nugent identify 
three main grounds for the equivalence they posit. The first is that state officials are able 
to influence policy through interactions with representatives and bureaucrats in the 
 There are, in addition to the accounts offered by Peabody and Nugent and Jessica Bulman-Pozen 5
(introduced below), numerous other articulations and versions of the unifying theory. See, for examples, 
Maxwell A. Cameron and Tulia G. Falleti, “Federalism and the Subnational Separation of Powers,” Publius 
35(2):245-271 (2005); Thomas R. Dye, Federalism: Competition Among Governments (Lexington Books, 
1990); and Victoria Nourse, “The Vertical Separation of Power,” 49 Duke Law Journal 749 (1999).
 Peabody and Nugent, “Unifying Theory,” 16-17.6
 Id., 17. Peabody and Nugent are careful to distinguish this notion of a vertical separation from the notion 7
given voice by Justice Kennedy in Clinton v. New York, according to which the “[s]eparation of powers 
operates on a vertical axis…between each branch and the citizens in whose interest powers must be 
exercised” [542 U.S. 452 (1998)].
 Id., 18.8
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national government. From congressional testimony and high-level meetings to 
implementation-stage cooperation between state and federal administrators, state 
representatives and bureaucrats can shape the creation and implementation of policy in 
ways similar to national officials. This influence can take the form of both positive and 
negative functions. Whereas the former is concerned with the productive use of political 
power, the latter is concerned with “checking institutional overreach.”  Second, as is true 9
for the separation of powers between the three branches of the national government, the 
separation of power between the national and state governments “leave[s] somewhat 
open the identity of the political entity ultimately authorized to decide how contested 
power is to be exercised.”  The insight here is that the same kind of underdeterminacy 10
that characterizes political power at the national level also characterizes political power in 
the domain of state-federal relations. As we shall see below, it is this point about 
underdeterminacy that connects arguments equating federalism and the separation of 
powers to considerations about constitutional authority. And third, the separations of 
power both at the national level and between levels of government “create different 
allocations of authority precisely so that they can be utilized differently, as distinctive 
kinds of power.”  Here Peabody and Nugent affirm the functional division of powers 11
that figures prominently in traditional accounts of the separation of powers, but add that 
 Id., 22.9
 Id., 21. 10
 Ibid.11
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they “simply think that the powers exercised by state politicians are qualitatively different 
from (but complementary to) their national analogues.”  12
 To this account of federalism as a separation of power we can add an argument posed 
by Jessica Bulman-Pozen, who presents a case for why in a cooperative federal scheme—
that is, one in which Congress empowers states to be partners in the implementation of a 
national statutory scheme—states can safeguard the separation of powers system.  What 13
is most important for our purposes is the way in which Bulman-Pozen sees states 
fulfilling this function. When included by Congress in a national regulatory scheme, she 
argues, states can “reinvigorat[e] the separation of powers” by checking the power of the 
federal executive.  To be clear, Bulman-Pozen does not explicitly argue, as do Peabody 14
and Nugent, that federalism is a separation of power, though she concedes that “the 
overarching similarities between federalism and the separation of powers are widely 
recognized.”  Rather, she contends that federalism can further the purposes of the 15
separation of powers. But in so doing, she indicates that a principal—perhaps the chief—
purpose of the separation of powers is to enable one branch of the national government 
(here Congress) to check another (the Executive). Indeed, though Bulman-Pozen 
 Id., 22. On this point Peabody and Nugent cite the work of Jeffrey K. Tulis in The Rhetorical Presidency 12
(Princeton University Press, 1988). See also Tulis, “Impeachment in the Constitutional Order,” in The 
Constitutional Presidency (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009) and a pair of articles by Robert Post and 
Reva Siegel: “Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric Interpretation of the 
Family and Medical Leave Act,” 112 Yale Law Journal 1943 (2003) and “Protecting the Constitution from 
the People: Juricentric Restrictions on Section Five Power,” 78 Indiana Law Journal 1 (2003). 
 Jessica Bulman-Pozen, “Federalism as a Safeguard of the Separation of Powers,” 112 Columbia Law 13
Review 459 (2012).
 See, e.g., Bulman-Pozen, id., 459, 461, 462, and 463. See also Heather Gerken, “Uncooperative 14
Federalism,” 118 Yale Law Journal 1256 (2009).
 Bulman-Pozen, id., 460.15
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disavows any attempt to address “first-order questions about the meaning of the 
separation of powers,”  her article makes clear that for her the separation of powers is 16
defined by its capacity to furnish one branch with checks on another branch’s attempts to 
exercise political power. In this, her argument emphasizes the negative functions of the 
separation of powers that Peabody and Nugent also identify as served by federalism. 
Two Notions of Power & Two Conceptions of Separation 
 Having identified the essential components of the argument that federalism is a 
separation of power, we can now turn to consider which aspects of the American 
constitutional regime it accurately captures and which it overlooks or misconstrues. My 
basic contention here is straightforward: arguments that equate federalism with the 
separation of powers, like those set out above, entail a distinction between two notions of 
political power and, consequently, two conceptions of the separation thereof. This is 
significant because only one of these conceptions is unproblematic when applied to 
federalism. I start by identifying the two notions of power at play in the unifying 
theorists’ argument and conclude by developing the conception of the separation of 
powers to which each gives rise. 
 We may begin by observing that the unifying theorists employ two different notions 
of political power. Peabody and Nugent are quite explicit about this when they 
distinguish between the “positive” functions of the separation of powers and the 
 Id., 463. This is a somewhat odd admission for an argument that, to be intelligible, requires some notion 16
of what the separation of powers is, if not a reasonably clear sense of what it is not. Nonetheless, Bulman-
Pozen is content to observe that the “separation of powers is an essentially contested concept, perhaps even 
an essentially contradictory concept” (id.), and to leave it at that. 
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“negative” functions. As they argue: “[O]ur approach to the separation of powers 
emphasizes taking stock of a number of ‘positive’ functions associated with this system, 
aside from its commonly acknowledged ‘negative’ role of checking institutional 
overreach.”  Though this will be discussed at greater length below, it will suffice for 17
present purposes simply to note that the positive functions Peabody and Nugent identify 
as relevant to federalism consist primary in the distinctive kinds of power that states can 
exercise in the separation of powers system—the “distinctive ‘qualities and functions’ 
associated with each branch or division of government.”  As indicated earlier, the 18
negative functions predominate Bulman-Pozen’s account of the separation of powers. 
Indeed, for her the essence of the separation of powers system is Congress’ ability to 
check Executive branch domination, in which enterprise the states can be a useful ally.  
 These two notions of power are founded on different premises and oriented toward 
different ends. The negative notion is premised on the belief that political power is liable 
to abuse and that it must accordingly be appropriately divided, limited, and checked to 
protect liberty and enable effective governance. The positive notion, on the other hand, 
holds that the fundamental values of liberal constitutionalism should be incorporated into 
the exercise of political power and that political institutions must therefore be designed 
and empowered to express those values through their interactions with one another. These 
values—democratic will, security from threats foreign and domestic, the protection of 
individual rights and the rule of law—correspond to the fundamental genres of political 
 Peabody and Nugent, “Unifying Theory,” 22.17
 Ibid., citing Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency, 4518
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power in modern constitutional governments: legislative, executive, and judicial. 
Whereas the positive notion is oriented towards the use of political power, the negative 
notion is oriented towards preventing its abuse. For this reason, the two notions of power 
undergird two conceptions of why political power should be separated, as well as how the 
exercise of separated powers should be evaluated. The distinction between the two 
conceptions rests on the difference, seemingly trivial but in fact deeply consequential, 
between dividing power among authoritative institutions in the service of preventing 
arbitrary or tyrannical exercise and separating the constitutive powers of a constitutional 
republic. The salient distinction, then, is between the division of power and the separation 
of powers.   19
 The division of power incorporates the negative notion’s emphasis on the potential 
abuses of power, and political power is accordingly either divided wholesale between 
governmental institutions and levels or interdependencies are created such that one 
branch cannot act without the concurrence of at least one other branch. As a result, 
branches (and individuals located therein) are able to prevent a use of power initiated or 
continued by another branch or institution from proceeding. Hence, an important 
 Because of the linguistic similarity of these conceptions, hereinafter occurrences of the terms are 19
selectively italicized in order to draw attention to the precise notion being discussed or distinguished. Given 
the distinction I am making here, it should be noted that although Peabody and Nugent are careful to 
employ “separation of power” in reference to federalism, their usage does not rest on the difference I’ve 
identified. Indeed, it isn’t clear if their choice has any principled basis other than consistency.
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institutional mechanism for the division of power conception is the veto point.  On this 20
understanding, political power is conceived of as a single quantum that is either checked 
or exercised, and institutional determinations are either blocked or endorsed. The most 
familiar example of this is the lawmaking process. In order for a bill to become a law, 
Congress must first pass it and the president must then sign it; after this process is 
concluded, the legislation is then subject to judicial review. This process is further 
subdivided on the front end, in that both chambers of Congress must pass the same bill, 
and bills that entail raising revenue must originate in the House. For the government’s 
lawmaking power to be successfully exercised, each of these conditions must be satisfied 
in the proper order. If one is not fulfilled or the proper order not followed, power cannot 
be exercised. 
 The division of power conception is closely associated with the natural rights 
interpretation of the Constitution.  Michael Zuckert, for example, has likened “the theory 21
of the separation of powers as we see it expressed in Montesquieu and reaffirmed by 
Madison in The Federalist Papers” to a relay race, in which “the three branches each run 
 There is a well developed literature in the field of American politics that has identified and evaluated the 20
consequences of a range of veto points. For example, see Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. 
Lawmaking (University of Chicago Press, 1998); George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions 
Work (Princeton University Press, 2002); and David Watkins and Scott Lemieux, “Compared to What? 
Judicial Review and Other Veto Points in Contemporary Democratic Theory,” Perspectives on Politics 
13(2):312-326 (2015). And for further evidence that the unifying theory, especially as it extends to the 
division of powers conception, is firmly established in undergraduate education, consider this passage from 
Susan Welch et al., Understanding American Government (Wadsworth, 2014): “Because of federalism, 
separation of powers, and checks and balances, the American governmental system has multiple veto 
points, which are points in the political process where one official or group of officials can block proposals 
moving through the process” (45).
 See, e.g.,, Randy Barnett, Restoring the Lost Constitution (Princeton University Press, 2003); and 21
Michael P. Zuckert, The Natural Rights Republic (University of Notre Dame Press, 1997). 
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part of the race and they pass the baton of law onto the next branch.”  This 22
incrementalization of power underscores the capacity of each “runner” to control the fate 
of the previous “runner.” In a more developed formulation, Zuckert locates the 
“conceptual foundations of the doctrine of separation of powers” in Lockean political 
philosophy, specifically in Locke’s identification of the functional separation of 
legislative, executive, and judicial powers, the absence of which makes “the state of 
nature a condition where rights are thoroughly insecure.”  On this basis, Zuckert 23
contrasts the Lockean vision of the separation of powers with Woodrow Wilson’s 
Progressive critique, according to which “how powers are divided and separated matters 
hardly or not at all; what matters is merely that they are separated and can check each 
other.”  Philip Muñoz has given voice to this (alleged Progressive) conception of the 24
separation of powers, with an argument that perhaps reveals the inaptness of the relay 
race metaphor for a theory oriented towards stymying the exercise of power: “Sometimes 
we forget the whole purpose of the separation of powers is to frustrate government action, 
to make it harder for government to act.”  Elsewhere Muñoz connects the emphasis on 25
the separation of powers in The Federalist to Publius’ “accept[ance] of human nature as it 
 Michael P. Zuckert, “Constitutional Principles: Separation of Powers,” The Bill of Rights Institute and 22
Jack Miller Center (Aug. 24, 2012). I take Zuckert here to be expressing a conventional, rather than his 
own, view of separation of powers. In the subsequently cited sources, he offers a considerably more 
detailed treatment of the issues and a more formal statement of his position. 
 Michael Zuckert, “On the Separation of Powers: Liberal and Progressive Constitutionalism,” Social 23
Philosophy and Policy 29(2):335-364, 358-359 (July 2012). See also Zuckert, “Natural Rights and Modern 
Constitutionalism,” 2 Northwestern Journal of International Human Rights 1 (2004).
 Zuckert, “On the Separation of Powers,” 359.24
 Vincent Philip Muñoz, “Constitutional Principles: Separation of Powers,” The Bill of Rights Institute and 25
Jack Miller Center (Aug. 24, 2012).
!106
is,” that is, that men are not angels.  Given the threats of abuse or infringement of 26
individual rights, checks must be built into the procedures by which power is exercised 
and public authority wielded. Thus, for example, congressional enactments are subject to 
presidential veto, presidential nominees are subject to senatorial confirmation, and 
judicial and executive actors alike are subject to impeachment by Congress. 
 The proof-text for the division of power conception is The Federalist No. 51, in which 
Madison characterizes the compound republic’s partitioning of power both between 
levels of government and among “distinct and separate departments” as “a double 
security to the rights of the people. The different governments will controul [sic] each 
other; at the same time that each will be controuled [sic] by itself.”  Thus will federalism 27
complement the “interior structure of the government” to protect the people’s rights. 
Moreover, the division of power conception gives a specific interpretation to Madison’s 
claim that, “Ambition must be made to counteract ambition.”  From the standpoint of 28
preventing the arbitrary or tyrannical use of political power, this description is understood 
to refer to each branch’s—and, indeed, each governmental level’s—ability to check 
actions of the others. Thus, according to the division of power conception ambition is 
construed as directed in the first instance towards thwarting the encroachments of other 
political actors. Further emphasizing the negative rights pedigree of this understanding, 
 Vincent Phillip Muñoz, God and the Founders: Madison, Washington, and Jefferson (Cambridge 26
University Press, 2009), 56.
 The Federalist, Jacob E. Cooke (ed.) (Wesleyan University Press, 1961), 51:351. [Hereinafter citations to 27
The Federalist will follow this template. The essay number will be cited, followed by a colon and the page 
number of the text referenced or quoted.]
 Id., 51:349.28
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the ambitious politician is one who strives, in defense of individual rights, to prevent the 
use of political power.  
 In contradistinction to the division of power, the separation of powers conception 
incorporates the positive notion of political power identified above and is consequently 
concerned with structuring and separating institutions that are designed to give 
expression to the polity’s fundamental value commitments. This concern has two 
components: (1) the creation of adequately independent legislative, executive, and 
judicial institutions; and (2) the establishment of processes by which these separate 
institutions jointly exercise constitutionally enumerated powers. This is a richer, if often 
overlooked, conception of why powers are separated in a constitutional system, one that 
focuses on the potential value added to exercises of governmental power by interactions 
between legislative, executive, and judicial institutions. Jeffrey Tulis expresses this 
conception particularly cogently in his discussion of the “basic desiderata” of 
constitutional self-government:  
Basic desiderata of all democratic regimes include provision for the expression of 
popular will in and about public policy, protection of individual rights, and 
(common to all regimes) provision for security or self-preservation. These 
desiderata exist in tension with each other. Separation of powers can be thought of 
as an attempt to productively resolve those tensions by representing them in and 
among competing institutions…The structure of each institution, as well as the 
arrangement of legal powers, can be thought of as an institutional design to make 
productive the tension between popular will, rights, and security both within and 
among major institutions of government.   29
On this account, while all three coordinate branches of the national government are 
concerned with the three basic desiderata, each is structured with a bias towards one 
 Jeffrey K. Tulis, “Impeachment in the Constitutional Order,” in The Constitutional Presidency, 242.29
!108
particular desideratum. Thus, because of its electoral bases and size, the Legislature is 
primarily concerned with the expression of popular will; endowed with the powers to 
conduct war and diplomacy, the Executive is oriented towards national security and 
welfare; and the Judiciary, having as its purpose the enforcement of both the Constitution 
and duly passed laws, is directed towards the protection of individual rights and the 
maintenance of the rule of law. In more refined accounts, these institutional biases are 
complemented by structurally-induced characteristics specific to each branch: 
deliberation in the Legislature, energy in the Executive, and judgment in the Judiciary.   30
 This view adduces as support Madison’s arguments in The Federalist Nos. 47-51, 
which begin from Montesquieu’s insight about the importance of separated powers but 
quickly move to the justification of a constitutional system in which institutions are “so 
far connected and blended as to give to each a constitutional control over the others.”  31
To the division of power advocates’ citation of Montesquieu as the model of separated 
powers that Madison affirms in The Federalist, adherents of the separation of powers 
conception counter that Madison’s embrace of Montesquieu was far from complete. 
Rather, while duly honoring one of the “enlightened patrons of liberty” Madison was 
keen to stress that all the theory of “the celebrated Montesquieu” required was that “all 
 See, e.g., Jeffrey K. Tulis, “Constitutional Decay and the Politics of Deference,” 10th Annual Walter F. 30
Murphy Lecture in American Ideals and Institutions, delivered April 4, 2011, under the aegis of Princeton 
University’s James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions. See also Tulis, “Deliberation 
Between Institutions,” in Debating Deliberative Democracy, James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett (eds.) 
(Blackwell Publishing, 2003).
 The Federalist, 48:332.31
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powers legislative, executive, and judiciary” not be accumulated in the same hands.  32
“[H]e did not mean,” Madison writes of Montesquieu in No. 47, “that these departments 
ought to have no partial agency in, or no controul over, the acts of the other.”  This left 33
considerable room for power-sharing between institutions. As Madison argues in The 
Federalist No. 37, such sharing may well be inevitable because of the impossibility of 
“the task of marking the proper line of partition”  between both levels of government 34
and the branches of the national government. More importantly, though, there is good 
reason for power to be shared. By giving “each department…a will of its own” and “the 
necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments,”  the 35
“opposite and rival interests” instilled in these institutions would, with every properly 
structured exercise of government power, express the fundamental values of liberal 
constitutionalism.  
 Just as the division of power account is associated with the natural rights 
interpretation of American constitutionalism, the separation of powers account is aligned 
with an ends-oriented interpretation of the constitutional order. A prominent proponent of 
this view is Sotirios Barber, who has over the course of several works developed the most 
sophisticated and comprehensive critique of the negative constitutionalist position.  The 36
 Id., 47:324 (emphasis added). Hence the need, as noted above as component (1) of the twofold concern 32
of the separation of powers, to construct adequately independent legislative, executive, and judicial 
institutions. 
 Ibid. (emphasis in original). 33
 Id., 37:235.34
 Id., 51:348, 349.35
 See Barber, Welfare and the Constitution (Princeton University Press, 2003), 1-22; The Fallacies of 36
States Rights (Harvard University Press, 2013), 172-179; and Constitutional Failure (University Press of 
Kansas, 2014), 26-52. 
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basic point of Barber’s argument is that it is incoherent to contend that a government was 
established chiefly for the purpose of limiting government. The primary purpose of any 
particular government must be the achievement (or the pursuit) of the ends for which 
governments are established—happiness, general welfare, justice.  Hence, the limitation 37
of government power can be, at most, an ancillary commitment of a constitutional 
system. And the limitation of government power must, moreover, be in service of the 
positive ends of government. What must take precedence are the purposes for which 
government is established—the pursuit of positive goods like general welfare, economic 
prosperity, and (in some account) secular public reasonableness.  The separation of 38
powers conception can even cite as support Locke’s articulation of the doctrine, which, 
returning to Zuckert’s account, “does not take its bearing from limiting government but 
from accomplishing the positive tasks government must accomplish to justify its 
existence.”  From this understanding of constitutional powers we arrive at a quite 39
different interpretation of the maxim from The Federalist No. 51 that, “Ambition must be 
made to counteract ambition.” Rather than being oriented towards frustrating or halting 
the use of power, ambition in a properly structured political system can be made to 
improve the use of political power by offering to the ambitious politician the interest and 
opportunity to defend an institution that is uniquely structured to express a fundamental 
 Each of these is identified as a or even the end of government in The Federalist. See 36:230 (“the great 37
ends of public happiness and national prosperity”); 45:309 (“the real welfare of the great body of the people 
is the supreme object to be pursued”); and 51:352 (“Justice is the end of government.”)
 On the last of these see Sotirios Barber, Constitutional Failure, 26-52 and 479-109.38
 Zuckert, “On the Separation of Powers,” 359.39
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regime value. It is through both conflict and deliberation between such institutions that 
well-considered, legitimate, and authoritative exercises of political power can be attained.  
 Before proceeding to an evaluation of the application of these conceptions to the 
unifying theory, it is necessary to make an important caveat with respect to the distinction 
I’ve made between the division of power and the separation of powers. The distinction 
offered here is clearly not a simple dichotomy. More importantly, the two exist 
concurrently, in the sense that the division of power is a structural feature of the 
constitutional order and the separation of powers is given life and possibility by this 
feature. This is most apparent when we realize that what appears to be a mine-run check 
of one institution on another (e.g., a veto or the rejection of a judicial nominee) can 
simultaneously be the expression of a particular branch’s distinctive governing capacity. 
But distinguishing between these two possibilities requires first determining the 
relationships between the relevant institutions and, second, evaluating the congruence 
between the reasons that are offered as justification for that branch’s actions and the facts 
of the situation in question. This, in turn, requires that we inquire into the content of the 
reasons offered by governmental institutions in defense of their actions as well as the 
institutional contexts through which those reasons are refracted. It is to these 
considerations that I now turn. 
Sovereignty, Supremacy, and Constitutional Authority 
 The claim that federalism is a species of separation of power is, at its most basic and 
consequential, a claim about the ends that both federalism and the separation of powers 
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serve. As I argued above, the unifying theory entails not a single but a dual notion of 
political power. From these two notions follow two conceptions of how and why power is 
separated in a constitutional system. The end served by the division of power model is the 
prevention of the arbitrary or tyrannical use of political power, while the end served by 
the separation of powers model is the beneficial use of political power ordered towards 
the expression of the fundamental values of liberal constitutionalism. Having 
distinguished between the two notions of power and the two conceptions of separated 
powers at play in the unifying theory, we must now determine which conception (if any) 
can properly be said to apply to federalism.  
 The argument I should like to develop here is that while the division of power 
conception captures some aspects of how federalism functions in the American 
constitutional order, the separation of powers conception cannot accurately be applied to 
the federal system. I begin by briefly discussing the ways in which federalism can serve
—for better and for worse—to frustrate the use of national power, thus serving the 
division of power conception of the nature of political power and the reasons why it must 
be divided among institutions. The majority of this section, though, is devoted to 
demonstrating why federalism ultimately cannot serve the ends stipulated by the 
separation of powers conception. Connecting the unifying theory’s emphasis on the 
underdeterminacy of the federal system to Mariah Zeisberg’s relational conception of 
constitutional authority, I argue that, unlike the separation of powers at the national level, 
federalism cannot generate robust constitutional authority. This inability is rooted in what 
I call the puzzle of constitutional authority, by which I mean that so long as states retain 
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political autonomy or sovereignty, and national supremacy must consequently be 
invoked, state-federal relations cannot produce robust constitutional authority. However, 
enabling these relations to generate constitutional authority would require surrendering 
either state sovereignty as it has come to be known in the American federal system or the 
supremacy of national law.  
The Kernel of Truth: Federalism as a Division of Power 
 Let us begin by identifying the kernel of truth in the unifying theorists’ argument. The 
federal system can, in fact, serve the ends of the division of power conception by both 
complicating and potentially frustrating the exercise of national power. In Peabody and 
Nugent’s and Bulman-Pozen’s terms, federalism can serve the negative functions of 
separated powers by checking the attempted exertion and perceived expansion of national 
power. This is due in part to the process by which state laws that putatively infringe on 
national concerns are contested. As Alison LaCroix has detailed in her study of the 
origins of American federalism and Matthew Brogdon has described in his work on the 
development of the federal judiciary, in rejecting Madison’s proposed national veto and 
constructing the Article III judiciary the Constitutional Convention endorsed a highly 
judicialized procedure for resolving state-federal disputes.  By requiring that all state 40
legislation be approved by the national government, the national veto supported by 
 See Alison L. LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism (Harvard University Press, 40
2008), 132-174; and Matthew S. Brogdon, “Constitutional Text and Institutional Development: Contesting 
the Madisonian Compromise in the First Congress,” American Political Thought 5(2):219-249 (2016) and 
“Political Jurisprudence and the Role of the Supreme Court: Framing the Judicial Power in the Federal 
Convention of 1787,” American Political Thought (forthcoming, 2016). For the argument that judicial 
resolution is not the only constitutional means of resolving state-federal conflicts, see Josh Chafetz, 
“Multiplicity in Federalism and the Separation of Powers,” 120 Yale Law Journal 1084 (2011).
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Madison and proposed by the Virginia Plan (or something else along those lines) would 
have forced a political resolution of these conflicts; as a result, the scope of state 
authority would be a function of national political discretion. Instead, the architecture of 
Article III, coupled with the development of federal jurisdiction over the first three 
decades of the Republic,  ensured that “federal questions” would be adjudicated before 41
the federal bar. And because of the Supremacy Clause, national law would trump contrary 
state laws and be binding on state judges. Though this has been widely interpreted as 
prejudicial to state interests—if not ab initio then certainly after the development of 
federal jurisdiction—it nevertheless created space for states to frustrate national power by 
passing laws that would have to be struck down in order for the alleged infringement of 
national authority to be corrected. By disconnecting the actions of state governments 
from direct federal oversight by Congress and the Executive, the rejection of the national 
veto increased both the opportunities for and the chances of state obstruction of national 
prerogatives and policies.  
 Furthermore, the large swaths of de jure and de facto concurrent regulatory power, in 
conjunction with the judicially protected domain of state police powers,  enable states to 42
vindicate the interests of their citizens in the face of contrary national policies, consistent 
with negative constitutionalism’s emphasis on the individual rights basis of separated 
powers. This aspect of the federal system has been increasingly emphasized in recent 
years, as the Court has vindicated state power against encroachments of national power in 
 For a discussion of this development, see Alison L. LaCroix, “Federalists, Federalism, and Federal 41
Jurisdiction,” 30 Law and History Review 205 (2012), 205-244.
 See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618-619 (2000).42
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the name of individual rights.  Particularly in a context of limited national political 43
capacity, the autonomy of state governments presents myriad opportunities for state 
institutions to oppose, contest, and frustrate national power. Such has been the case in 
both historically vindicated efforts, such as western states’ expansion of the franchise to 
include women in the nineteenth century, and historically repudiated efforts, like slave 
states’ attempts to protect the human property of slaveholders in the face of perceived 
national hostility. Regardless of their merits, both are examples of how states can oppose 
national power and policy. Though these are only a few considerations of many, they 
suffice to show that the unifying theory accurately captures how the federal system 
enables states to frustrate, complicate, and otherwise encumber the exercise of national 
power. 
Sovereignty and the Puzzle of Constitutional Authority  
 While federalism can serve the ends of the division of power conception, it cannot 
serve the ends of the separation of powers conception, which is to say that it cannot 
produce the positive functions of separated powers. To see why this is the case we must 
return to the logic of the unifying theory. Recall that Peabody and Nugent’s second 
premise holds that the separation of powers between the national and state governments 
 See, e.g., New York v. U.S., 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (arguing that “federalism secures to citizens the 43
liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power”); Bond v. United States, 564 U.S.       (2011) 
(“By denying any one government complete jurisdiction over all the concerns of public life, federalism 
protects the liberty of the individual from arbitrary power.”); National Federation of Independent Business 
v. Sebelius, 567 U.S., slip op. at 47 (arguing that a movement away from “the two government system 
established by the Framers would give way to a system that vests power in one central government, and 
individual liberty would suffer.”). See also United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S.       (2013) (recognizing the 
power of states to confer dignity and class protections on groups excluded from and unprotected by federal 
legislation).
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“leave[s] somewhat open the identity of the political entity ultimately authorized to 
decide how contested power is to be exercised.”  The insight here is that the federal 44
system is underdeterminate, which means that the constitutional text “constrains, without 
fully fixing a legal outcome.”  And it is because of this underdeterminacy, Peabody and 45
Nugent argue, that the states’ “distinctive kinds of power”  can be exercised, thus 46
furnishing positive functions for the separated powers system. Thus, as regards the 
separation of powers conception, the unifying theory depends on how constitutional 
underdeterminacy is resolved in the federal system.  
 It is in this connection that Mariah Zeisberg’s relational conception of constitutional 
authority can serve as a useful analytic guide, for her argument and the unifying theory 
are both founded on the recognition of underdeterminacy in the constitutional order. 
According to her conception, interbranch relations can be evaluated according to a set of 
(a) substantive standards identified by the Constitution and (b) processualist standards 
derived from “the branches’ structural positions in the constitutional order.”  The second 47
component is itself rooted in a corresponding set of structural conditions from which the 
processualist standards are derived. Employing these standards allows for the evaluation 
of branch behavior not in terms of their adherence to putatively “determinate textual 
meaning” but rather by “how well they bring their special institutional capacities to bear 
 Peabody and Nugent, “Unifying Theory,” 21. 44
 Mariah Zeisberg, War Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority (Princeton University Press, 45
2013), 5 n.23. For a discussion of underdeterminacy and its relation to related terms like “vagueness” and 
“ambiguity,” see Ralf Poscher, “Ambiguity and Vagueness in Legal Interpretation,” in The Oxford 
Handbook on Language and Law, Lawrence Solum and Peter Tiersma (eds.) (Oxford University Press, 
2011). 
 Peabody and Nugent, “Unifying Theory,” 21.46
 Zeisberg, War Powers, 19.47
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on the problem of interpreting the Constitution’s substantive standards[.]”  Because this 48
account focuses on the development of the constitutional meaning of the relevant 
substantive standards and the exercise of underdetermined constitutional powers, 
Zeisberg argues, constitutional authority is “generated,” “created”, and “produced” by 
interbranch deliberation.  This notion of constitutional authority is opposed to the 49
conventional Razian account,  which holds that constitutional authority consists in 50
reasons to obey that are independent of justificatory content. Zesiberg’s relational 
account, in contrast, is distinguished by its emphasis on the content-dependence of 
constitutional authority. Whereas the conventional account seeks the authority by which 
government actors act (i.e., the prescribed rules governing the exercise of power), the 
relational conception seeks the authority with which they act (i.e., the substantive 
justifications animating the process by which power is exercised). 
 Put succinctly, the connection between the relational conception of constitutional 
authority and the unifying theory of the separation of powers is that the model Zeisberg 
advances is intended to evaluate the political phenomena on which the unifying theorists’ 
argument is premised—the occasions for political deliberation that can furnish positive 
functions of separated powers induced by the underdeterminacy of the federal system. 
Rendered slightly differently, the positive functions of separated powers that the unifying 
theory stipulates state-federal relations can produce are themselves a form of 
 Ibid.48
 Id., 37, 41, and 45.49
 See, e.g., Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford University Press, 1986), 38-60; and The 50
Authority of Law (Oxford University Press, 2009), both cited in Zeisberg, War Powers, 46 at n.110.
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constitutional authority, which is exactly what Zeisberg’s theoretical framework was 
developed to assess. Our attention, then, must turn to the nature of state-federal 
deliberations, which the relational conception enables with its identification of the 
structural conditions for such institutional interactions.  
 We can concede arguendo the first two structural conditions—the relevant political 
institutions’ (1) independent sources of authority and (2) distinctive governing and 
epistemic capacities—for my main focus is on the third condition: shared powers and the 
responsive relationships constituted thereby.  While such powers and relationships are 51
clearly present in the area on which Zeisberg focuses (i.e., war powers) it is far less clear 
that they apply to the federal system, as the unifying theory requires. This is the case 
principally because, whereas institutional relationships at the national level are governed 
by a principle of formal equality, relationships between state and federal institutions are 
governed by formal inequality and subordination, as enshrined in the Supremacy Clause’s 
guarantee that national law will trump contrary state law. In turn, national supremacy is 
required, today as at the Founding, to rebuff state attempts to trench on national concerns, 
 Zeisberg, War Powers, 30-31. Beyond my purpose of leveling a critique of its applicability to the 51
unifying theory, we are justified in focusing on the third condition because it incorporates the other two 
conditions. As Zeisberg explains this condition, “[T]he actual exercise of their powers brings the branches 
into relationship with one another, a relationship that may activate the conflictual possibilities inherent in 
their independent sources of authority (condition one) and distinctive perspectives on public matters 
(condition two)” (30). 
Though the first two conditions can be granted for the sake of argument, it is important to note a few 
complications concerning the validity of the second condition—the distinctive governing and epistemic 
capacities of the states. Recall from the initial elaboration of the unifying theory, this is an important claim 
in Peabody and Nugent’s argument, though one that is not directly addressed in this inquiry. It will suffice 
for present purposes to highlight the distinction between distinct capacities and variations on the same 
capacities. The latter seems to be a more accurate characterization of state functions than the former. (On 
this point, see Purcell, Originalism, Federalism, and The American Constitutional Enterprise (Yale 
University Press, 2007), 191.) If that is the case, then there are grounds for evaluating them alongside their 
corresponding national functions. And if we follow Sotirios Barber’s ends-oriented account of American 
constitutionalism—as I do in this limited respect—we are required to give interpretive priority to national 
ends.  
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attempts often borne by claims of state sovereignty. When sovereignty is understood as a 
government actor or institution with “no higher enforcement agency—no political 
superior,”  it becomes clear how claims of state sovereignty run directly counter to the 52
responsive relationships required by a politics that can generate constitutional authority.  
 The difference here is between the deliberative and consultative relations among the 
national branches of government, on the one hand, and the independence and 
completeness of each level of government, on the other. While the implications of this 
difference may not be widely recognized, the distinction itself is far from novel. Writing 
to Thomas Jefferson in 1823, Madison discussed a pressing and ongoing constitutional 
challenge: “after surmounting the difficulty in tracing the boundary between the General 
& State Govts. the problem remains for maintaining it in practice; particularly in cases of 
Judicial cognizance.”  Madison quickly dispenses with the viability of popular 53
resolution, exclusive state interpretive authority, and leaving matters to the disputing 
parties. He then comes to the possibility of a non-judicial resolution between 
governmental levels. But the prospects here are no better than the other options he 
canvassed: 
Nor would the issue be safe if left to a compromise between the two 
Governments; the case of a disagreement between Governments being essentially 
different from a disagreement between branches of the same Government. In the 
latter case, neither party being able to consummate its will without the 
concurrence of the other, there is a necessity on both to consult and to 
accommodate. Not so with different Governments, each possessing every branch 
of power necessary to carry its purpose into compleat [sic] effect. It here becomes 
 Sotirios A. Barber, The Fallacies of States’ Rights (Harvard University Press, 2012), 152.52
 James Madison, Letter to Thomas Jefferson, 27 June 1823, Letters and Other Writings of James Madison 53
(J.B. Lippincott & Company, 1884) 3:325.
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a question between Independent Nations, with no other dernier resort than 
physical force. Negotiation might, indeed, in some instance, avoid this extremity; 
but how often would it happen, among so many States, that an unaccommodating 
spirit in some would render that resource unavailing?   54
It is this difference that, for Madison, made the intervention of the federal judiciary “the 
constitutional resort for determining the line between the federal & State jurisdictions.”   55
 It is essential here to return to a point made previously about the decisions made at 
the Constitutional Convention. The Article III judiciary—the basis for Madison’s 
argument in behalf of judicial oversight—was constructed as a replacement for the 
national veto, which would have required state legislation to be reviewed and endorsed 
by the national government before going into effect. The principle of consultation and 
accommodation identified above in Madison’s description of the separation of powers 
applied as well, though to a considerably more limited extent, to his proposed veto, which 
would have enabled the national legislature “to negative all laws passed by the several 
States, contravening in the opinion of the National Legislature the articles of Union.”  56
The plan of government submitted at the Constitutional Convention by the Virginia 
delegation also called for a joint executive-judicial “council of Revision with authority to 
examine every act of the National Legislature before it shall operate, & every act of a 
particular Legislature before a Negative thereon shall be final.”  While these provisions 57
would have enabled consultation both between legislative chambers and between national 
 Id., 3:326.54
 Ibid. It’s important to note here that Madison saw Senate confirmation, the oath of office, and “the 55
surveillance of public Opinion” as important checks on federal judicial behavior. 
 Virginia Plan, Art. 6. Max Farrand, The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787 (Yale University 56
Press, 1911), I:21 (May 29, 1787).
 Id., Art. 8. Farrand, Records, ibid.57
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representatives and members of the council of revision, they also would have increased 
the number of possible veto points in the operation of the federal system. We thus see in 
Madison’s national veto a particularly illustrative example of the simultaneous operation 
of both the division of power and separation of powers conceptions. It is important in this 
connection to recognize the differences between the national veto of state legislative 
actions and the executive-judicial veto of national legislative actions. Whereas 
consultation between the national legislature and the proposed council of revision would 
be fairly straightforward and could consequently produce deliberative benefits, it would 
be considerably harder for a similar process to occur between levels of government. The 
multiplication of legislatures at the subnational level, the limitations on communication at 
the time, and the discrepancy in popular and institutional interests between levels would 
make ongoing consultation extremely burdensome, if not impossible. We therefore see 
the fundamental difficulty—even in the case of a veto mechanism that would enable and 
perhaps even induce greater consultation—of generating meaningful deliberation 
between levels of government.  
 Of course, the national veto was defeated at the Constitutional Convention. And as 
Alison LaCroix documents in her study of the origins of the American federal system, the 
compensatory mechanisms the Convention selected were judicial resolution of state-
federal boundary disputes and a clause explicitly establishing the supremacy of federal 
law.  But unlike the national veto, from the standpoint of guaranteeing the authority of 58
the national government this legal process presents only a partial solution, in that it lacks 
 LaCroix, The Ideological Origins of American Federalism, 158-174.58
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the completeness and efficiency of a mechanism that routed all state legislation into a 
national forum prior to enforcement. Under the compromise that produced Article III, 
any state infringements of national authority (or actions impermissibly prejudicial to 
other states) would stand until judicial proceedings were commenced and an injunction 
staying or decision invalidating such action was handed down. As a consequence, state 
laws threatening national powers and prerogatives would be invalidated only 
retrospectively and, in many cases, only after a period of enforcement. Further, their 
invalidation would come in the language of law, complete with legal justification and 
elucidation of the constitutional text. This is profoundly consequential for the kinds of 
politics to which the Constitution would give rise. As an initial matter, it permits states to 
not only make abstract claims of sovereignty—rooted either in history or in an 
interpretation of the constitutional text—but also to back up those claims with 
authoritative actions, establishing policy regimes and enforcing laws reflective of the 
state governments’ sentiments without any intermediation from the national government. 
So in addition to the constitutional arguments that could be made about the nature of the 
federal system and the proper understanding of sovereignty, claims about state 
sovereignty would be grounded as well in political facts—in the states’ ability to act as 
they see fit unless and until checked by the national government through the judiciary. 
Moreover, interpretations of the Constitution would be refracted through and influenced 
by the states’ ability to act in this way, because state and national action would together 
construct the political and legal context in which the underdeterminate state-federal 
relationship would be articulated and refined.  
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 We can get a sense of what has just been described by contrasting the policymaking 
process under the Constitution with the process under the proposed Virginia Plan. Figures 
2.1 and 2.2 provide visual depictions of these two processes. (In both figures, solid lines 
represent processes linking institutions, dashed lines represent veto points and processes, 
and dotted lines represent oversight or review processes.)  The clearest difference 59
between the two is the relative separation and independence of the levels of government 
in the policymaking process established by the Constitution, and the permeability of the 
 While these figures are intended to depict only the policymaking process, it nonetheless warrants 59
mention that they omit a number of important processes and relationships. Most significantly, the modes of 
representation and electoral constituencies of the relevant institutions are not included. Additionally, 
second-level processes are also omitted. So under the Constitution, a presidential veto can be overridden by 
the Congress; and under the Virginia Plan, decisions by the Council of Revision were likewise reviewable 
by the national legislature. 
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FIG. 2.1: POLICYMAKING PROCESS—CONSTITUTION
NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
STATE GOVERNMENT
Upper House
Executive Judiciary
Executive Policy & Enforcement Judiciary
Policy & 
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state-federal boundary under the process proposed by the Virginia Plan. Under the 
Constitution, it isn’t until the last phase—after legislation has been passed and policy 
enacted—that concerns about the states encroaching on national authority, or vice versa, 
can be authoritatively addressed. And even then, many of these concerns would first be 
dealt with by state courts, which despite the formal commitment to national supremacy 
nonetheless provided leverage for further state resistance and encroachment. Viewed in 
this light, the expansion of federal jurisdiction, though profoundly important and 
doubtless an enhancement of national authority, did little to change the underlying 
fundamentals of the policymaking process. Under the Constitution, the state 
policymaking process is largely insulated from intervention by the national government. 
National oversight and review of state actions is relegated to the end of the process, 
thereby allowing states to back up their claims of autonomy and sovereignty with 
authoritative action. This oversight and review, moreover, would come in the form of 
legal adjudication pursuant to the Constitution.  
 Compare this with the Virginia Plan. As Figure 2.2 makes clear, national oversight 
would have occurred very early in the policymaking process, with the actions of state 
legislatures immediately subject to a two-stage review process before any law could be 
passed or implemented. Even after passage, there remained the possibility of national 
oversight by legal means. But the primary check on state actions wouldn’t come with the 
force of law or with legal precedent as a consequence. Rather, it was to be reflective of a 
distinctly national interest that would be open to revision and change in a national forum
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—that, at least, was Madison’s intention.  In this framework state claims of autonomy 60
and sovereignty would be either reviewed by national authorities or subject to national 
oversight. While it is important to note that a state could claim sovereignty over its laws 
and the enforcement thereof, that would only come after those laws had been endorsed by 
national authorities. And prior to national review, such claims could do little to change 
the legal substance of the state-federal relationship. For these reasons, claims of 
sovereignty under the Constitution are, at least in part, a function of the states’ ability to 
act without immediate federal intervention. In short, the inclusion of a judicial and not 
 Madison’s thinking on the national veto was developed (in part) through correspondence with a range of 60
figures. See, with reference to Letters and Other Writings of James Madison (J.B. Lippincott & Company, 
1865), Madison’s Letter to Thomas Jefferson, March 19, 1787, 1:284-286; and Letter to George 
Washington, April 16, 1787, 1:287-292. See also Letter to Edmund Randolph, April 8, 1787, The Papers of 
James Madison, William T. Hutchinson et al. (eds.) (University of Chicago Press, 1975), 9:369-371.
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FIG. 2.2: POLICYMAKING PROCESS—VIRGINIA PLAN
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political solution to the boundary problem inherent in federal systems—Article III instead 
of the national veto—furnished critics of federal power with both legal and political 
resources to resist national authority. And these resources would not be deployed in the 
context of deliberation and reciprocal compromise between co-equal and co-dependent 
institutions—as can be the case with the separation of powers—but in the context of 
opposition between two independent and complete governments.  
 Returning then to the nature of relations between levels of government, we can see 
that the claim of state sovereignty, just like the assertion of national supremacy, presents a 
content-independent reason for obedience. That is, both depend not on the reasons 
underlying the claim of authority—the very reasons that fuel the generation of 
constitutional authority—but on the validity of the claim itself, whether or not the states 
are sovereign in a relevant respect or the national government is supreme. As a result, 
deliberation between state and national institutions cannot produce the positive goods 
claimed by the unifying theory; indeed, deliberation is not a feature of state-federal 
relations in the way that it is for relations between the branches of the national 
government. Where content-independence obtains, any appearance of responsive 
relationships will have been the result of national discretion. It should, therefore, be 
unsurprising that the opportunities unifying theorists commonly identify for states to 
produce the positive functions of separated powers—congressional testimony, high-level 
meetings between state and national officials, cooperation between state and federal 
administrators—are entirely matters of national discretion.  Furthermore, any powers 61
 Peabody and Nugent, “Unifying Theory,” 18. 61
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that are “shared” between the two levels of government will similarly be the result of 
national discretion and determination, meaning that they are not shared powers in the 
sense required for the production of constitutional authority.  62
 This, then, is the puzzle of constitutional authority in the American constitutional 
order. The generation of robust constitutional authority as regards the federal system is 
impossible where claims of state sovereignty have legal purchase or national supremacy 
must be invoked, both of which are products of the design of the constitutional system. 
But if state sovereignty is surrendered and national supremacy is rendered superfluous, 
though the generation of robust constitutional authority would then be possible, the 
resulting system of government would be quite different from that established by the 
Constitution. The creation of deliberative relations between governmental levels, rooted 
in legal equality and reciprocal dependence along the lines of the separation of powers at 
the national level, would give rise to a political system in which either the states could 
exercise veto power over national decisions (as in a confederacy) or states would pose no 
obstacle to the exercise of national power (as in a consolidated government). In both of 
these cases, distinguishing features of American constitutionalism would no longer 
obtain. Hence, while the unifying theory does accurately capture some aspects of how the 
federal system functions, it ultimately fails to prove its claim that federalism can yield the 
positive functions of a system of separated powers. This failure is rooted in the unifying 
 The clear exceptions here are the areas of concurrent regulatory authority, most significantly the power to 62
tax but including as well the powers to make bankruptcy laws, establish courts, borrow and spend money, 
and regulate elections. But here too state powers are not without limitation, as the doctrine of federal 
preemption has produced an elaborate system of qualifications and checks on seemingly shared powers. 
The literature on this topic is sprawling, but for a particularly thorough, and yet still critical, overview see 
Caleb Nelson, “Preemption,” 86 University of Virginia Law Review 225 (2000).  
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theory’s ignorance of how the relationships between state and national political 
institutions impose a limit on what their deliberations can produce. In the final analysis, 
there are some respects in which federalism and the separation of powers cannot be 
unified at the level of constitutional theory. 
The Puzzle of Constitutional Authority and the Politics of Sovereignty 
 I’ve argued thus far that, although it accurately captures one dimension of the federal 
system, the unifying theory is ultimately falsified by the absence of formally responsive, 
power-sharing relationships between state governments and the national government. 
Through an analysis of its component parts, I showed that the argument that federalism is 
a separation of power makes claims about both the positive and negative functions of 
separated powers. As such, it entails two different notions of political power: a negative 
notion and a positive notion. The negative notion is premised on the belief that all 
political power is liable to abuse and that it must accordingly be properly divided, 
limited, and checked to protect liberty. The positive notion, on the other hand, holds that 
the fundamental values of liberal constitutionalism should be incorporated into the 
exercise of political power and that political institutions must therefore be designed and 
empowered to express those values through their interactions with one another. Whereas 
the positive notion is oriented towards the use of political power, the negative notion is 
oriented towards preventing its abuse. These notions, in turn, give rise to two conceptions 
of why political power should be separated, as well as how the exercise of separated 
powers should be evaluated. The division of power conception incorporates the negative 
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notion’s emphasis on the potential abuses of political power, and power is accordingly 
divided wholesale between governmental institutions and levels. In contrast, the 
separation of powers conception incorporates the positive notion of political power and is 
consequently concerned with sub-dividing powers across institutions that are designed to 
give expression to the polity’s fundamental value commitments. 
 While the division of power conception accurately captures some aspects of how 
federalism functions in the American constitutional order, the separation of powers 
conception cannot properly be applied to the federal system. Connecting the unifying 
theory’s emphasis on the underdeterminacy of the federal system to recent theorizing of 
constitutional authority, I argued that, unlike the separation of powers at the national 
level, federalism cannot generate robust constitutional authority because of the lack of 
responsive, power-sharing relationships between state and national institutions. The 
failure of the unifying theory is rooted in what I called the puzzle of constitutional 
authority, by which I mean that so long as state sovereignty is claimed over against 
national power, and national supremacy must therefore be invoked, state-federal relations 
cannot produce robust constitutional authority. But enabling these interactions to generate 
constitutional authority would require a transformation of the fundamentals of American 
constitutionalism. 
 The argument presented here has made much of the relevance of claims of 
governmental sovereignty to the evaluation of the unifying theory. As detailed in the 
previous section, the political system established by the Constitution did contemplate the 
continued presence of sovereigntist arguments, in the sense that the political processes it 
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established would give rise to and even foster claims of state autonomy and exclusive 
authority in ways that would have been precluded by alternative institutional 
arrangements. Furthermore, that the states would retain ultimate decisional authority—
which is synonymous with sovereignty as used here—in some matters was both a 
contingent reality  and a positive good recognized by many of the Constitution’s 63
architects.  At the same time, many of the notions of state sovereignty that have cropped-64
up throughout American history and have dominated interpretations of the federal system 
have largely denied the underdeterminacy of the state-federal relationship, and have 
instead substituted a determinate state-federal relationship from which state sovereignty 
can be derived.  On the account I’ve offered, it is (1) the structure of the constitutional 65
order, (2) the resulting threat and consequences of claimed state sovereignty, and (3) the 
consequent need for a constitutional principle of juridically enforced national supremacy 
that, taken together, preclude interactions between state and federal institutions that are 
generative of robust constitutional authority. The question that now lies before us is 
 See, for example, The Federalist Nos. 45 and 46, in which Publius responds to the Anti-Federalist charge 63
that the proposed Constitution would, in due course, establish a consolidated government. There Madison 
identifies the conditions that preclude the national government from “divest[ing] the States of [their] 
authorities”: the people’s “attachment” to their states and the governments thereof; the preponderance of 
state, as opposed to federal, employees; the regulation by state governments of “all the more domestic and 
personal interests of the people”; the greater familiarity of the people with those “domestic and personal 
interests”; and stronger personal and familial ties between members of the state governments and the 
people. Far from legal or institutional protections, each of these safeguards rests on contingent—and thus 
changeable—foundations.
 In The Federalist No. 39, for example, Madison notes the connection between state sovereignty and the 64
federal character of the Constitution, arguing that such is a virtue of the proposed charter of government 
(39:254). There is also the repeated Publian refrain concerning the “residuary sovereignty” (and 
“authority”) of the states. See, e.g., The Federalist, 33:207, 39:256, 43:296, and 62:417.
 For a sampling of scholarly reliance on notions of sovereignty as definitional components of the federal 65
system, see Malcolm M. Feeley and Edward Rubin, Federalism: Political Identity and Tragic Compromise 
(University of Michigan Press, 2008); William Riker, Federalism: Origin, Operation, and Significance 
(Little, Brown & Co., 1964); and Frank Cross, “The Folly of Federalism,” 24 Cardozo Law Review 1 
(2002). 
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whether this is the fate of the federal system, to be always beset by a deficit of 
constitutional authority? Is the puzzle of constitutional authority insoluble? 
 Throughout this analysis, I’ve been careful to stress that it is claims of state 
sovereignty rather than state sovereignty as such that is at the root of the puzzle of 
constitutional authority. The reason for this is twofold. Primarily, as I attempted to show 
in the previous section, the design of the constitutional order creates legal and political 
space for states to generate plausible assertions of sovereignty, even though these 
assertions may conflict with the underlying logic of the regime. These claims issue 
despite—even against—legal or abstract determinations of sovereignty and, as such, 
should be the focus of an inquiry into constitutional politics and development, as opposed 
to strictly constitutional law. And second, the Constitution was predicated on an 
underdeterminate division of sovereignty authority between the states and the national 
government that was, in turn, grounded in the sovereignty of the people. As a result, both 
levels of government could (and would) claim to act authoritatively on behalf of their 
constituents. Thus, it is the claims of sovereignty, within and beyond the parameters of 
constitutional underdeterminacy that are of greatest interest to us here, as we’re 
concerned principally with how the structure of the state-federal relationship shapes 
constitutionally structured politics. Both of these reasons are grounded in the 
constitutional logic of federalism outlined in the previous chapter. That logic partakes of 
the same underdeterminacy that underlies both the positive benefits of the separation of 
powers and the content-dependent understanding of constitutional authority. According to 
this understanding of the federal system, the Constitution does not draw a clear or 
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comprehensive line between state and national powers; nor does it definitively resolve the 
question of how sovereign states can persist under a supreme national government.  As a 66
result, the precise contours of the state-federal relationship are constructed through 
constitutional politics. This means that the very division of powers that structures the 
federal system is produced through the legal and political processes established by the 
Constitution, even as the ex ante division of power structures those processes. This, in 
turn, opens the door to the possibility of avoiding persistent standoffs between state 
sovereignty and national supremacy, thus ameliorating the puzzle of constitutional 
authority. However—as the formulation of the  preceding sentence suggests—the 
fundamental nature of interlevel relations will persist in the absence of significant 
structural and operational changes to the federal system. Just as federalism itself is a 
disharmonious component of American constitutionalism, the puzzle of constitutional 
authority will remain a feature of state-federal relations as long as the underdeterminate 
division of power characterizes the federal system. 
 The constructive processes outlined here and described in Chapter One proceed in 
two general ways. The first is through judicial oversight and review of questions touching 
on the state-federal relationship, as contemplated by Article III. The second entails 
legislative elaborations of the state-federal relationship, a process that involves both the 
legislative and the executive branches. These two developmental possibilities—legal 
interpretation and legislative definition—are treated in depth in the subsequent chapters. 
 For the clearest descriptions of American federalism along these lines, see Edward Purcell, Originalism, 66
Federalism, and The American Constitutional Enterprise (Yale University Press, 2007); and Keith 
Whittington “The Political Constitution of Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification Debate as 
an Illustration of Informal Mechanisms of Constitutional Change,” Publius, 26(2):1-24 (1996).
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It will therefore suffice for present purposes to outline the basic contours and defining 
features of these developmental processes. Judicial engagements with the state-federal 
relationship, the subject of Chapter Three, produce legal interpretations of and, in many 
cases, constitutional precedents concerning the meaning of the federal system. This 
process is uniquely inflected by the intersection—the conflict, even—of constitutional 
underdeterminacy and the institutional logic of the judiciary. As explained in the second 
part of this chapter, the judiciary is structurally and functionally biased to maintain the 
rule of law and to vindicate individual rights. In the context of federalism, this means that 
questions that come before courts will, as a matter of course, be transmuted into legal 
questions requiring legal answers. The questions will sound in constitutional meaning, 
and the answers will require legal reasoning and constitutional interpretation. This 
institutionally-induced constitutional perspective supplies the syntax of judicial 
engagements with the federal system. To the extent that the quest for constitutional 
meaning and legal determinacy—though the latter isn’t a necessary feature of 
constitutional jurisprudence—entails denying the fundamental underdeterminacy of the 
federal system, judicial engagements with federalism questions will trade in a different 
logic of federalism than the constitutional logic outlined here.  
 In contrast, legislative elaboration of the state-federal relationship is principally 
oriented not around law but governance and policy. Whereas the question confronting 
judges concerns constitutional meaning, the question confronting elected representatives 
is one of prudence and constitutional possibility. Legislative constructions of the state-
federal relationship entail the creation of policy programs and regimes that put to use the 
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powers possessed by the national government, both building on and creating afresh 
relationships between state and federal institutions. These relationships can be explicitly 
created by positive law or implicitly created by adjusting the political context in which 
the levels of government relate to each other. For legislators and presidents alike, the 
federal system can be either an obstacle or an asset to public policy. Particularly pertinent 
to this analysis are the influence of political culture and administrative capacity. The 
resources and capacities of each governmental level condition what is and is not possible, 
identifying opportunities for policy implementation as well as obstacles to successful 
policy regimes. And popular support for each level of government similarly conditions 
what things the national government does and does not undertakes and, at some level, 
how it goes about doing so.  This isn’t true—or, more precisely, isn’t true in the same 67
way—for judicial engagements with the federal system. When pronouncing constitutional 
meaning, courts needn’t take into account the level of governmental capacity or the 
degree of popular support for a specific exercise of power. In many cases, interpretive 
 Though a full presentation of this argument is beyond the scope of the present inquiry, this is a point for 67
which the clear statement of a thesis is warranted. By saying that popular support is connected to both 
whether and how government acts, I am drawing a connection between the use of constitutional powers and 
public opinion. The broader argument, which I’ve presented in greater detail elsewhere, is that “the 
constitutional powers available to Congress have their own politics, and those politics shape the processes 
and procedures that produce legislation.” See Connor M. Ewing, “Structure and Relationship in America 
Federalism: Foundations, Consequences, and ‘Basic Principles’ Revisited,” 51 Tulsa Law Review 689 
(2015), 724.
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moves of this kind would be criticized for straying beyond the proper judicial role.  But 68
for elected representatives, such behavior is not only permitted but encouraged.  
 Moreover, legislative elaborations of the state-federal relationship do not require 
comprehensive interpretations or reworking of the federal system. Unlike legal questions 
that demand interpretations of the federal system as such—as a foundational commitment 
of governance requiring coherent, systemic exposition—legislative constructions are 
(most often) one-off and answer to prudence and popular opinion, rather than to legal 
coherence or theoretical consistency. We should hope, of course, that legislators and 
presidents take the Constitution seriously and seek fidelity to its provisions and purposes. 
But even so, the president, senator, or representative who “takes the Constitution 
seriously” will not look upon the document in the same way as a jurist, nor will any one 
of these elected representatives necessarily look upon it in the same way as the other two. 
The institutions in which these individuals are embedded induce different perspectives on 
constitutional meaning that fundamentally structure their actions and outlooks. Given that 
these perspectives are induced by institutional structures, they may produce arguments 
and outlooks that conflict with an individual’s previous statements in office or on the 
 A possible counterargument to this point would cite the interpretive approach(es) commonly called 68
sociological jurisprudence to show that judges can, and in fact do, take account of “nonlegal” facts along 
the very lines I identify as beyond the usual scope of constitutional interpretation. While it is certainly 
conceivable that a broadly sociological approach could be constructed around political culture and 
administrative capacity, it is instructive to reflect on the tension between the emphasis on means-ends 
analyses in seminal articulations of sociological jurisprudence and the contingent limitations identified 
here, which are distinct from the purposes embedded in legislative acts and the means chosen to effect 
those purposes. While the former may properly and naturally be the focus of judicial inquiry, the latter are a 
more traditional, and similarly natural, focus for elected representatives in their construction and 
implementation of legislation. See, for example, Benjamin Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process 
(Yale University Press, 1921), 98-141; Roscoe Pound, “The Scope and Purpose of Sociological 
Jurisprudence. [Concluded] III. Sociological Jurisprudence,” 25 Harvard Law Review 489 (1912); and 
James A. Gardner, “The Sociological Jurisprudence of Roscoe Pound (Part I),” 7 Villanova Law Review 1 
(1961), 9-19.
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campaign trail. But as Jeffrey Tulis has provocatively argued, hypocrisy, though a defect 
of individual character, can be a virtue of institutional design.  To the extent that such 69
instances give voice to the fundamental values of a constitutional regime, they should be 
seen as an indication of institutional resilience. Their absence, moreover, should raise 
concerns about institutional decay.  70
 In the main, the constructions of the state-federal relationship described here will 
define the scope of national power and, either implicitly or explicitly, define the 
corresponding scope of state power. But they will not generate responsive and 
reciprocally dependent relationships along the lines of those present among institutions at 
the national level. In other words, the puzzle of constitutional authority can be only 
provisionally and temporarily solved by constructions of the state-federal relationship, 
not wholly removed from the constitutional system. The degree to which this tension can 
properly be thought to be resolved will be a function of the congruence between the 
prevailing construction of the state-federal relationship and contemporaneous political 
practice. As this congruence decreases, claims of state sovereignty will be increasingly 
present, thus necessitating assertions of national supremacy. Conversely, to the extent that 
the prevailing construction of the state-federal relationship is consistent with political 
practice, relations between levels of government will proceed more or less harmoniously. 
If all of this is true, then the constitutional commitment to a federal system in which 
claims of sovereignty by both governmental levels have purchase and retain substantive 
 Jeffrey K. Tulis, “On Congress and Constitutional Responsibility,” 89 Boston University Law Review 515 69
(2009), 523. See also Tulis, “Deliberation Between Institutions,” in Debating Deliberative Democracy, 205
 Jeffrey K. Tulis, Democratic Decay and the Politics of Deference (Princeton University Press, 70
forthcoming).
!137
meaning may not be an insurmountable obstacle to the generation of some measure of 
constitutional authority. Rather, it can be an ongoing tension of constitutional politics, 
one that provokes and anticipates contestation over the meaning and purpose of one of 
the Constitution’s defining features: the commitment to multilevel governance.  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Chapter Three: Constitutional Law vs. Constitutional Logic  
  
But the question respecting the extent of the powers actually granted is perpetually arising, 
and will probably continue to arise so long as our system shall exist. In discussing these 
questions, the conflicting powers of the General and State Governments must be brought into 
view, and the supremacy of their respective laws, when they are in opposition, must be settled. 
— John Marshall, McCulloch v. Maryland (1819)  1
I have always supposed that the meaning of a law, and for a like reason, of a Constitution, so 
far as it depends on Judicial interpretation, was to result from a course of particular 
decisions, and not these from a previous and abstract comment on the subject. The example in 
this instance tends to reverse the rule and forego the illustration to be derived from a series of 
cases actually occurring for adjudication. 
— James Madison, Letter to Spencer Roane (1819)  2
In the fraught union of these two passages is found the essential tension of American 
federalism, and one of the fundamental dynamics of American constitutional 
development. The issue of what powers can be exercised by which level of government is 
a recurring concern because it addresses the basic questions of politics. All polities must 
decide what things government should (and should not) do, and in federal systems a 
determination must be made as to which level of government should (and should not) do 
those things. As a result, the nature and scope of governmental powers and the 
relationships between and among governing institutions constitute inherent tensions in 
the American constitutional order. The state-federal relationship, as argued in each of the 
preceding chapters, is a disharmonic component of the American constitutional order, 
provoking contestation over its very identity.   3
 17 U.S. 316, at 405 (1819)1
 Letter to Spencer Roane, Sept. 2, 1819, The James Madison Papers at the Library of Congress, Series 1, 2
General Correspondence, 1723-1859, Reel 19.
 Gary J. Jacobsohn, Constitutional Identity (Harvard University Press, 2010), 1-33.3
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And yet, in a political order that aspires for some measure of popular control—to act 
legitimately and authoritatively in the name of “We the People”—there is a reluctance to 
cede the resolution of these questions entirely to one governing institution. Nor should 
they be resolved in a single moment of political time. If at all possible, Madison argues in 
his response to Marshall’s McCulloch opinion, questions of such significance should be 
resolved over time rather than in one fell swoop, and through the interaction of governing 
institutions instead of by a single institution or actor. His claim suggests that, considering 
the alternatives, working towards a resolution of questions concerning the scope and 
location of government powers in the American federal system can be a constitutional 
good. It is not desirable, Madison advises, to seek to harmonize constitutional 
disharmonies, especially if the one doing so is an enrobed judge whose pronouncements 
claim the authority of fundamental law and have the force of precedent.  4
There is also in Madison’s and Marshall’s claims a deeper recognition about 
American federalism, one that unifies rather than divides them. Indeed, both 
acknowledge the defining characteristic of the American federal system: its 
underdeterminacy. That is, they both recognize that the Constitution does not establish a 
comprehensive jurisdictional division between the states and the national government. 
Had that been the case, then “the question respecting the extent of powers actually 
granted” to each level of government could be answered by recourse to the constitutional 
text. Similarly, if the Constitution’s meaning with respect to the state-federal relationship 
 As  is  discussed  below,  it’s  important  to  note  that  what  Madison  warns  against  is  not  the  per  se 4
involvement of the judiciary in questions concerning the federal system but the immediate supremacy or 
exclusivity of the judicial voice. Madison’s letter to Spencer Roane, among others, makes clear that he saw 
a legitimate role for judicial review of congressional powers and their limits. 
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was clearly directive, then encouraging a prolonged, inter-institutional debate over that 
meaning, as Madison can be read to encourage, would be tantamount to resisting the 
requirements of the fundamental law.  
But the Constitution does not do this. Instead, it grants powers to the national 
government,  specifies limits to national power,  acknowledges the existence and 5 6
operation of state governments  while putting limitations on the same,  and situates both 7 8
levels of government in a regime of national supremacy in the event of conflicts between 
state and national laws.  The Constitution emphatically does not include an explanation 9
of or rule for determining where one set of powers must yield to the other; nor does it 
spell out the ways in which the enumerated powers can and cannot be put to use beyond 
the identification of general purposes and prohibitions. Put another way, the Constitution 
does not delineate the precise relationship between the states and the national 
government, though it does establish the initial parameters of the state-federal 
relationship. But to put the federal system into action—to  create policy in a context of 
multiple levels of government—the relationship between state and federal powers must 
be elaborated, either implicitly or explicitly. And because this is the case, our attention is 
drawn to the relationships between national powers and state powers, as well as the 
interactions between the institutions of the national government and those of the state 
 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 8. 5
 Id, Sec. 9.6
 For two examples see id., Sec. 2, cl. 1 and Sec. 3, cl. 2.7
 Id, Sec. 10.8
 Id., Art. IV, Sec. 2.9
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governments. We must, therefore, take seriously the relational dimensions of the state-
federal relationship.  10
What would such a relational understanding look like? The few who’ve emphasized 
this conception of American federalism have by and large taken a juricentric approach, 
focusing on some aspect of how courts do or should engage with the federal system. 
Charlton Copeland, for example, has argued that analyses of the judicial enforcement of 
federalism (specifically state court obligations to vindicate federal claims) should focus 
less on the Constitution’s substantive division of powers than on the interactions between 
state and federal institutions. Eschewing enforcement models predicated on the allocation 
of legal authority, Copeland has offered a relational model of federalism enforcement 
“based on an understanding of federalism as an enduring relationship” that “generates 
norms of behavior capable of constraining the national and states actors, even where there 
is a clear possession of substantive authority by one or both spheres of government.”  11
Another variant of the juricentric relational model focuses on constitutional 
interpretation, in particular the Supreme Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Here the work 
of the self-styled “new nationalists,”  led by Heather Gerken, looms largest. In her root 12
 The touchstone for this argument is Charles Black’s Structure and Relationship in Constitutional Law 10
(Louisiana State University Press, 1969), in which he juxtaposes the “method of purported explication or 
exegesis of the particular textual passage considered directive of action” with “the method of inference 
from structures and relationships created by the constitution in all its parts or in some principal part” (7).
 Copeland, “Federal Law in State Court: Judicial Federalism Through a Relational Lens,” 19 William & 11
Mary Bill of Rights Journal 511, 516 (2011).
 See, generally, “Symposium: Federalism as the New Nationalism,” 123 Yale Law Journal 1626-2133 12
(2014).
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and branch reconsideration of “Our Federalism,”  Gerken has called for the Court to 13
“think hard about how the states and the federal government interact.”  For the new 14
nationalists, though, it’s crucially important that this “relational account” does not start 
from claims of state (i.e., subnational) sovereignty; it must instead take seriously the fact 
that the “states’ most important form of power lies not in presiding over their own 
empires but in administering the federal empire.”  It is here that Gerken’s preferred 15
relational account departs from what she characterizes as a relational variant whose 
analytical starting point is state power. Precisely because sovereignty is an unworkable 
doctrinal foundation, the Court must develop an account of federalism that reflects the 
realities of state-federal interactions in the modern policy state. 
While juricentric in focus, the relational accounts offered by Copeland and Gerken 
are distinctly normative in purpose. For different reasons and in different ways, both are 
concerned with the ways judicial actors should engage the federal system and its legal 
requirements. This focus looks at what the Court ought to do with the underdeterminacy 
of the American federal system. A separate and, indeed, analytically prior question 
reverses this order and asks, what has underdeterminacy done to the Court? That is, how 
has the underdeterminacy of the state-federal relationship influenced judicial 
engagements with the federal system? Such a question forces us to consider the judiciary 
not as an observer of or neutral participant in the underdeterminate federal system 
 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, at 44 (1971) (Black, J.J.)13
 Gerken, “Slipping the Bonds of Federalism,” 128 Harvard Law Review 85, at 113 (2014).14
 Ibid.15
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established by the Constitution, but as an institution embedded in political processes and 
debates that are decisively shaped by the constitutional logic of federalism. This question 
is made all the more pressing when one considers the institutional logic of the judiciary: 
the nature and mandate of the judicial function is to find (or establish) legal meaning and, 
in many cases, determinacy. What, then, is the result of the intersection of the 
constitutional logic of federalism and the institutional logic of the judiciary? That is the 
question under consideration in this chapter.  
In the pages that follow, I seek to assess the consequences of constitutional 
underdeterminacy for judicial engagements with the federal system. This is, to be sure, 
but one part of a much broader picture. A complete account of the consequences of 
constitutional underdeterminacy would attend also to the ways in which legislative, 
executive, and administrative behavior are shaped by this feature of the federal system. 
Accordingly, these issues are taken up in the following chapter. We must also avoid 
mistaking jurisprudential development for the whole of constitutional development. 
Indeed, that is one of the central arguments of this chapter. An examination of the 
development of federalism jurisprudence reveals the emergence of a logic of federalism 
strikingly at odds with the constitutional logic of federalism. This logic, in turn, clearly 
illustrates the tensions between the constitutional law and the constitutional logic of 
federalism, while also revealing the salience of judicial reasoning about sovereignty in 
order to arrive at directive legal principles. 
I begin by briefly restating the constitutional logic of federalism, adding to the 
account that has been presented in the preceding chapters a number of considerations 
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relevant to the institution under examination here: the judiciary. This discussion is 
intended both to identify and to limn the contours of the fundamental tension between the 
constitutional logic of federalism and the institutional logic of the judiciary. With this as 
background, I then turn to consider the development of federalism jurisprudence over a 
period of roughly one century, outlining the emergence of a constitutional law of 
federalism which, I argue, partakes of a logic strikingly different from the constitutional 
logic of federalism. The cases covered in this section run from the ratification of the 
Constitution in the late eighteenth century through the Civil War. Though this section 
covers only a small portion of all “federalism cases” the analysis is intended not to offer a 
comprehensive review of the jurisprudence but to identify the patterns of reasoning that 
characterize judicial engagement with the underdeterminate federal system. In the final 
section, I reflect on this jurisprudential development and identify two main lessons. I 
argue, first, that the constitutional law of federalism and the constitutional logic of 
federalism exist in considerable tension with one another. This tension results from 
judicial attempts to elaborate the state-federal relationship in order to resolve 
constitutional disputes, attempts that were occasioned by the underdeterminacy of the 
federal system. And second, I argue that the connection between constitutional 
underdeterminacy and invocations of sovereignty to adjudicate state-federal disputes 
suggests an endogenous dimension of sovereignty in American constitutional politics. In 
this way, notions of sovereignty are a product of constitutional politics, a legal and 
political concept that is produced by the interaction of constitutional logics, institutional 
structures, and contested visions of the American constitutional order. 
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The Constitutional Logic of Federalism & the Institutional Logic of 
the Judiciary  
Reading the Constitution, one is struck not by the prominence of the states but by 
their relative absence—by the negative space resulting from the constitutional drafters’ 
articulation of national powers and purposes that left the presence and operation of state 
governments largely implied. In contrast to the constitutions of many other federal 
systems, the U.S. Constitution does not specify a set of legal entitlements or protections 
for the states; nor does it enumerate a list of subnational powers.  In short, the 16
Constitution does not constitute the state governments in the same way that it constituted 
a new central government. Instead it assumes their continued existence while 
fundamentally changing the political context in which they would exist after ratification. 
The Constitution, it must be remembered, was created in the shadow of failure. The 
Articles of Confederation, which had been in force since 1781, had proven insufficient to 
 A small sampling: the German Basic Law Sec. II, Art. 32, para. 3 (granting treaty powers to the Länder, 16
subject to federal approval); Sec. VII, Art. 70, para. 1 (granting the Länder “the right to legislate insofar as 
this Basic Law does not confer legislative power on the Federation”); and Sec. X, Art. 105, para. 2(A) 
(recognizing the qualified power of the Länder to “legislate with regard to local taxes on consumption and 
expenditure”). Similarly, the South African Constitution contains an entire section defining the legislative 
authority of the provinces. See the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, Ch. 6, Part A, sec. 104.
Of course, the U.S. Constitution does, in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, make reference to powers 
and rights not granted to the national government. But as the uses and consequences of those amendments 
over the course of American political history have shown, a reference to such a body of powers and rights is 
quite different from an enumeration (or even general description) of the same. See, e.g., United States v. 
Sprague,  282  U.S.  716,  at  733  (1931)  (the  Tenth  Amendment  “added  nothing  to  the  instrument  [i.e., 
Constitution]  as  originally  ratified”);  and  United  States  v.  Darby,  312  U.S.  100,  at  124  (1941)  (“The 
amendment states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.”). But see Fry v. United 
States, 421 U.S. 542, at 547 n.7 (1975) (the Tenth Amendment “expressly declares the constitutional policy 
that Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States’ integrity or their  ability to 
function effectively in a federal system”) and the (temporary) codification of this understanding in National 
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
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the challenges of the day. The litany of failures is all too familiar: domestic instability, 
international insecurity, economic inadequacy, and near insolvency.  Central to these 17
failures were the strict limitations on the powers of the confederation government and the 
high barriers to collective action. The confederation’s dependence for tax revenue on 
requisitions on the states,  its limitation of confederal powers to those “expressly 18
delegated,”  and the requirement that all states assent to proposed amendments  had so 19 20
enervated the United States that, by 1786, it had received far less than one percent of its 
requisitions and the leading reform efforts were facing certain failure.  These failures, in 21
turn, were rooted in rivalries and frustrations between states, all of which produced a 
resistance to centralized political authority while also stymying efforts at coordinated 
action.  
The challenge facing the convention that assembled in Philadelphia in the summer of 
1787, then, inhered principally in reconstituting the relationship between the states and 
the United States, an objective that entailed establishing a novel kind of government: a 
 Max Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of 17
the American State (Oxford University Press, 2008).
 Articles of Confederation, Art. 8.18
 Id., Art. 2. 19
 Id., Art. 13.20
 See Calvin H. Johnson, Righteous Anger at the Wicked States (Cambridge, 2009), 15-39. Johnson puts 21
the exact figure of “mandated” requisitions at $3,800,000, most of which was intended for debt financing, 
and the amount collected at $663 (15 and text accompanying n. 6). The reforms referenced are the seven 
amendments proposed in August of 1786, which included strengthening congressional regulatory powers 
and enhancing the likelihood of state compliance with requisitions. See Report of Continental Congress, 
Aug. 7, 1786, 31:494-498.
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compound republic.  Unlike federal regimes of old, the Constitution did not preserve the 22
complete sovereignty of the states by erecting a central government that was legally 
dependent upon them.  Rather, it created a central government endowed with the 23
inherent powers of national sovereignty—preservation of national security, 
superintendence of conflicts between and among states, management of the national 
economy, and the conduct of foreign diplomacy. Decisively, the new national government 
had a direct relationship with citizens as well as greatly enhanced fiscal and military 
powers, precluding at least some of the state obstruction that gave rise to calls for a new 
constitution.  Though they weren’t expressly enumerated in the constitutional text, the 24
states would retain “most of the policy tools for governing everyday life,” which included 
the powers to maintain peace, preserve and further local welfare, and regulate local 
commerce.  25
While the Constitution provided a framework for the federal system, it stopped short 
of specifying the exact jurisdictional line dividing levels of government. The state-federal 
relationship outlined by the Constitution was just that—an outline. While the parameters 
set forth by the Constitution constrained the permissible configurations of the state-
 Much of what is said here follows the argument laid out in Martin Diamond’s “The Federalist’s View of 22
Federalism,” in  As Far as  Republican Principles  Will  Admit:  Essays by Martin Diamond  (William A. 
Schambra, ed.) (AEI Press, 2011). For a treatment of how this novelty played out in the debate between 
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, see Jeffrey K. Tulis and Nicole Mellow, “The Anti-Federal Appropriation,” 
American Political Thought 3(1):157-166 (2014).
 Diamond, id., 108-110.23
 On this second point, see especially Max Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government, 89-148 and 24
163-190.
 David Brian Robertson, Federalism and the Making of America (Routledge, 2012), 3225
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federal relationship, it did not specify a defined set of options, much less fix a single 
jurisdictional division of power and authority. This is what is meant when the federal 
system is characterized as underdeterminate. The constitutional text did not determine the 
specific nature and substance of American federalism. Instead, it left the federal system 
open to elaboration, definition, and revision through the political and legal processes it 
established. As is explained in greater detail in Chapter One, there were both practical 
and functional reasons underlying the structure of the federal system. Whereas the 
explanation from expediency holds that underdeterminacy was an inevitable consequence 
of the circumstances surrounding the creation of the Constitution, the functional 
explanation holds that it can be beneficial for the purposes of government. By 
empowering the national government to energetically and effectively engage the 
problems of the day and by permitting citizens’ attachments to consequentially shift from 
one governmental level to the other, the underdeterminate federal system grounded the 
quest for good governance on the authority of the People in whose name the Constitution 
spoke.  
Fully understanding the nature and development of the federal system established by 
the Constitution requires recognizing the significance of the institutions created thereby. 
For it is these institutions, corresponding to the three branches of government, whose 
operation would both shape and be decisively shaped by the underdeterminacy of the 
federal system. This is the case because efforts to enact policy and pursue the ends for 
which the Constitution was created would require the elaboration of the state-federal 
relationship. Though underdeterminacy is a feature of constitutional design, it cannot in 
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an absolute sense be a feature of public policy, which requires specifying how 
governmental institutions relate to one another in the provision of a particular service or 
the exercise of certain powers. Because legislation puts to use the powers granted by the 
Constitution, it must build on the underdeterminacy of the initial constitutional 
relationship by supplying greater detail and determinacy. It is, therefore, crucially 
important to understand how the logics of governing institutions interact with the 
constitutional logic of federalism. 
For our purposes here, the relevant interaction is that concerning the logic of judicial 
institutions and the constitutional logic of federalism, the distinctiveness of which can be 
illustrated by comparison with the interactions of legislative and executive institutions 
with the constitutional logic. The judiciary was created with the principal purpose of 
resolving questions of law, up to and including the Constitution. While debates can be 
had about the status and reception of judicial interpretations of the Constitution, it 
shouldn’t be inordinately controversial to claim that among the central judicial functions 
is the interpretation of the fundamental law when disputes arise over its meaning and 
requirements.  Conversely, the legislature was created to express (some version of) the 26
will of the people and to devise and pass laws in pursuance of the preambular ends “to 
form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, promote the 
general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty[.]” And finally, the executive was 
 Jeremy Waldron is perhaps the most prominent critic of judicial review and may, as a result, be one who 26
takes issue with this claim. For a direct statement of his argument, see “The Core of the Case Against 
Judicial Review,” 115 Yale Law Journal 1346 (2006).
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designed to execute the laws and, especially, to preserve domestic security.  These 27
institutional purposes are complemented by broad institutional capacities rooted in the 
structure of each, capacities that inflect the behavior of the actors embedded in those 
institutions. And so the legislature has the capacity of deliberation, the judiciary 
judgement, and the executive dispatch or energy. The result, in Jeffrey Tulis’ formulation, 
is “an institutional design to make productive the tension between popular will, rights, 
and security both within and among major institutions of government.”  28
These institutional logics fundamentally shape the engagement of governmental 
institutions with the underdeterminate federal system. Structured to pursue popular 
interests, the legislature approaches underdeterminacy with an eye towards possibility, 
treating the state-federal relationship as something that can be adjusted to best pursue 
policy goals, even as it is constrained by both the prevailing configuration of the state-
federal relationship and the capacity of government institutions. To the extent that the 
executive is concerned with implementing and administering the measures passed by the 
legislature, much the same could be said for that institution. And where the executive has 
a distinctive concern with administration, the state-federal relationship is viewed through 
 While these institutional purposes are described in the past tense (e.g., “the executive was structured”) 27
this  argument  shouldn’t  be  taken  to  imply  a  historical  disconnect  between  the  establishment  of  these 
institutions and some future point. It has been suggested by some that those seeking to make arguments 
about institutional purposes and capacities need to prove continuity between the founding and the period 
under examination. See Jeremy D. Bailey, “It’s the War Power, Again,” 50 Tulsa Law Review 649, at 655 
(2005) (arguing that  “institutional  capacities are far  from fixed”).  Despite the many changes that  have 
occurred since the drafting of the Constitution, the argument I am advancing in this chapter assumes that 
the basic institutional identities and capacities of the three branches of government have not changed so 
much as to preclude the application of the fundamental characteristics used here.
 Jeffrey K. Tulis, “Impeachment in the Constitutional Order,” in The Constitutional Presidency (Johns 28
Hopkins University Press, 2009), 242.
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the lens of efficiency or practicality.  For presidents seeking to implement or further a 
policy agenda, the federal system presents a set of opportunities and constraints. In this 
respect, presidents and their administrations are doubly constrained—first (and like the 
legislature) by the prevailing condition of state-federal relations and governmental 
capacity, and second by the laws passed by Congress. 
But for the judiciary, the federal system presents questions of meaning and 
interpretation. In their interactions with the state-federal relationship, courts must identify 
what is permissible and what is impermissible.  The disputes that come before courts 29
arise because of disagreements over the compatibility between the Constitution and laws 
passed pursuant or subordinate thereto. Whether a federal law is within the power of 
Congress to pass, whether a state can sever its relationship with the Union, what the 
Constitution requires of national and subnational governments—these and innumerable 
other possibilities present questions about legal and constitutional meaning. Therefore, 
resolving them requires the application of legal texts and the interpretation thereof. This 
feature of judging is most apparent in the work of jurists and theorists whose approach is 
grounded in some notion of original meaning, authorial intention, or contemporaneous 
 For the sake of simplicity, and because the focus of this chapter is Supreme Court (i.e., an apex court’s) 29
jurisprudence,  I  am setting aside distinctions between higher and lower courts that  are relevant within 
judicial systems. 
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public understanding.  But even among those who reject such an approach, the 30
determination of legal meaning and, moreover, which meanings are relevant to a given 
case are basic components of interpretation.  For it is fundamental to the judicial 31
enterprise to reason by example, to identify the controlling rules in previous cases and 
apply the rule from the most similar case(s) to the controversy at hand.  This is not only 32
a feature that characterizes constitutional reasoning and jurisprudence; it also serves an 
end of constitutional governance, namely the rule of law. Because of the judiciary’s 
relatively diminished democratic character—which is a virtue of institutional design—
 As this list of emphases is intended to convey, there is considerable diversity among the interpretive 30
camp  conventionally  labeled  “originalist.”  This  diversity  is  due  in  part  to  significant  methodological 
developments over time, which have yielded a distinction between “old originalists” and “new originalists.” 
Among the former, the works of Robert H. Bork and Antonin Scalia are most prominent. See Bork, The 
Tempting of America: The Political Seduction of the Law (Free Press, 1990); and Scalia, “Originalism: The 
Lesser Evil,” 57 University of Cincinnati Law Review 849 (1989) and A Matter of Interpretation: Federal 
Courts and the Law (Amy Gutmann, ed.) (Princeton University Press, 1997). Central early works among 
the “new originalists” include Randy E. Barnett,  “An Originalism for Nonoriginalists,” 45 Loyola Law 
Review 611 (1999) and Keith E. Whittington, “The New Originalism,” 2 Georgetown Journal of Law & 
Public Policy 599 (2004). For an overview of originalism’s development, see Lawrence B. Solum, “What is 
Originalism?  The  Evolution  of  Contemporary  Originalist  Theory,”  in  The  Challenge  of  Originalism: 
Theories  of  Constitutional  Interpretation  (Grant  Huscroft  and  Bradley  W.  Miller,  eds.)  (Cambridge 
University Press, 2011), 12-41. 
 There is as much diversity among non-originalist thinkers as there is division between originalists and 31
non-originalists.  As  a  result,  it  is  common  to  subdivide  this  second  camp  into  distinct  schools  or 
approaches.  Due  to  their  prominence,  three  warrant  identification  here.  (1)  Ronald  Dworkin’s  “moral 
reading”  approach;  see  especially  Freedom’s  Law:  The  Moral  Reading  of  the  American  Constitution 
(Harvard  University  Press,  1996),  73-76.  (2)  Sotirios  A.  Barber  and  James  E.  Fleming’s  philosophic 
approach; see Constitutional Interpretation: The Basic Questions (Harvard University Press, 2007). And (3) 
a related group of approaches that seek the synthesis of post-founding developments or the translation of 
founding commitments; see Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Foundations (Belknap, 1991), 88-89 and 
Lawrence Lessig, “Fidelity in Translation,” 71 Texas Law Review  1165 (1993), 1263-1264. Somewhere 
between  these  methodologies  and  originalism lies  Jack  Balkin’s  “text  and  principle”  approach,  which 
purports to synthesize originalism and living constitutionalism. See Balkin, Constitutional Redemption: 
Political Faith in an Unjust World  (Harvard University Press,  2011),  103-138; and Living Originalism 
(Harvard University Press, 2011), 3-5.
 Edward H. Levi,  “An Introduction to Legal Reasoning,” 15 University of Chicago Law Review 501 32
(1948), 501-506. I do not pretend that the end of constitutional interpretation is perfect determinacy. What 
has been said here is entirely consistent with the recognition that a legitimate purpose of interpretation is, at 
times, the reduction (not eradication) of either ambiguity or underdeterminacy.
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judicial inquiry should be constrained by past decisions. But even where it is not caselaw 
but constitutional commitments that are under examination, judges must first determine 
the meaning of and then apply the provisions of the Constitution. In Chief Justice 
Marshall’s formulation—which perhaps does more to highlight rather than resolve the 
central question—it is “the province and duty of the Judicial Department to say what the 
law is.”  33
The juxtaposition of the institutional logic of the judiciary and the constitutional logic 
of federalism presents a clear tension, if not a fundamental contradiction. Whereas the 
constitutional logic is predicated on underdeterminacy and the consequent possibility of 
multiple manifestations of the state-federal relationship, the institutional logic of the 
judiciary is oriented towards removing uncertainty, identifying legal boundaries, and 
presenting the justificatory rationale for its determinations. Though the preceding analysis 
has identified a theoretical tension between the institutional logic of the judiciary and the 
constitutional logic of federalism, it is far too abstract to derive any meaningful insights 
about the consequences of judicial engagements with the federalism system. Moreover, 
the question of how constitutional underdeterminacy has shaped judicial engagements 
with the federal system is an empirical question that should direct our attention to the 
history of those engagements. We must, in other words, consider particular disputes that 
have come before the Court and the jurisprudence they have produced. That is the matter 
now before us.  
 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 177 (1803).33
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The Constitutional Law of Federalism  
While the foregoing description of the constitution logic of federalism and the 
institutional logics of the branches of the national government paints a picture of the 
nature of the American federal system, it limns only the broadest and most general 
contours of these institutions’ engagements with federal underdeterminacy. To see how 
this has played out in practice and, importantly, what the consequences have been, we 
must attend to the details of political and constitutional development. As the object of 
concern here is how constitutional underdeterminacy has shaped judicial engagements 
with the federal system, those details consist principally in the particular legal disputes 
over the meaning of the federal system. For that reason, this section examines the 
development of federalism jurisprudence across Supreme Court cases in order to 
illustrate the consequences of judicial engagement with the federal system, each of 
which, I’ve argued, partake of different animating logics. Through that interaction, I 
argue below, a new logic of federalism was created, one that is decisively shaped by the 
institutional logic of the judiciary.  
As noted at the outset of this chapter, the goal here is to offer an account of this 
interaction and its consequences, not a comprehensive narrative of the underlying 
jurisprudence. This distinction is possible because the new logic that I argue emerges 
from the interaction of the judiciary with the constitutional logic of federalism is 
discernible within and across a wide range of cases the Supreme Court has decided. As 
such, the imperative is to address cases with sufficient scope to adequately present the 
argument; the inclusion of other cases would only underscore the argument advanced via 
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the smaller set of cases considered here. Additionally, my intention is not to rewrite the 
history of federalism jurisprudence, which would indeed require a comprehensive 
treatment of the caselaw. It is, rather, to identify and assess the principal consequences of 
the intersection of two logics—one constitutional, the other institutional—that I’ve 
argued appear to be at odds. Such a method permits scrutiny and objections on the basis 
of the cases discussed as well as those omitted. The cases are presented in a method that 
is both chronological and topical, moving from the ratification of the Constitution 
through the Civil War but focusing on defining tensions and issues. As a result, the 
analysis is divided into two sections. The first addresses the first fifty years under the 
Constitution, focusing on several cases concerning the division of power between the 
state and national governments. Picking up where the first section leaves off, the second 
section focuses on a number of cases dealing with related questions of slavery, secession, 
and the nature of the American Union. 
The Early Republic: 1787-1837 
The first three decades under the Constitution saw the rise of the federal judiciary as 
the guarantor of national supremacy.  The next two would make clear the consequences 34
of that role in American constitutional politics. Having effectively routed disputes over 
 As this introduction makes clear, the period covered in this chapter picks up after crucially important 34
jurisprudential and political developments in the domain of federal jurisdiction. That issue is not taken up 
here, as the jurisdictional expansion that occurred largely due to the efforts of the Marshall Court is beyond 
the scope of the present inquiry. See Alison LaCroix, “Federalists, Federalism, and Federal Jurisdiction,” 30 
Law and History Review 205 (2012). This is the principal reason why Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 
(1793), is excluded from analysis, as that case is best addressed in the context of early battles over federal 
jurisdiction.
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the Constitution’s meaning before the federal bar, the Court was positioned to leave its 
mark on constitutional interpretation. And in the domain of state-federal relations, that is 
precisely what it did. The period following the War of 1812 into the late 1830s is often 
treated as a tumultuous time for federalism jurisprudence.  Running from the middle 35
years of John Marshall’s chief justiceship to the early years of Roger Taney’s, and 
spanning significant changes in federalism jurisprudence wrought by the transition from 
the former to the latter, there is much evidence for this belief. But it was during this 
period that a new logic of federalism emerged from the engagement of the judiciary with 
the underdeterminacy of the American federal system. While the Marshall Court would 
articulate one dimension of this logic, the Taney Court would supply a corresponding 
dimension. In truth, the new logic of federalism was only partially constructed in the 
period of each man’s tenure at the head of the Court. It is only when the substantive and 
formal transitions over time are accounted for that the new logic begins to appear in its 
fullness. The opposing convictions of the Courts’ nationalists and its advocates of robust 
state sovereignty drove the development of a new understanding of federalism that 
entailed the elaboration of the state-federal relationship far beyond the broad outlines 
provided in the Constitution. This new understanding forsook the underdeterminacy of 
the jurisdictional division between state and nation in favor of settled legal meaning. 
Though judicial engagement with questions touching on the nature of the federal 
system arose in earlier cases of the Marshall Court, such questions are treated most fully, 
and most consequentially, in its opinions in McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) and Cohens v. 
 See, for example, William P. Murphy, The Triumph of Nationalism: State Sovereignty, the Founding 35
Fathers, and the Making of the Constitution (Quadrangle Books, 1967), 409-417.
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Virginia (1821).  At issue in McCulloch was Congress’s power to incorporate the Second 36
Bank of the United States and Maryland’s power to tax it. Writing for the Court, Marshall 
upheld the exercise of congressional power and held that a state could not tax an 
instrumentality of the federal government. Two years later, with the McCulloch 
controversy still simmering, the Court heard Cohens, which involved the Supreme Court 
of Virginia’s contention that it—and not the Supreme Court—had final say over the 
commonwealth’s criminal cases. In an opinion evocative of the political finesse exhibited 
nearly two decades earlier in Marbury v. Madison (1803),  Marshall denied Virginia’s 37
claim of possessing exclusive jurisdiction, claimed federal jurisdiction over the case, and 
ultimately affirmed the lower court’s decision.  
Crucially, in both McCulloch and Cohens Marshall did not cite narrow grounds for 
upholding the exercise of congressional power and claiming federal jurisdiction, 
respectively. Rather, in lengthy disquisitions on the nature, scope, and extent of national 
power he sought a principled constitutional basis for the Court’s holdings. Asked whether 
Congress could do what it did in McCulloch, Marshall attempted to clarify the kinds of 
things the national government could lawfully do. And asked whether the Court could 
hear a case decided by a state high court in Cohens, he set his opinion in the context of an 
elaborate constitutional relationship between states and the national government. The 
foundation of both opinions is Marshall’s elaboration of the nature of sovereignty in the 
federal system. While it was true that the states possessed some sovereignty and that the 
 19 U.S. 264 (1821).36
 5 U.S. 137 (1803)37
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sovereignty of the federal government was defined by its enumerated powers, he argued, 
it was also true that where the federal government was granted power it was supreme. 
Moreover, the sovereignty of the national government depended upon the efficacy of the 
powers it was granted. It was on this basis that Marshall interpreted the Necessary and 
Proper Clause to mean that the Congress had significant discretion to select the means it 
deemed necessary to pursue legitimate ends. Accordingly, state sovereignty was limited 
by the means Congress employed to “carry into execution powers conferred on that 
body.”   38
In explicating the state-federal relationship implied by the Constitution—for that is 
how he saw the connection—Marshall was not content to leave room for state 
infringement on the proper domain of national power and thus took the opportunity to 
demarcate the line that separated the sovereign states from the sovereign national 
government.  This was a far cry from the underdeterminacy of the state-federal 39
relationship set out in the Constitution. And that was precisely the point. For as Marshall 
wrote in Cohens, it was the “different opinions on the true construction of the 
constitutional powers of Congress” that compelled federal jurisdiction in the case. In 
order to protect the constitutionally established federal system, Marshall argued, its 
 17 U.S. 316, at 429. 38
 Though it  may seem incongruous to  attribute  sovereignty to  the states  in  the context  of  Marshall’s 39
opinion, it should be remembered that this is how Marshall himself formulated the matter: “In the case now 
to be determined, the defendant, a sovereign State…” (17 U.S. 316, 400).
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vulnerabilities must be shored up and strengthened against state hostilities.  To be truly 40
sovereign, the national government’s powers must be secure and to be secure they must 
be clearly defined. Under this theory of sovereignty, underdeterminacy was not a virtue 
but a threat to the integrity of the national government. In the absence of a clearly 
demarcated scope of national authority, state infringements would erode not only the 
reality but also the possibility of national sovereignty. 
Thus, in addressing questions about the federal system the Court fundamentally 
transformed the way federalism was conceived of and enforced. Where the Constitution 
left room for political deliberation and definition, the Court sought legal precision; where 
the Constitution established an underdeterminate state-federal relationship, the Court 
sought directive constitutional meaning. What had been a political question about what 
the federal system could and should be was transmuted into a legal question about what 
the federal system was as a matter of law. In short, in elaborating the theory of 
sovereignty implied by Constitution’s underdeterminate federal system, the Court 
attempted to resolve a question that the Constitution itself did not answer—that is, what 
are the precise contours of the state-federal relationship? The result of the interaction 
between the logic of the judiciary and the constitutional logic of federalism was a new 
logic, one in which the proper domains of state and national responsibility and 
sovereignty could be discerned from the Constitution’s text and structure. By elaborating 
 In this respect, Marshall’s argument echoed the concerns expressed by Publius in The Federalist. In No. 40
17, for example, Hamilton writes, “It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach 
upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the state authorities” (106). 
And in No.  45 Madison argues that  “all  the examples of  ancient  and modern confederacies” reveal  a 
stronger tendency “to despoil the general government of its authorities, with a very ineffectual capacity in 
the latter to defend itself against the encroachments” (310). 
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the relationship between the levels of government and arriving at categories of behavior 
appropriate to each, the actions of both levels could be measured against a constitutional 
standard. Conceived thusly, underdeterminacy was replaced by definitive meaning and 
the dynamism of the political realm was exchanged for the codification of legal 
reasoning.  
The last decade of Marshall’s time on the bench, from 1825 to 1835, is widely seen as 
a period of accommodation and retreat on questions of national power.  Due in part to 41
the appointment of new justices—three between 1823 and 1830—the Court began issuing 
opinions more supportive of state (i.e., subnational) power.  Furthermore, with the 42
increase of dissenting opinions—a  practice Marshall had actively opposed in favor of 
opinions of the Court as a whole—the Court began to seem more sympathetic to state 
 See, e.g., Charles F. Hobson, “The Marshall Court (1801-1835): Law, Politics, and the Emergence of the 41
Federal Judiciary,” in The United States Supreme Court: The Pursuit of Justice (Christopher Tomlins, ed.) 
(Houghton Mifflin Co., 2005), 61.
 For  examples,  see  Ogden v.  Sanders,  25  U.S.  213  (1827)  (upholding  a  New York  bankruptcy  law 42
applying to contracts made after the passage of the law); Wilson v. Blackbird Creek Marsh Company, 27 
U.S. [2 Pet.] 245 (1829) (holding that Delaware’s damming of the Blackbird Creek did not infringe on 
congressional regulatory powers under the Commerce Clause); Providence v. Billings, 29 U.S. [4 Pet.] 514 
(1830) (upholding a Rhode Island law taxing the capital stock of all banks in the state against a Contracts 
Clause  challenge);  and  Barron  v.  Baltimore,  32  U.S.  [7  Pet.]  449  (1829)  (rejecting  a  Takings  Clause 
challenge against Baltimore development efforts on the grounds that the Fifth Amendment limited actions 
of the national government and not the states). 
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claims.  This process continued, with one notable exception,  until Marshall’s death in 43 44
1835. The vacancy at the center of the bench presented President Andrew Jackson with 
yet another opportunity to shape the court to his liking: in the six years preceding 1835, 
Jackson had put three new justices on the bench. (And by 1838, after Congress added two 
additional seats to the Court, he had appointed seven of the nine sitting justices.) His 
choice to lead the Court was Roger Brooke Taney, the son of a Maryland planter whom 
Jackson had tapped to be his Attorney General. During Taney’s chief justiceship, the 
Court would (attempt to) negotiate the sectional disputes preceding the Civil War and, of 
course, issue the infamous Dred Scott decision. Though Taney would occupy the Court’s 
middle seat until 1864, we needn’t look far from his confirmation in 1836 to see how the 
new logic of federalism fared in the post-Marshall Supreme Court. In just the first term, 
the Taney Court would “set the stage for the jurisprudence of the newly remade 
Jacksonian Court.”  In so doing, it would mark a significant point of departure from the 45
substance of the Marshall Court’s federalism jurisprudence but not, as I’ll argue, from its 
logic. By 1837, it was clear that the Taney Court was committed to the same logic of 
 For examples, see Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. [12 Wheat.] 419 (1827) (Justice Johnson dissenting from 43
a decision invalidating a licensure law); and Weston v. City Council of Charleston, 27 U.S. [2 Pet.] 449 
(1829) (Justice Johnson dissenting from a decision striking a state law imposing a tax on stock issued for 
loans made to the United States). For the development of norms governing judicial opinions, see Karl M. 
ZoBell, “Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judicial Disintegration,” 44 Cornell Law 
Quarterly 186 (1959). See also Ruth Bader Ginsburg, “The Role of Dissenting Opinions,” 95 Minnesota 
Law Review 1 (2010).
 Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. [6 Pet.] 515 (1832) (voiding a state law regulating the access of non-44
Native Americans to Native American lands and establishing the federal government’s sole authority to 
regulate relations with Indian tribes).
 Paul Finkelman, “The Taney Court (1836-1864): The Jurisprudence of Slavery and the Crisis of the 45
Union,” in The United States Supreme Court: The Pursuit of Justice, 79.
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federalism promulgated by Marshall in McCulloch and Cohens, though in the service of 
quite different ends.  
For present purposes the first case of note is Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge 
(1837),  a dispute out of Massachusetts that concerned the state’s ability to build a 46
bridge over the Charles River that would effectively revoke a preexisting charter held by 
a ferryboat company. Writing for the Court, Taney invoked a principle of construction 
from English common law, holding that contractual ambiguity should be decided “in 
favor of the public.” The decision thus facilitated state attempts to pursue economic 
development on their own terms, while also sanctioning state promotion of technological 
and industrial advancements even where extant contracts could otherwise stand in the 
way. More important for the development of the logic of federalism were the Court’s 
decisions in New York v. Miln (1837)  and Briscoe v. Commonwealth of Kentucky 47
(1837).  In Miln the Court faced a state law that imposed fines on ships that did not 48
report their passengers to authorities. When a shipmaster failed to comply with the law, 
George Miln, the ship’s consignee, was fined $15,000. Miln argued that the New York 
law was an unconstitutional regulation of interstate commerce. Despite the (Marshall) 
Court’s holding thirteen years earlier in Gibbons v. Ogden,  which gave an expansive 49
 36 U.S. 420 (1837).46
 36 U.S. 102 (1837).47
 36 U.S. 257 (1837).48
 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (striking down a New York licensure law for out-of-state steamboat operators on the 49
grounds that it infringed on Congress’s power to regulate interstate commerce).
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reading to Congress’s power to regulate commerce, in Miln it decided in favor of New 
York and upheld the shipping regulation.  
The basis for the Court’s decision, Justice Philip Barbour wrote, was that, “we are of 
the opinion that the act is not a regulation of commerce, but of police; and that being thus 
considered, it was passed in the exercise of a power which rightfully belonged to the 
states.”  These “police powers,” identified as the basis for a constitutional decision for 50
the first time in Miln, recognized a body of traditional state powers according to which,  
[I]t is not only the right, but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to advance 
the safety, happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its general 
welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem to be conducive 
to these ends; where the power over the particular subject, or the manner of its 
exercise is not surrendered or restrained, in the manner just stated. That all those 
powers which relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may perhaps, more 
properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or restrained; and that, 
consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a state is complete, 
unqualified, and exclusive.  51
Just as Marshall had attempted to secure the national government from state 
encroachment in McCulloch and Cohens, through the articulation of police powers 
Barbour sought to protect the states from the expansion of the national government. 
Doing so required elaborating the state-federal relationship to clarify how, to his and the 
majority’s mind, state powers related to national powers. 
In Briscoe, the Court employed similar reasoning to uphold Kentucky’s incorporation 
of a bank to issue bank notes. Six years earlier, in Craig v. Missouri,  the Marshall Court 52
 36 U.S. 102, at 132.50
 36 U.S. 102, at 139.51
 29 U.S. [4 Pet.] 410 (1830).52
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had invalidated state attempts to issue paper money. In response to that ruling, Kentucky 
created a state-chartered bank that would issue its own bank notes instead of currency. In 
1837, this was enough to satisfy a majority of the Court, which in a 6-1 decision upheld 
the state’s actions. Without explicitly grounding the decision in the states’ police powers, 
Justice McClean argued that the power to create a corporation to issue bank notes was 
constitutional precisely because it wasn’t precluded by the Constitution. This line of 
reasoning put the power to issue bank notes firmly in the category of powers “not…
surrendered or restrained” that Justice Barbour had announced in Miln. That power had 
belonged to the states before 1787 and because it was not withdrawn, it still belonged to 
them. As in Miln, the majority in Briscoe read into the Constitution a theory of 
sovereignty and state-federal relations that empowered states to serve their traditional 
purposes.  
For McLean, the Constitution’s lack of determinacy was the basis not for a malleable 
relationship between levels of government—much less for deference to Congress—but 
for a broad reservoir of rights reserved to the states. This impulse to derive specific, 
directive meaning from an underdeterminate constitutional text, whether done in service 
of national or state interests, is the hallmark of the new logic of federalism produced by 
judicial engagement with the federal system. Though it was a consensus view that states 
had certain powers that were theirs alone, not to be infringed by the national government, 
nowhere, least of all in the Constitution, were those powers spelled out. What the Court 
did in Miln and Briscoe was recognize legal categories—police powers and traditional 
functions—to remedy or supplement the Constitution’s silence about the precise extent of 
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powers possessed by the states. For both the Marshall Court’s nationalist jurisprudence 
and the Taney Court’s states’ rights opinions, underdeterminacy was a threat to what each 
saw as the sovereign relationship implied by the Constitution. The result was a logic of 
federalism predicated not on jurisdictional negotiation through constitutional politics but 
on defining and preserving a balance of powers between the state and national levels.  
The conventional account of the federalism jurisprudence of the post-Marshall Court 
attributes much significance to the states’ rights sentiments of President Jackson and the 
justices he appointed to the bench. This telling give considerable weight to the power of 
judicial review, without which the Court would have been unable to substantially limit 
earlier pro-nationalist decisions.  There is doubtless some truth to this view. Jackson’s 53
justices, Taney foremost among them, were frequently skeptical of national power, 
particularly when it collided with areas of traditional state concern, and they weren’t 
reluctant to express as much in their opinions. But when we examine the reasoning of the 
decisions surveyed here, we see in the early years of the Taney Court the persistence of 
the same logical form that characterized the Marshall Court’s most expansive opinions. 
Whereas in McCulloch and Cohens the Court explicated the scope of national powers up 
to the point it was delimited by state powers, in Miln and Briscoe the Court began with 
state powers and defined a domain of sovereign authority limited at its outer edge by 
national powers. The latter decisions erected a category of government powers that 
corresponded to the category of nation powers articulated by Chief Justice Marshall in 
McCulloch and Cohens and later extended in Gibbons. Neither category was fully 
 William P. Murphy, The Triumph of Nationalism, 51.53
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deducible from the Constitution. But both were attempts to elaborate the state-federal 
relationship there set out and, in the process, elucidate directive and determinate legal 
principles from a text whose logic was fundamentally underdeterminate.  
The central difference between the decisions of the Marshall and Taney Courts in 
these cases concerns the interpretation of the relationship between sovereign entities. 
Chief Justice Marshall prioritized the efficacy of national constitutional powers and 
national governance, thus interpreting the sovereignty of the national government as 
extending as far as necessary to achieve these ends. The limitation on national powers, 
then, were traditional areas of state concern that, more often then not, the national 
government could not practicably reach. Conversely, Chief Justice Taney and Justices 
Barbour and McLean accorded most value to the states’ traditional functions and 
accordingly defined the scope of national power by first giving an expansive reading to 
the necessary domain of state control. To arrive at these conclusions, each justice had to 
construct a state-federal relationship that, while drawing on the constitutional text, went 
far beyond the underdeterminacy of the federal system found there. It was this effort to 
elaborate a robust and directive theory of the federal system that caused the Court to read 
underdeterminacy out of the Constitution. 
Though the two often reached opposing substantive conclusions, the Taney Court in 
its early years continued the new logic of federalism forged under the Marshall Court, 
treating federalism as something far more determinate than a fair reading of the 
constitutional text would support. In this way, the states’ rights jurisprudence of the late 
1830s had more in common with the Marshall Court’s nationalist jurisprudence than with 
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the constitutional logic of federalism. Both sought to apply legal rigor and precision to 
the question of the state-federal relationship’s meaning, identifying a principled basis on 
which to deem as lawful and unlawful not only particular state or federal actions but also 
the categories of actions that were appropriate to each. In the course of acquitting the 
judicial duty “to say what the law is,” Marshall strove to delineate that which was within 
the realm of national power and that which was beyond the realm of state power. The 
Taney Court decisions reversed Marshall’s deductive process, seeking to clarify the 
proper domain of state power and the improper domain of national power. Though 
fundamentally different in their emphases, both modes of reasoning partook of the same 
impulse: to provide clarity where the Constitution left underdeterminacy. That is the 
essence of the new logic of federalism produced in the early decades of the nineteenth 
century by judicial engagements with the constitutional logic of federalism.  
Slavery, Secession, and Union: 1842-1873 
It is impossible to separate the history of federalism from the institution and legacy of 
slavery.  Conspicuous in its literal absence from the constitutional text, the existence and 54
protection of slavery were undeniable considerations during the construction of the 
 The unfortunate consequence of this relationship is captured by William Riker’s striking assertion: “If 54
one approves the goals and values of the privileged minority, one should approve of federalism. Thus, if in 
the United States one approves of Southern white racists, then one should approve of American federalism. 
If,  on the other  hand,  one disapproves of  the values of  privileged minority,  one should disapprove of 
federalism. Thus, if in the United States one disapproves of racism, one should disapprove of federalism.” 
Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance (Little, Brown, 1964), 155. Legal historians Sara Bayeux and 
Karen Tani have recently argued that this sentiment, in conjunction with the increasing nationalization of 
domestic  politics,  led  scholars  of  American  politics  and  history  to  neglect  the  federal  system.  See 
“Federalism Anew,” American Journal of Legal History 56:128-138 (2016). For an attempt to remedy this 
situation, see Karen Tani, States of Dependency: Welfare, Rights, and American Governance, 1935-1972 
(Cambridge University Press, 2016).
!168
federal system and are apparent in the structure of government established by the 
Constitution. From the formula for representation of “three fifths of all other Persons,”  55
to the electoral college’s consequent privileging of slaveholding states, to the Fugitive 
Slave Clause of Article IV —slavery pervaded not just the Constitution but also the 56
politics it was meant to structure. While the status of slavery in the Constitution was (and 
remains) a much controverted question of legal theory and history,  it is difficult to 57
defend the proposition that the federal system did not provide constitutional resources for 
slavery’s endurance. For that reason, myriad legal cases arose that, despite their 
individual characteristics, all stemmed from the presence of slavery in some states, its 
absence in others, and the host of phenomena—ranging from economic structure to 
political culture—generated by this difference.  Those surveyed here, like many among 58
the set from which they’re drawn, present fundamental questions about the extent of state 
power, the scope of national regulatory authority, and the nature of citizenship in the 
American federal system. Taken together, they demonstrate how the Court conceptualized 
 U.S. Constitution, Art. I, Sec. 3., cl. 3.55
 Id., Sec. 2, cl. 3. 56
 The most famous disagreement, of course, is that between the positions of William Lloyd Garrison—that 57
the Constitution was “a covenant with death” and “an agreement with hell”—and Frederick Douglass—that 
there “is no word, no syllable in the Constitution to forbid” the abolition of slavery—who himself had 
previously affirmed Garrison’s position.
 For primary sources and analysis of some of the cases not covered here, see Paul Finkelman, Slavery in 58
the Courtroom: An Annotated Bibliography of American Cases (Lawbook Exchange, 1998). See also Don 
E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the Unites States Government’s Relations to 
Slavery (Oxford University Press, 2001). Important also is the emergence of antislavery argumentation in 
the late eighteenth and nineteenth century. In this connection, see Justin Buckley Dyer, Natural Law and 
the Antislavery Constitutional Tradition (Cambridge University Press, 2012),
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the underdeterminate state-federal relationship in the context of slavery and what the 
consequences were of its interaction with the constitutional logic of federalism.  
Among the most significant cases that directly broached the constitutional 
foundations of slavery was Prigg v. Pennsylvania (1842). Prigg concerned the 1793 
Fugitive Slave Act, specifically whether it precluded Pennsylvania’s law prohibiting the 
removal of slaves and criminalizing efforts to do so. Upon attempting to remove a former 
slave from Pennsylvania to Maryland, Edward Prigg was arrested and found guilty under 
the Pennsylvania law. His appeal to the Supreme Court claimed that the state law should 
be displaced by the federal law. Reversing the conviction, the Court affirmed the 
constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act and, moreover, held that “the power of 
legislation upon this subject is exclusive in the national government[.]”  Writing for the 59
majority, Justice Story grounded national authority in a Marshallian understanding of 
national sovereignty. National powers should be construed to extend to the point required 
for their efficacious use and, for that reason, must be understood to include “powers 
which were necessary and proper as means to carry into effect rights expressly given, and 
duties expressly enjoined” by the Constitution.  And like Marshall, Story included a 60
gesture towards (though not a clear demarcation of) the limit of national power: “the 
police powers belonging to the states in virtue of their general sovereignty.”  Paralleling 61
the logical structure of the Court’s opinions in McCulloch and Cohens, Story’s opinion 
 41 U.S. [16 Pet.] 539, at 542 (1842).59
 41 U.S. [16 Pet.] 539, at 618-619.60
 41 U.S. [16 Pet.] 539, at 625.61
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for the Court in Prigg proceeded by articulating the full scope of national power and only 
then acknowledging the body of state powers on the other side of that legal horizon. Even 
as—or, perhaps, because—he gave an expansive construction to national powers, Story 
outlined the powers of government on the other side of that horizon. As was argued above 
in the context of Marshall’s opinions, this mode of reasoning—in which state and 
national powers are understood as a function of their relationship to each other—was 
induced by the underdeterminacy of the federal system. 
In an opinion that concurred only in judgement, Chief Justice Taney rejected Story’s 
conception of the state-federal relationship and offered his own elaboration. Though the 
substance of the two opinions differed starkly their logical forms were quite similar, with 
Taney taking as his starting point the powers of the states rather than a full articulation of 
the enumerated powers of Congress. This approach to the state-federal relationship was 
buttressed by what could be thought of as a strict constructionist approach to the 
constitutional text. For Taney, the absence of an explicit prohibition on state legislation 
enforcing the rights of slaveholders to reclaim their property, in conjunction with the 
explicit prohibition on impairing that right, yielded the conclusion that “the [states’] 
power to pass laws to support and enforce it, is necessarily implied.”  On this basis, he 62
rejected the majority’s assignment of exclusive regulatory power to the national 
government. In so doing, he located the states’ concurrent power to legislate in behalf of 
slaveholders’ rights in a vision of the state-federal relationship according to which 
constitutional underdeterminacy was to be read in a way that maximized state power.  
 41 U.S. [16 Pet.] 539, at 628. 62
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Though often overshadowed by Prigg, a case decided the prior year broached matters 
of comparable significance. In Groves v. Slaughter (1841), the Court affirmed the validity 
of a contract for the sale of slaves in Mississippi over objections that it was abrogated by 
the state constitution’s prohibition on the importation and sale of slaves. Though the case 
was resolved on fairly narrow grounds—the state constitutional provision was found to 
require enabling legislation in order to go into effect—the opinions issued by the Court 
nonetheless addressed a question of considerable constitutional importance: what was the 
scope of Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause vis-à-vis state regulatory powers? 
As in Prigg, the opinions in Groves addressed the question of whether commercial 
regulation was a concurrent power or a power exclusive to the national government. But 
unlike Prigg, Groves includes a more explicit engagement with the vision of union that 
informs the interpretation of Congress’ enumerated powers. And for this reason, it is an 
illustrative example of how the structure of the federal system induces judicial reasoning 
about the nature of union for which the Constitution is the charter of government.  
In the absence of an exhaustive division of power between governmental levels, the 
conflict between Congress’ enumerated right to regulate interstate commerce and an 
implicit right for states to regulate their own commerce induced justices on both sides of 
the issue to reason about the nature of the polity established by the Constitution. As the 
three opinions that take up this matter demonstrate, depending on how one understands 
the union and the place of the component governments therein, the question of the proper 
state-federal relationship can be answered differently. Hence, Justice McLean’s 
conclusion that Congress possessed exclusive power to regulate commerce followed from 
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his argument that the “spirit of the constitution” required national powers to face no 
opposition from the states, even if Congress has chosen not to act. “The necessity of a 
uniform commercial regulation,” he wrote, was the principal motivation for writing a new 
constitution. If not exclusive to Congress, “the Constitution must fail to attain one of the 
principal objects of its formation.”  But where did this power end? Like the 63
endorsements of national power we’ve already seen, McLean’s came with the 
identification of a class of activities under the states’ control: “The power over slavery 
belongs to the states respectively. It is local in its character, and in its effects; and the 
transfer or sale of slaves cannot be separated from this power.”  Locality, then, defined 64
the line of separation between state and national powers, as the police powers had for 
Story in Prigg. 
In his opinion affirming state regulatory powers, Justice Baldwin proceeded in a 
manner quite similar to McLean, reasoning about the relationship of one level of 
government to the other. But rather than reason from national power to state power, he 
began by emphasized the states’ police powers. Most relevant to this analysis is not only 
Baldwin’s acknowledgment of the underdeterminacy of the federal system, but also his 
proposed solution to this problem of constitutional interpretation. The jurisdictional line, 
which he confesses can be difficult to identify, is buttressed by a body of state powers 
that must be inferred from both the constitutional text and some notion of the union it 
 40 U.S. 449, at 504 (1841). 63
 40 U.S. 449, at 508 (emphasis added).64
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established. After conceding that Gibbons “conclusively settled” that Congress’ power to 
regulate interstate commerce is exclusive, he writes: 
Cases may indeed arise wherein there may be found difficulty in discriminating 
between regulations of ‘commerce among the several states’ and the regulations 
of ‘the internal police of the state,’ but the subject matter of such regulations of 
either description will lead to the true line which separates them when they are 
examined with a disposition to avoid a collision between the powers granted to 
the federal government by the people of the several states and those which they 
have reserved exclusively to themselves.  65
Baldwin’s effort to identify and protect state power involved first asserting that a 
construction must be made that avoided conflict between state and national power; what 
was needed was a clear separation of the two. Doing so required identifying the objects of 
regulation, which in turn drew on the premise that congressional powers yielded to a set 
of definite state powers, namely their internal police powers. While this understanding 
would seem consistent with McClean’s emphasis on locality as the line between the 
extent of state and national powers, Baldwin reaches exactly the opposite substantive 
conclusion as McClean. This is the result of similar patterns of relational reasoning, 
induced by constitutional underdeterminacy, that are distinguished by the analytical 
starting point. The line dividing state from national powers will differ depending on 
which powers and which level of government is given analytical priority. What appears to 
be a disagreement about constitutional—and primarily textual—interpretation, is actually 
a much more consequential disagreement about the relationship between state and nation 
and how that relationship should be understood. This disagreement takes on its distinctive 
 40 U.S. 449, at 511.65
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appearance because it occurs within the institutional context of the judiciary and is thus 
animated by the imperatives of finding constitutional meaning and legal determinacy.  
There is, perhaps, no case as significant to the history of, or revealing of the 
relationship between, federalism and slavery as Dred Scott v. Sanford (1857).  At issue 66
in the case was whether Scott, a slave who had been moved into and lived for some time 
in a free state, could sue for this freedom.  The suit thus presented the threshold question 67
of his standing to sue. But in the course of rejecting Scott’s standing, the Court made the 
case about much more. Writing for the seven justice majority, Chief Justice Taney went 
on from the jurisdictional question to address two further questions. The first was 
whether Dred Scott, or any former or current slaves, was a citizen of the United States; 
the second whether Congress had power to regulate slavery in the territories acceded to 
the federal government after the Constitution was ratified. To both questions Taney’s 
answer was no. These two issues—citizenship and the scope of national power—are at 
the core of the federal system, especially when one acknowledges the centrality of 
popular attachment to the distribution of power in the state-federal relationship. To this 
point citizenship hasn’t figured in the analysis of federalism jurisprudence. This is partly 
for reasons of case selection but also because it was not a significant focus of early 
 A seminal treatment of this case, as well as the legal and historical background, is Don E. Fehrenbacher’s 66
The Dred Scott Case: Its Significance in American Law and Politics (Oxford University Press, 2001). For 
an analysis of the broader jurisprudence of which Dred Scott was a part, see Austin Allen, Origins of the 
Dred Scott Case: Jacksonian Jurisprudence and the Supreme Court, 1837-1857 (University of Georgia, 
2006); and Mark Graber, Dred Scott and the Problem of Constitutional Evil (Cambridge University Press, 
2006). 
 The  facts  of  the  case  are  much  more  complicated  than  this  simplification  undoubtedly  suggest.  In 67
addition to the sources cited previously, one should consult Lea VanderVelde’s Mrs. Dred Scott: A Life on 
Slavery’s Frontier (Oxford University Press, 2009) for an excavation and examination of many commonly 
overlooked aspects of the circumstances surrounding the case.  
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Supreme Court rights jurisprudence. As Michael Vorenberg has observed, “the lodestar of 
rights in early nineteenth-century America was not citizenship but freedom.”  But as 68
Dred Scott reveals, citizenship would become an increasingly pivotal piece of the 
relationship between state governments and the national government. This will become 
clear throughout the remainder of this section, as the post-Civil War changes to American 
law are surveyed and the changed position of American citizens with respect to the 
governments that represent them are examined. 
Chief Justice Taney’s answers to the questions he deemed implicated by the threshold 
question of jurisdiction were undergirded by a robust theory of the American union and 
the nature of the constituent power that created it. His argument rests on a sharp 
distinction between “the rights of citizenship which a State may confer within its own 
limits, and the rights of citizenship as a member of the Union.”  Appearances to the 69
contrary notwithstanding, this is not an argument for dual citizenship if that term is 
understood to entail separate and independent legal statuses with respect to both the state 
and national governments. It is, rather, a relationship of separate but dependent 
citizenships. After making the distinction between the two modes of citizenship, Taney 
clarifies the relationship between the two: citizenship as a member of the union depended 
on citizenship in the states that formed the union. If the latter status did not obtain, neither 
could the former. Moreover, this dependence referred to the concrete historical moment at 
 “Citizenship and the Thirteenth Amendment: Understanding the Deafening Silence,” in The Promise of 68
Liberty: The History and Contemporary Relevance of the Thirteenth Amendment (Columbia University 
Press, 2010) (Alexander Tsesis, ed.), 61.
 40 U.S. 393, at 405 (1856).69
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which the Constitution was established. If one was not among the classes of individuals 
included in state citizenship at the time of ratification, one could not be a citizen of the 
United States nor enjoy the rights and privileges conferred thereby. Though they could 
enjoy the benefits and protections offered by their own states, classes of individuals 
admitted to state citizenship subsequent to the founding could not enjoy the advantages of 
“citizenship as a member of the Union” because they were not party to the creation of the 
union.  At this point in Taney’s argument, we begin to see more clearly the 70
interdependence of citizenship, sovereignty, and government power. Only citizens can 
delegate sovereign authority that is otherwise and ultimately their own. Citizenship in a 
broader union, moreover, is derivative of and dependent upon citizenship in the 
component parts of that union, namely the states. Once delegated, the sovereign authority 
held by government can be used only on and for the benefit of those who were party to 
the original delegation. To do otherwise—for example, by extending citizenship or the 
rights of citizenship to groups who weren’t part of the initial delegation of authority to 
the union—would amount to violating the sovereignty of both individual citizens and the 
state governments that are the trustees of those citizens’ initial delegations of power.  
Despite the many differences between Taney’s opinion and the dissents by Justices 
McClean and Curtis, both of the latter present a broadly similar picture of citizenship in 
the United States. It bears mention, though, that McLean stresses Congress’ exclusive 
power of naturalization and defines “citizen” in very simple terms as “a freeman,” that is, 
 Ibid.70
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one “born under our Constitution and laws.”  But this qualification still fits within the 71
relationship of dependence and state primacy that Taney outlines. As McLean concludes, 
“No person can legally be made a citizen of a State, and consequently a citizen of the 
United States, of foreign birth, unless he be naturalized by the acts of Congress.”  Curtis 72
is much more direct in his formulation of citizenship, though much longer in his analysis 
of the issue. Under the Constitution, he concludes after surveying citizenship under the 
Confederation and through the establishment of the Constitution, “every free person born 
on the soil of a State, who is a citizen of that State by force of its Constitution or laws, is 
also a citizen of the United States.”  In all three of these opinions, then, the picture of 73
citizenship that emerges is one in which, despite separate modes corresponding to each 
level of government, citizenship as a member of the United States depended on state 
citizenship. In connecting rights to citizenship, the opinion of the Court increased the 
legal import of the latter. If the denial of citizenship entailed the denial of rights, then 
protecting rights would require extending and protecting citizenship. But that would 
require an understanding of citizenship, and of the state-federal relationship in which it 
was embedded, that didn’t yet obtain. 
The final thing to note about the Dred Scott opinions is that the restrictions, both 
temporal and participatory, that Taney puts on citizenship in the union also serves as a 
foundational premise for his argument that the federal government had (limited) 
 60 U.S. 393, at 531.71
 60 U.S. 393, at 532 (emphasis added).72
 60 U.S. 393, at 576.73
!178
regulatory power over only those territories ceded to the union upon ratification of the 
Constitution. This argument is supported by an additional premise that illustrates another 
aspect of the relational reasoning that is induced by the structure of the federal system. In 
conjunction with the restrictions on Congress’ power over territories ceded to the union 
following ratification, Taney asserts that territories “are acquired [by the union] for the 
benefit of the people of the several States who created it.”  The power of the national 74
government over the territories cannot be discretionary, he continues, because the 
national government is a government of enumerated, not discretionary, powers. 
According to this theory of union and national power, the formation of territories into 
states is a requirement. The relationship established by the Constitution is a twofold 
relationship: the first is between the states and the national government; the second 
between citizen and the governments that represent them. We’ve already seen how Taney 
understood the latter relationship, identifying citizenship in the union as derivative of and 
dependent upon state citizenship at the time of the founding. His treatment of the former 
reveals that, on his understanding of the union, the binary relationship between the state 
and national governments left no room for permanent territories. To be constitutionally 
intelligible—to fit the legal grammar of the regime established by the Constitution—there 
could be no permanent addition to the relationship between state and nation. The powers 
of the national government were understood and, most importantly, limited in relation to 
the states. This division of power would be undermined and distorted by the addition of 
an entity that didn’t similarly bind the national government. This is yet another example 
 60 U.S. 393, at 448.74
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of the relational mode of reasoning induced by the interaction of the institutional logic of 
the judiciary, governed as it is by the imperative to resolve questions of constitutional 
meaning, with the underdeterminate division of power between the states and national 
government. 
For the most part, the fight over secession was fought not in federal courtrooms but in 
legislative chambers, state conventions, and, before long, on the contested battlefields 
and coastal waters of the once united states. With a few notable exceptions, this would 
remain true for the duration of the Civil War.  However, following Lee’s surrender at 75
Appomattox and the cessation of hostilities, a case did come to the Court that presented, 
albeit somewhat indirectly, the central constitutional question on which the war was 
predicated: could a state secede from the union? Texas v. White (1869) dealt with a 
dispute over U.S. bonds once held by Texas that, its Reconstruction government claimed, 
had been sold illegally by the state legislature during the war. At the behest of plaintiff’s 
counsel, the Court considered the legality of Texas’ actions during the war and, by 
extension, the legality of secession. A five justice majority held that, because “the union 
between Texas and the other States was as complete, as perpetual, and as indissoluble as 
the union between the original States,” Texas could not, in fact, leave the union.  76
Accordingly, the state’s declaration of secession and subsequent implementation of the 
secession ordinance were invalid, making the actions of the Confederate legislature 
 Perhaps chief among those exceptions are the Prize Cases, 67 U.S. 635 (1863), which affirmed President 75
Lincoln’s power under Article II to seize ships that attempted to evade the blockade of Southern ports. 
Notable also, though not heard by the Supreme Court,  is Ex Parte Milligan,  F. Cas. No. 9487  (1861), 
rejecting Lincoln’s power to suspend habeas corpus. 
 74 U.S. 700, at 726 (1868).76
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“absolutely null.” The bonds, then, still properly belonged to Texas, who was entitled to 
possess them or to receive compensation from those who had redeemed them.  
The majority opinion, written by Chief Justice Chase, reflects the enduring, and yet 
evolving, influence of the relational framework evidenced by opinions as varied as 
McCulloch and Dred Scott. The conclusion that the union was perpetual and indissoluble 
follows from the definition of “state,” which was needed in order to determine if the 
Court had original jurisdiction in the case. After reviewing the different senses in which 
the term is used, Chase concluded that for constitutional purposes, “A ‘state’…is a 
political community of free citizens, occupying a territory of defined boundaries, and 
organized under a government sanctioned and limited by a written constitution, and 
established by the consent of the governed.” The union of these states under the 
Constitution “forms the distinct and greater political unit” designated the United States 
“and makes of the people and states which compose it one people and one country.”  77
Such a union was not new with the Constitution; instead, it was formed at first in the 
colonial period and given explicit legal shape with the Articles of Confederation. Through 
this process, the relationship of union was deemed to be “perpetual” and, when 
governance under the Articles cast doubt on that proposition, “the Constitution was 
ordained ‘to form a more perfect Union.” Chase ends this part of his opinion with a 
rhetorical question meant to clarify the nature of the state-federal relationship: “What can 
be indissoluble if a perpetual Union, made more perfect, is not?”  78
 74 U.S. 700, at 721.77
 74 U.S. 700, at 725.78
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Central to the indissolubility of union, then, is the nature of the relationship between 
the national government and the states. Here we see a variation on the relational mode of 
reasoning already identified. Because of the constitutional underdeterminacy of the state-
federal relationship, Chase’s opinion had to draw on historical developments and 
commitments that filled in the details and supplied context for that relationship. Whereas 
in previous cases we saw that the powers of governmental levels are understood in 
relation to each other, in White we see that the place and purpose of each level within the 
broader constitutional regime is understood in relation to the other level. Thus, without 
the states-in-union, there could be no such political entity as the United States. But at the 
same time, the “preservation of the States, and the maintenance of these governments” 
are constitutional ends on a par with the preservation and maintenance of the national 
government.  This relationship of reciprocal duties—to stay and be kept in union while 79
the independent existence of the states is preserved—gives rise to the overriding 
responsibilities of each level of government. The states must not—indeed cannot—sever 
their ties with the United States, while the United States must guarantee to the states a 
republican government and guard against domestic insurrection. Hence, the status, 
powers, and rights of both level of government were identified by clarifying the 
relationship of each to the other.  
From a contemporary vantage, the decision in White is striking for what it does not 
contain, namely much emphasis on citizenship. It would seem, after all, that citizenship 
in the United States would furnish sufficient grounds for national action to protect the 
 Ibid. 79
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rights that, in the estimation of the national government, were violated or threatened by 
secession. But this is not the justification the Court offered. Instead, the interests of 
individual citizens were located in the political communities that composed the states, 
which in turn composed the union. This definition of citizenship mirrors that set out in 
Dred Scott, in which individual citizenship in the union was a function of state 
citizenship, thus precluding national action directed towards vindicating rights of an 
independent national citizenship. By presenting a capacious definition of “state,” one that 
emphasized the aspect of political community over against the aspect of the state 
governments, the White majority was able to equivocate on what the national 
government’s duties to the states actually entailed and from what precisely they arose. 
Nonetheless, the opinion rejects the legitimacy of secession and justifies the actions of 
the national government to restore rebellious states to the union on the grounds of the 
proper relationship between governments, not on a duty to citizens. As a result, the 
national government’s actions to restore states to the union were only indirectly 
connected to the claims of those citizens and required the elaboration of the state-federal 
relationship just discussed. This feature of the decision reflects the status and 
understanding of citizenship even after the Civil War and puts into stark relief changes 
that were already in motion when the Court handed down its opinion.  
Far more consequential than the Court’s decision in Texas v. White were the actions a 
few years earlier of the 39th Congress, which had passed the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. Although the Thirteenth was ratified by 1866, it took another two years 
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and considerable political maneuvering for the Fourteenth to enter into force.  It is 80
difficult to overstate the significance of the Fourteenth Amendment to both the structure 
of the federal system and the course of modern constitutional jurisprudence.  With its 81
definition of citizenship in the United States and prohibition on state abridgment of the 
privileges and immunities of national citizens, deprivation of due process of law, and 
denial of equal protection, Section 1 alone signaled a profound alteration to the formal 
relationship between state and nation. Equally important was Section 5, which granted 
Congress “power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.” Nonetheless, the 
extent to which the changes to the state-federal relationship would be not merely formal 
would depend on congressional action, executive enforcement, and—what is the focus of 
the remainder of this section—judicial reception.  
The first case to test the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment came before the 
Court in 1873. Arising out of Louisiana, the Slaughter-House Cases questioned the 
constitutionality of the state-created monopoly that required all butchers to use the 
services of a single slaughterhouse company. A group of New Orleans butchers brought 
suit claiming that the law establishing the monopoly violated the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments because it “creates an involuntary servitude…abridges the 
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States…denies [them] the equal 
 For a history of the construction and ratification of these amendments, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of 80
Rights: Creation and Reconstruction (Yale University Press, 1998), 163-214.
 For two notable accounts of the history and, especially, jurisprudential development of the Fourteenth 81
Amendment,  see  Alexander  Tsesis,  We Shall  Overcome:  A History  of  Civil  Rights  and the  Law  (Yale 
University Press, 2008) and Michael Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil Rights: The Supreme Court and the 
Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford University Press, 2004). And for an account that focuses less on the 
Court than on Congress, see Rebecca E. Zietlow, Enforcing Equality: Congress, the Constitution, and the 
Protection of Individual Rights (New York University Press, 2006).
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protection of the laws; and…deprives them of their property without due process of 
law[.]”  The significance of the case stems from the Court’s narrow reading of the 82
Privileges or Immunities Clause, which it held protected only “those privileges and 
immunities which are fundamental; which belong of right to the citizens of all free 
governments, and which have at all times been enjoyed by citizens of the several States 
which compose this Union[.]”  Given this construction, the butchers’ Fourteenth 83
Amendment claims were rejected. However, from the standpoint of the development of 
the federal system, the case is more significant for revealing how the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s definition of national citizenship affected judicial reasoning about the 
relationship between the two levels of government and the scope of their respective 
powers. 
The case produced four separate opinions, with Justice Miller delivering the opinion 
of the Court and Justices Field, Bradley, and Swayne each writing a dissent. While the 
opinions are divided on the question of scope of the Privileges or Immunities Clause, 
they are united on at least one issue: the nature of citizenship in the United States. Each 
opinion affirmed not just the dual nature of citizenship under the Constitution, but also 
the independence of citizenship in the United States from citizenship in the states. With 
the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, Miller wrote, “It is quite clear…that there 
is a citizenship of the United States, and a citizenship of a State, which are distinct from 
each other, and which depend upon different characteristics or circumstances in the 
 83 U.S. 36, at 62-61 (1873).82
 83 U.S. 36, at 76.83
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individual.”  In his dissent, Justice Field highlights the significance of the Fourteenth 84
Amendment with respect to citizenship. After recounting the “diversity of opinion among 
jurists and statesmen” ranging from Calhoun to Dred Scott, he declares,  
The first clause of the fourteenth amendment changes this whole subject, and 
removes it from the region of discussion and doubt. It recognizes in express 
terms, if it does not create, citizens of the United States, and it makes their 
citizenship dependent upon the place of their birth, or the fact of their adoption, 
and not upon the constitution or laws of any State or the condition of their 
ancestry.   85
Justice Bradley viewed the matter in similar terms, writing that after the Fourteenth 
Amendment “citizenship of the United States is the primary citizenship in this country; 
and that State citizenship is secondary and derivative[.]”  This is a striking change from 86
previous jurisprudence and is made all the more striking by the fact that, with the 
exception of Justice Bradley, each opinion writer in the Slaughter-House Cases had been 
a member of the Court that decided Texas v. White four years earlier. Though the 
Privileges or Immunities Clause wouldn’t enjoy the same reception, at least one 
consequence of the Fourteenth Amendment was clear: American citizens now enjoyed 
two independent citizenships, one corresponding to each level of government.  
But the agreement on the new nature of American citizenship didn’t preclude 
disagreement on the substantive question presented by the case. The clarity of the 
Citizenship Clause would guarantee neither the clarity of nor consensus on the meaning 
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause. Even so, the citizenship distinction acknowledged 
 83 U.S. 36, at 74.84
 83 U.S. 36, at 95.85
 83 U.S. 36, at 112.86
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by all opinions provided the structure for Justice Miller’s opinion for the majority. It is, 
moreover, an opinion animated by the explicit purpose of assimilating the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the basic structure and understanding of the American federal system. 
Accordingly, it is yet another example of the mode of reasoning induced by the 
institutional imperatives of the judiciary when confronted with the underdeterminacy of 
the federal system. Accepting the plaintiff’s proposition that the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause transferred to the national government superintendence of “the entire domain of 
civil rights heretofore belonging exclusively to the States” was inconceivable, Miller 
argued.  And it was inconceivable because it conflicted so deeply with the majority’s 87
understanding of the state-federal relationship, a relationship rooted more in historical 
practice and structural inference than constitutional text. Immediately after 
acknowledging the potential weakness of consequentialist arguments, Miller writes: 
But when, as in the case before us, these consequences are so serious, so far-
reaching and pervading, so great a departure from the structure and spirit of our 
institutions; when the effect is to fetter and degrade the State governments by 
subjecting them to the control of Congress, in the exercise of powers heretofore 
universally conceded to them of the most ordinary and fundamental character; 
when in fact it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State 
and Federal governments to each other and of both of these governments to the 
people; the argument has a force that is irresistible, in the absence of language 
which expresses such a purpose too clearly to admit of doubt.  88
We see in this passage the role played by (interpretations of) history and (perceptions of) 
settled practice in the majority’s opinion, a move occasioned by the need to clarify how 
the two levels of government were to relate to each other in light of the addition of the 
 83 U.S. 36, at 77.87
 83 U.S. 36, at 78.88
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Fourteenth Amendment. The reliance on history mustn’t obscure the fact that this history 
is a stand-in for “the whole theory of the relations of the State and Federal governments 
to each other, and of both of these government to the people,” which in turn furnishes the 
grounds for rejecting a more expansive reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.  
An alternative to Miller’s interpretation is put forth in Justice Swayne’s dissent, 
which argues that the “serious” and “far-reaching” consequences Miller sought to avoid 
were, in fact, the very goals of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.  These 89
amendments “are a new departure, and mark an important epoch in the constitutional 
history of the country. They trench directly upon the power of the States, and deeply 
affect those bodies.”  The new constitutional epoch Swayne describes is to be 90
understood in contrast with the previous era, which he portrays as animated by “a spirit of 
jealousy on the part of the States” that had, with the first eleven amendments, tried to 
bind and limit the national government created by the Constitution. Central to this “new 
departure” is the codification of independent and separate national citizenship 
relationship from which flow new obligations and powers.  
 If the opinions of Miller and Swayne are taken to represent two poles of a spectrum, the dissents of 89
Justices Field and Bradley fall somewhere in between. Field understood the Fourteenth Amendment “to 
obviate objections which had been raised and pressed with great force to the validity of the Civil Rights 
Act, and to place the common rights of American citizens under the protection of the National government” 
(83 U.S. 36, at  93).  This interpretation, as noted previously,  conclusively settled in the affirmative the 
question of whether there existed a national independent of state citizenship. For his part, Bradley, who 
joined Field’s dissent,  sought to downplay how disruptive the Fourteenth Amendment would be to the 
“internal affairs of the States.” More specifically, he argued that (1) little legislation would be needed to 
give effect to the amendment,  (2) federal jurisprudence would soon define the scope of privileges and 
immunities  protected,  and  (3)  “the  recognized  existence  of  the  law  would  prevent  its  frequent 
violation” (83 U.S. 36, at 124).
 83 U.S 36, at 125.90
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The disagreement between Miller and Swayne demonstrates that, while the 
underdeterminacy of the federal system induces judges to reason about the broader 
relationship between levels of government and the notions of sovereignty appropriate to 
that relationship, it does not overdetermine the content of that reasoning. It is possible to 
elaborate the state-federal relationship—to reason from the federal system established by 
the Constitution—in a way that advantages claims of the states to continue regulating 
areas of traditional control, just as it is possible to do so in a way that vindicates national 
claims over against assertions of state power. What matters here is not so much the 
substantive conclusion or result of such reasoning but the fact that, when confronted with 
the underdeterminacy of the federal system, judges revert to elaborations of the state-
federal relationship, often couched in terms of sovereignty, that supply the rationale for 
sustaining or dismissing claims of power. The addition of citizenship, to both the 
Constitution and the interpretation thereof, codified another relational dimension, one that 
complicated the relationship between state and nation by adjusting the context in which 
the powers of each were articulated.  
Logic, Law, and Sovereignty 
The federalism jurisprudence just canvassed illustrates two principal consequences of 
the interaction between the constitutional logic of federalism and the institutional logic of 
the judiciary. The first is that the constitutional law of federalism produced by these 
interactions exists in considerable tension with the constitutional logic of federalism. This 
tension results from judicial attempts to elaborate the state-federal relationship in order to 
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resolve constitutional disputes, attempts that were occasioned by the underdeterminacy of 
the federal system. The second consequence concerns the connection between 
constitutional underdeterminacy and notions of sovereignty that are invoked to adjudicate 
state-federal disputes. Specifically, the pattern and content of sovereigntist reasoning 
suggest an endogenous dimension of sovereignty in American constitutional politics. In 
this way, notions of sovereignty are a product of constitutional politics, a legal and 
political concept that is produced by the interaction of constitutional logics, institutional 
structures, and contested visions of the American constitutional order. Each of these 
consequences is discussed in turn below.  
Constitutional Law vs. Constitutional Logic 
The interaction of the judiciary with the underdeterminacy of the federal system 
reveals a stark contrast between constitutional law and constitutional logic. The 
constitutional law of federalism in the early years of the Republic was characterized by 
the imposition of legal determinacy on an underdeterminate state-federal relationship. 
This, in turn, entailed elaborating the state-federal relationship in order to define the 
proper roles and powers of the levels of government. As Court personnel changed and 
questions about the nature of the federal system continued to arise, this elaborated 
relationship, rather than the underdeterminate state-federal relationship, became the 
central point of dispute. But whereas a return to constitutional underdeterminacy would 
have required justifying the imposition of determinate meaning, the creation of doctrinal 
categories (e.g., police powers) and juridical concepts (e.g., state and national 
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sovereignty) through the development of constitutional law facilitated the entrenchment 
of the judicially contrived logic of federalism. 
Also relevant to this point is the nature of the relational reasoning employed by the 
justices in the cases surveyed. It was noted at the outset of this chapter that the relational 
approach to federalism has been invigorated by Heather Gerken’s recent call for an 
account that does justice to the innumerable and innumerably varied state-federal 
interactions in the modern American state.  In that piece Gerken responds to what she 91
characterizes as the contemporary Court’s flawed understanding of the federal system, 
which she characterizes as “relational.” This relational understanding entails an analysis 
that begins with some notion of state power and proceeds to determine how that relates to 
the constitutionally defined powers of the national government. The alternative to this 
relational approach is an analysis that “defines federal power in isolation.”  But if the 92
analysis presented here demonstrates anything, it is that there are many more options than 
these. Specifically, what Gerken casts as a single relational approach is but one version or 
mode of relational reasoning. As Barbour’s and McLean’s opinions in Miln and Briscoe, 
respectively, demonstrate, one can follow the model Gerken identifies and reason from 
the powers of the states to the powers of the national government. But, as Marshall’s 
 Gerken, “Slipping the Bonds of Federalism,” 14.91
 Id. at 98. It is important to note that while Gerken disagrees with the Court’s use of this “relational” 92
approach in the case in question (Bond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 2077 [2014]), she admits that “[b]ad 
theory can make good law or at least halfway decent doctrine” that (in this case, at least) is “reasonably 
manageable  and  coherent”  (123).  See  also  Alison  LaCroix,  “Redeeming  Bond?  The  Court’s  quiet 
transformation of federalism doctrine,” 128 Harvard Law Review Forum 31 (Nov. 10, 2014).
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reasoning in McCulloch and Cohens demonstrates, one can also begin with the powers of 
the national government and reason to the power of the states. 
With the addition of citizenship considerations, an additional component was added 
to the state-federal relationship. In this context, the relationships between citizens and 
their governments factored into the articulation of state and national sovereignty. Far 
from reducing the underdeterminacy of the federal system, the Fourteenth Amendment in 
general, and the Privileges or Immunities Clause specifically, posed anew the same 
question of jurisdictional division as did the 1787 Constitution. What had changed, 
though, was the constitutional context of this question, specifically with respect to the 
institutions and relationships that shape the federal system. In the Slaughter-House Cases 
we encountered the significance of national citizenship, a new vector of attachment 
between individuals and government in the federal system. No longer were state or 
national powers affecting fundamental rights or privileges and immunities articulated in 
isolation; nor too were they articulated strictly in relation to each other, as had been the 
case in the decisions of the late Marshall and early Taney Courts. With the Fourteenth 
Amendments’s establishment of national citizenship came a new relationship between 
citizen and government. And because this relationship was separate and independent from 
state citizenship, it augmented the powers and obligations of the national government. 
The nature of the citizenship relation, therefore, had profound consequences for the 
powers and prerogatives of both levels of government. 
As the differences between and among these cases show, the directionality of this 
relational reasoning—whether it runs from national to state power or state to national 
!192
power, or instead prioritizes the rights of citizenship—is decisively important. Depending 
on the analytical starting point (and the substantive priorities that entails) one can arrive 
at quite different jurisdictional lines dividing state and national power. And because 
judges inherit the doctrinal categories and juridical concepts of their predecessors, it is 
essential to ascertain the jurisprudential influences on any particular Court’s or justice’s 
relational reasoning. Thus, perhaps ironically, making good on Gerken’s call for a 
relational account fit for modern politics requires returning to the foundations and 
development of American federalism jurisprudence.  
Reflecting on these developmental dynamics, one must ask whether it could have 
been otherwise. After all, it is the responsibility of the Court to say what the law is and, as 
the discussion of the constitutional logic of federalism made clear, it is necessary to 
elaborate the state-federal relationship—to reason relationally—in order to put it to work. 
So what was the alternative? This question draws our attention to the logistics of judicial 
administration. The quotation from James Madison cited at the outset of this Essay 
speaks to these issues. In his letter to Spencer Roane reflecting on Marshall’s opinion in 
McCulloch, he advocates something along the lines of a common law jurisprudence of 
federalism, according to which disputed constitutional meaning would be established 
only over time “from a course of particular decisions, and not these from a previous and 
abstract comment on the subject.”  Here Madison seems to suggest that abstractions 93
from the constitutional text on the matter of the state-federal relationship are an 
inappropriate basis for determining the meaning and requirements of the federal system. 
 Letter to Spencer Roane, Sept. 2, 1819.93
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Rather than abstract theory dictating the outcomes in specific cases, those cases should 
give rise to constitutional meaning in areas, such as the federal system, where in certain 
circumstances there is no determinate legal meaning to be “found” through interpretation. 
Later in the same letter, Madison takes issue with the manner in which the Court’s 
opinion was presented in McCulloch. In that case there was only one opinion—“the 
opinion of the court.” This had the effect of putting the whole weight of the federal 
judiciary behind a decision establishing meaning on a hotly disputed constitutional 
question. For his part, Madison would have preferred that the justices deliver their 
opinions seriatim, as had been the dominant practice before Marshall’s tenure and would 
reappear towards the end and continue after his term. He wrote to Roane: 
The case was of such magnitude, in the scope given to it, as to call, if any case 
could do so, for the views of the subject separately taken by them. This might 
either by the harmony of their reasoning have produced a greater conviction in 
the Public mind; or by its discordance have impaired the force of the precedent 
now ostensibly supported by a unanimous & perfect concurrence in every 
argument & dictum in the judgment pronounced.  94
Madison was joined in this sentiment by Thomas Jefferson, who sharply criticized the 
practice of delivering a single opinion with the judgment of the Court for (among other 
things) concealing possible disagreements in the guise of unanimity.  These 95
considerations, in conjunction with the tensions between constitutional law and 
constitutional logics discussed above, demonstrate the significance of both the form and 
the substance of the interaction between the institutional logic of the judiciary and the 
 Ibid.94
 See, for example, Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Thomas Ritchie, Dec. 25, 1820, in The Works of Thomas 95
Jefferson (Paul L. Ford, ed.) (1905), 12:175. 
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constitutional logic of federalism. They also point to a possible resolution of the tensions 
created by judicial engagement with the nature of the federal system that does not entail 
invoking the political questions doctrine or, more significantly, simply abandoning 
judicial review of federalism questions in favor of a process-based approach to the 
federal system. Both of these are prominent responses to the Court’s seeming inability to 
forge a stable federalism jurisprudence, and the latter even enjoyed partial acceptance by 
the Supreme Court.   96
But in Madison’s critique of the McCulloch decision can be found another possibility, 
one that acknowledges the fundamental underdeterminacy of the federal system and yet 
recognizes as well the broader constitutional order in which that system is embedded. 
That possibility is a jurisprudence that self-consciously resists the creation of precedent 
that reduces the underdeterminacy of the federal system, a jurisprudence wary of the 
tension between legal doctrine that establishes determinate constitutional meaning and a 
federal system predicated on underdeterminacy and, as a consequence, responsiveness to 
the claims of exigency and democratic desire. As critics of the process-based view have 
stressed, judicial review of conflicts between state and federal powers was both a feature 
of constitutional design and a widespread expectation at the time of the Constitution’s 
 For an articulation of the political question avenue, see Keith E. Whittington, “The Political Constitution 96
of Federalism in Antebellum America: The Nullification Debate as an Illustration of Informal Mechanisms 
of  Constitutional  Change,”  Publius  26(2):1-24,  1-2.  The seminal  source for  arguments  against  judicial 
review  of  federalism  questions—commonly  called  “process  federalism”—is  Herbert  Wechsler,  “The 
Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the States in the Composition of and Selection of the 
National Government,” 54 Columbia Law Review 543 (1954). See also Jesse H. Choper, Judicial Review 
and  the  National  Political  Process:  A Functional  Reconsideration  of  the  Role  of  the  Supreme  Court 
(University  of  Chicago  Press,  1980).  Both  Wechsler  and  Choper  are  cited  in  Garcia  v.  San  Antonio 
Metropolitan  Transit  Authority,  469 U.S.  528 (1985),  in  which  the  Court  rejected  the  “traditional”  or 
“integral” governmental functions standard set out in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976), in favor of a process-based approach.
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creation.  Absent a mechanism along the lines of the national veto proposed by Madison 97
at the constitutional convention, conflicts between governmental levels and laws are 
bound to arise. Though developments over the course of American history, principally the 
ratification of the 14th Amendment, have done much to mitigate or control such conflicts, 
the basic phenomenon remains. There are, moreover, clear limitations on both national 
and state actions bearing on the nature of the federal system that require enforcement 
beyond what can be expected to issue from the political process. Thus, judicial review of 
“federalism questions” is a practical consequence and an important part of our 
constitutional order. And yet, the tension between the institutional logic of the judiciary 
and the constitutional logic of federalism remains. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for, 
then, is a jurisprudence that acknowledges this tension and, through procedural reforms 
like seriatim opinions and substantive efforts to resist the reduction of constitutional 
underdeterminacy, seeks to mitigate its negative effects.   
The Endogeneity of Sovereignty 
The second consequence brought to light by the federalism jurisprudence developed 
over the first century under the Constitution concerns the notions of sovereignty 
deployed. Sovereignty has long been a fixture of federalism debates, as both an 
organizing principle and a principle criticized for its failure to supply any meaningful 
 See, for examples, John C. Yoo, “The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism,” 70 Southern California Law 97
Review 1311 (1977); and Saikrishna B. Prakash and John C. Yoo, “The Puzzling Persistence of Process-
Based Federalism Theories,” 79 Texas Law Review 1459 (2001). It should be noted, in this connection, that 
in his letter to Spencer Roane, Madison also seems to support judicial review, saying that seriatim opinions 
could  have  the  consequence  of  producing  “a  greater  conviction  in  the  Public  mind”  that  the  Court’s 
resolution of a disputed question was correct or otherwise acceptable. 
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organization.  For those analyses that take sovereignty seriously, it often serves as a pre-98
constitutional  or constitutionally specified  theory defining the roles, powers, and 99 100
authority of governmental levels. Under this approach, government actions and judicial 
determinations are evaluated by their conformity to the stipulated theory of sovereignty. 
But the analysis presented here suggests that notions of sovereignty may be produced by 
the interaction of institutional logics with constitutional logics, even as they are informed 
by pre-constitutional or foundational understandings. If so, then there is an endogenous 
dimension to sovereignty’s appearance and use in constitutional politics and it is rooted in 
the underdeterminacy of the federal system. 
There are two aspects of this endogeneity. The first is formal, the second substantive. 
As to the first, judicial engagements with the underdeterminacy of the federal system 
demonstrate the need to elaborate the state-federal relationship, which can be done by 
searching for directive textual meaning or by reasoning inferentially from the 
relationships established by the Constitution and laws made pursuant thereto. At least for 
the cases covered here, answering constitutional questions concerning the “zone of 
underdeterminacy” entailed supplementing the Constitution’s definition of national power 
vis-à-vis the states with a more robust notion of state-federal relations. For both the 
 For a review of this literature, see Heather K. Gerken, “Foreword: Federalism All the Way Down,” 124 98
Harvard Law Review 4, 4-21 (2010).
 These  works  are  often  historically  oriented,  as  with  Alison  LaCroix’s  The  Ideological  Origins  of 99
American  Federalism  (Harvard  University  Press,  2010)  and  Samuel  Beer’s  To  Make  a  Nation:  The 
Rediscovery of American Federalism (Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1993).
 The most forceful articulation of the nationalist side of this approach is, perhaps, Sotirios A. Barber’s. 100
See Welfare and the Constitution (Princeton University Press, 2003), 1-22; The Fallacies of States Rights 
(Harvard University Press, 2013), 172-179; and Constitutional Failure (University Press of Kansas, 2014), 
26-52. 
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Marshall Court and the Taney Court, that involved defining the sovereign claims of each 
level of government and how they relate to each other. We saw this as well in the 
jurisprudence of slavery and secession, where considerations of citizenship were added to 
the picture. Most notably in the Slaughter-House Cases, the claims of each level of 
government derived in part from their relationships with their citizens and how those 
relationships, in turn, related to each other. This can also be seen in the negative. In Dred 
Scott, where a whole class of individuals was put outside the citizenship relationship, the 
powers of each governmental level were defined without reference to the excluded 
individuals. Citizenship entered the picture only to the extent that governments were to 
act as agents for the protection of other citizens’ (i.e., slaveholders’) property rights. And 
it was on the basis of those claims that limitations on and requirements of the national 
government were defined. In this way, the underdeterminacy of the federal system shaped 
the form of judicial reasoning, inducing justices to utilize sovereignty as a concept that 
underlies different notions of state power, national power, and the relationships between 
the two. As a functional matter, theories of sovereignty structure the state-federal 
relationship judges reason to and elaborate in order to resolve questions about the 
structure of the federal system that the Constitution, because of its underdeterminacy, 
doesn’t answer.   
The second aspect of the endogeneity of sovereignty identified in the cases covered is 
substantive. Not only does constitutional underdeterminacy induce judicial actors to 
reason about sovereignty or in the language of sovereignty; it also influences the content 
of that reasoning. This is illustrated especially clearly in the development of federalism 
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jurisprudence from McCulloch and Cohens to Briscoe and Miln. In those cases, the 
picture of sovereignty that emerged over time consisted in a balance of opposing 
governments and their roles. As I’ve attempted to show, this was due in part to the 
relational reasoning of the justices writing the opinions. Every articulation of state or 
national power brought with it a recognition of the other set of powers, whether through 
correspondence or entailment. This is most apparent in the nationalist opinions of Chief 
Justice Marshall, for whom the assurance that the federal government was a government 
of enumerated powers served as something of a leitmotif, a regular accompaniment to his 
robust articulations of national powers. But this is also true across time, because the 
conflicts between state and national power that arose from iterated political and legal 
disputes over the nature of the federal system in the early Republic yielded a 
constitutional law of federalism that was structured by categories and kinds of power 
appropriate to each level of government. In this way, an articulation of national power 
reciprocally defined a category of state powers; and the invocation of local concerns over 
which states had authority reciprocally defined national concerns over which the national 
government had authority. The salience of either category of powers or level of 
government—and the strength with which it was articulated—frequently hinged on which 
governmental interests were being vindicated. 
Thus, under certain conditions—namely those prevailing through the mid-nineteenth 
century—the underdeterminacy of the federal system made sovereignty a disputed 
touchstone of political and legal discourse. This is relevant to contemporary federalism 
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debates, as sovereignty continues to carry rhetorical and legal weight.  Moreover, the 101
balance of powers framework that undergirds the notions of sovereignty at play in the 
Marshall and Taney Court cases parallels the framework employed in some of the most 
high profile federalism cases of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. From 
United States v. Lopez to NFIB v. Sebelius, “concern for the federal balance”  has been 102
put forward as a justification for judicial enforcement of limitations on congressional 
powers. Perhaps sovereignty’s critics are right about it being an unhelpful, antiquated, or 
inaccurate guide for understanding the American federal system. But if a fundamental 
characteristic of that system—its underdeterminacy—has the effect of foregrounding and 
shaping notions of governmental power, then regardless of one’s normative position in 
that debate, we must come to terms with the causes and consequences of the endogeneity 
of sovereignty in our constitutional politics.  
 See, e.g., Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. ____ (2013), which struck down Section 4(b) of the Voting 101
Rights Act on the grounds that it violated the “equal sovereignty” of the states. See also Northwest Austin 
Municipal  Utility  District  Number  One v.  Holder,  557 U.S.  193 (2009),  on  which  the  Shelby  County 
majority relied. Also relevant are the sovereign immunity cases decided in the late 1990s: Seminole Tribe of 
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) and Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
It is worth noting here that the conceptual ground of the Court’s decisions in Northwest Austin and 
Shelby  County,  the  “fundamental  principle  of  equal  sovereignty,”  first  emerged  in  the  context  of 
congressional powers concerning the admission of new states to the Union. This was one of the central 
issues at play in Dred Scott and, in a slightly different way, Texas v. White, though this connection has only 
infrequently been acknowledged. Fortunately, the Court’s reinvigoration of “equal sovereignty” hasn’t gone 
wholly unnoticed. For an important exception to the just mentioned lacuna, see James Blacksher and Lani 
Guinier, “Free at Last: Rejecting Equal Sovereignty and Restoring the Constitutional Right to Vote: Shelby 
County  v.  Holder,”  8  Harvard  Law  &  Policy  Review  39  (2014).  See  also  Abigail  B.  Molitor, 
“Understanding Equal Sovereignty,” 81 University of  Chicago Law Review  1839 (2014);  and Leah M. 
Litman, “Inventing Equal Sovereignty,” 114 Michigan Law Review 1207 (2016). For a rare defense of the 
principle, see Jeffrey M. Schmitt, “In Defense of Shelby County’s Principle of Equal State Sovereignty,” 68 
Oklahoma Law Review 209 (2016).
 National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. ____ (2012) (joint dissent of Scalia, 102
Kennedy,  Thomas,  and  Alito,  JJ.),  quoting  United  States  v.  Lopez,  514  U.S.  549,  578  (Kennedy,  J., 
concurring).
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Conclusion 
The American federal system is characterized by underdeterminacy. While the 
Constitution establishes a relationship between the states and the national government, 
the exact jurisdictional line dividing governments and the precise contours of the 
relationship are not spelled out. This constitutional logic of federalism induces a 
distinctively relational mode of reasoning, according to which state and national powers 
are understood in relation to each other, implicitly or explicitly delimiting each other, 
with each level of government shaping the powers of and limitations on the other. But the 
consequences of this mode of reasoning depend on how governing institutions interact 
with the underdeterminacy of the federal system. This chapter provided an account of the 
interaction of the institutional logic of the judiciary and the constitutional logic of 
federalism over the first century under the Constitution. An examination of federalism 
jurisprudence spanning the chief justiceships of John Marshall and Roger Taney and 
bracketing the Civil War revealed the essence and development of this mode of 
reasoning, showing how, in the hands of the judiciary, the constitutional logic of 
federalism was transmuted into a different, markedly determinate, logic of federalism. 
This new logic reveals deep tensions between the constitutional law of federalism and the 
constitutional logic of federalism, the significance of which derived in part from the 
logistics of judicial administration. Furthermore, it suggests an endogenous dimension to 
notions of sovereignty in American constitutional politics, according to which the 
underdeterminacy of the federal system both induces reasoning about sovereignty and 
shapes the precise notions of sovereignty employed over time.  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Chapter Four: From Law to Governance 
 American history is replete with efforts to determine the proper division of power 
between the national and state governments. As Chief Justice Marshall put it in 
McCulloch v. Maryland, the question of the scope of national power, and the relationship 
with the states that it implies, “is perpetually arising, and will probably continue to arise, 
as long as our system shall exist.”  Federalism is, after all, “America’s oldest 1
constitutional debate.”  But when in 1953 President Eisenhower called for “the creation 2
of a commission to study the means of achieving a sounder relationship between federal, 
state, and local governments,” the need for clarity was particularly acute.  In the previous 3
two decades, the country had endured the Great Depression and Second World War and, 
as a result of both, seen an unprecedented expansion of federal authority and capacity. 
More importantly, the need for national unity and mobilization necessitated by the war 
 17 U.S. 405 (1819).1
 Sotirios Barber, The Fallacies of States’ Rights (Harvard University Press, 2013), 12
 Message to the Congress from the President of the United States, March 30, 1953.3
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cut short debate over the expanded role of the federal government in American life. This 
debate resurfaced when the war ended, with the New Deal inheritance posing unresolved 
questions about the compatibility of the modern American state and the constitutional 
commitment to federal governance.  
 For students of American political development the New Deal represents a hinge of 
political history, the point at which a new understanding of the constitutional order 
emerged with both legal sanction and widespread political support. In this respect, the 
New Deal stands beside the Founding, Reconstruction, and (in some accounts) the Civil 
Rights era as revolutionary “constitutional moments.”  On this telling, the New Deal 4
moment was defined by the destruction “of the old notion that Congress had limited 
powers over the economy,”  with the constitutional basis for claims of state sovereignty 5
diminishing pari passu. While this narrative picks up on fundamentally important 
developments in American law and politics, it overlooks the significance of World War II 
to the development of the American state and the evolution of the federal system. Within 
a decade of the first New Deal program and five years of the Court decisions that 
endorsed expanded federal powers, the United States was waging total war. On the way 
to winning the war, the country would undergo a transformation that both built on and 
superseded the New Deal. Most pertinently, the period from the beginning of the New 
Deal through the end of the War reconfigured the foundations of the federal system, 
though this change had yet to be fully recognized and evaluated. 
 The primary exponent of this view is Bruce Ackerman. See We the People, Vols. I-III (Belknap, 1992, 4
1998, 2014).
 Bruce Ackerman, We the People: Transformations (Belknap, 1998), 372.5
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 Hence, Eisenhower’s call for a reassessment of governmental roles came at a crucial 
point in American history. And Congress answered his call, creating the Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (CIR) and charging it to conduct a full-scale assessment of 
the activities and relationships of the federal system. Staffed by sitting senators and 
House representatives, current and former governors, academics, and business leaders, 
the CIR was charged with clarifying the jurisdictional lines that defined and separated 
state and national authority, all while striving to improve service provision and maintain 
accountability. It sought, in other words, the assimilation of the constitutional 
commitment to federal governance to the post-New Deal, post-World War administrative 
state. But its eventual report ended up offering a quite different picture of American 
federalism, one in which the focus shifted from the constraints of constitutional law to the 
desiderata of administration and efficiency. Federalism was conceptualized less as a 
matter of law than one of governance. Despite its contemporaneous and enduring 
importance, this episode of American political development has been woefully 
understudied.  As a result, our understanding of both the development of American 6
federalism and the emergence of the modern American state is incomplete. 
 In this chapter, I seek to rectify this shortcoming by examining the political 
construction of the federal system carried out by the Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations. Situating its work in the context of the epochal changes wrought by the New 
 But see Tim Conlan, “From Cooperative to Opportunistic Federalism: Reflections on the Half-Century 6
Anniversary of the Commission on Intergovernmental  Relations,” Public Administration Review 66(5): 
663-676 (2006); Bruce D. McDowell, “Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1996: The 
End of an Era,” Publius 27(2): 111-127 (Spring, 1997); and Selma Mushkin, “Report of the Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations,” The Review of Economics and Statistics, 39(3): 334-341 (Aug., 1957).
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Deal and the Second World War, I argue that the Commission responded to the changes in 
the foundations of the federal system by reconceptualizing, and thus reconstructing, 
federalism along the lines of effective governance and administration rather than clear 
divisions of legal authority. Within the larger context of this inquiry, this chapter is 
intended to illustrate how the state-federal relationship is constructed by the legislative 
and executive branches. More specifically, I aim to show how, like the judiciary, the 
engagement of the so-called political branches with the federal system is inflected by 
their respective institutional logics. But because the institutional logics of the legislative 
and executive branches differ from that of the judiciary, the nature and consequences of 
their interactions with federalism differ from those of the judiciary. In that respect, this 
chapter is oriented towards complementing the previous chapter. Taken together, these 
two chapters are intended to present an account of how the distinctive characteristics and 
capacities of the branches of the national government influence their engagements with 
the federal system.  
 To accomplish these goals I proceed in three steps, which correspond to the main 
sections of the chapter. First, drawing on the theoretical framework elaborated in Chapter 
One, I describe the political construction of federalism, that is, how the political branches 
respond to constitutional underdeterminacy by supplying greater detail to the relationship 
between the states and the national government. These constructions are decisively 
shaped by the interaction of each branch’s institutional logic with the contingent 
foundations of the federal system. These foundations (or determinants) fall into two broad 
categories: political culture and administrative or governmental capacity. Second, I argue 
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that the growth of central state capacity spurred by the New Deal must be considered in a 
wider temporal frame, namely one that includes the state building that occurred during 
the Second World War. To do so, I survey the development of the American state during 
the New Deal and Second World War, documenting how changes in public finance, 
government employment, and political culture altered the determinants of the state-
federal relationship identified in the first section. Finally, I turn to the work of the CIR. 
Drawing on the Commission’s report as well as archival sources from the Eisenhower 
Presidential Library, I seek to demonstrate how it re-conceived and reconstructed 
American federalism in terms of administration and governance rather than constitutional 
law and formal divisions of power. Using the model of the federal system developed in 
the previous two sections, I strive to understand the work, as well as the significance, of 
the Commission. The state-federal relationship, I argue, is a product of American political 
development, one that responds to and is decisively shaped by the contingent foundations 
of the federal system. 
The Political Construction of Federalism 
 It is a revealing feature of modern American constitutionalism that the term 
“political” stands in stark contrast with—and even, at times, opposition to—the term 
“legal.” Increasing polarization is no doubt a contributing factor to the effort to 
distinguish what is contested and partisan from what is ostensibly settled and objective. 
Moreover, the Court routinely speaks of the “political branches” as a way to both clarify 
the limits of its purview and, more consequentially, define the scope of its review 
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authority.  On this view, politics is the domain of discretionary authority and mutability, 7
and is therefore deserving of judicial deference. Conversely, law is the domain of clear 
rules that permit neutral arbitration.  Though such a view of law and the legal process has 8
been subject to sustained criticism, particularly since the early twentieth century, it still 
supports the Supreme Court’s vision of the constitutional division of labor.  A central 9
argument of the previous chapter, though, was that constitutional jurisprudence is 
inscribed within constitutional politics, fundamentally shaped and inflected by the 
constitutional logic of federalism. In other words, judicial institutions are far from neutral 
in their engagement with the Constitution. Rather, the distinctive institutional logic of the 
judiciary—namely the imperative of resolving legal questions through constitutional 
interpretation—shapes both its interactions with constitutional logics as well as the 
consequences of those interactions. Nonetheless, distinctions not only can but must be 
made between the work of courts and other constitutional actors. Whereas the judiciary is 
not directly electorally accountable at the federal level, legislators and the president of 
 One of the earliest occurrences of this exact formulation appears to be United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 7
(1882) (“In such cases the judicial department of this government follows the action of the political branch, 
and will not embarrass the latter by assuming antagonistic jurisdiction.”). By far the most significant usage, 
though, occurred in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), in which the distinction figured prominently in the 
Court’s reformulation of the political questions doctrine. For an analysis of the doctrinal dimensions of this 
distinction in the context of separation of powers disputes, see Jonathan L. Entin, “Separation of Powers, 
the Political Branches, and the Limits of Judicial Review,” 51 Ohio State Law Journal 175 (1990). For a 
more theoretical discussion of this distinction, see Jesse H. Choper, “The Supreme Court and the Political 
Branches: Democratic Theory and Practice,” 122 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 810 (1974).
 A seminal work in this vein is Herbert Wechsler, “Toward Neutral Principles in Constitutional Law,” 73 8
Harvard Law Review 1 (1959).
 An  overview of  this  literature,  and  the  broader  movement  that  produced  it,  is  offered  by  Allan  C. 9
Hutchinson and Patrick J. Monahan, “Law, Politics, and the Critical Legal Scholars: The Unfolding Drama 
of American Legal Thought,” 36 Stanford Law Review 199 (1984). See also Mark V. Tushnet, “Following 
the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles,” 96 Harvard Law Review 781 
(1983).
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course are. Moreover, in the American constitutional order the branches are constructed 
not only to do different work but to do that work differently from each other. These 
differences, in turn, underlie the prerogatives and possibilities of the legislature, 
executive, and judiciary. While the distinction between law and politics so eagerly urged 
by the Court risks obscuring profoundly consequential phenomena, it corresponds to a 
basic differentiation of functions in the American constitutional order. It is in this context, 
then, that I speak of the “political construction of federalism,” which is the subject of this 
chapter. The focus here is how the underdeterminacy of the federal system influences the 
actions of the “political branches.” As I argue below, it is in this context that the 
distinction between the political branches and the judiciary illuminates more than it 
obscures.  
 The argument in the previous chapter began with the institutional logic of the 
judiciary and, on that basis, proceeded to ascertain the consequences for its engagement 
with the underdeterminacy of the federal system. We shall start here, then, with the 
institutional logics of the legislative and the executive branches.  The constitutional 10
values these branches are structured to advance are democratic will and general welfare, 
respectively, purposes reflected in their structures. Whereas the legislature is composed of 
numerous representatives drawn from different constituencies, the executive is a single 
actor whose constituency is the entirety of the American People. Hence, the former is 
 The argument presented here rehearses and extends that advanced in Chapter Two, which drew heavily 10
on the work of Jeffrey Tulis. See, generally, “Deliberation Between Institutions,” in Debating Deliberative 
Democracy,  James S. Fishkin and Peter Laslett (eds.) (Blackwell Publishing, 2003); “On Congress and 
Constitutional Responsibility,” 89 Boston University Law Review 515 (2009); and “Impeachment in the 
Constitutional Order,” in The Constitutional Presidency (Johns Hopkins University Press, 2009).
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structurally well adapted to the aggregation of divergent viewpoints, deliberation of 
mutual concerns, and the reconciliation of differences where agreement is possible. The 
executive, on the other hand, is designed to act with energy and dispatch, to put into 
effect the laws passed by the legislature, and to represent a national constituency. These 
institutional characteristics, it will be remembered, are contrasted with the judiciary, 
which is structured to advance the rule of law and (especially in its modern form) protect 
individual rights. Insulation from direct electoral accountability and life tenure are 
structural features of the federal judiciary calibrated towards the realization of these ends.  
 How, then, do the political branches approach the federal system? Whereas federalism 
presents the judiciary with questions of interpretation and legal meaning, for the 
legislative and executive branches the federal system presents a system of opportunities 
and constraints. Considered in its fullness, the state-federal relationship can both facilitate 
and frustrate the enactment of public policy. In its engagements with the federal system, 
the political branches supply further specificity to the underdeterminacy of the federal 
system, constructing relationships between state and federal institutions and defining how 
political power is wielded in the federal system. In this way, as argued at some length in 
Chapter One, the state-federal relationship is constructed through constitutional politics. 
This is what is meant by the political construction of federalism as the expression is used 
here.  11
 This usage is broadly consistent with the literature that has taken a similar approach to these questions. 11
See  especially  Keith  E.  Whittington,  Constitutional  Construction:  Divided  Powers  and  Constitutional 
Meaning (Harvard University Press,  1999).  For a sophisticated application of this concept,  see Mariah 
Zeisberg, War Powers: The Politics of Constitutional Authority (Princeton University Press, 2013).
!209
 Political constructions of the state-federal relationship come in many forms. (Figure 
4.1 attempts to illustrate the salient differences and relative relationships among the 
constructions discussed below.) The first dimension of variation concerns the extent of 
the construction. Whereas some bring about major or large-scale changes to the contours 
of the federal system, others operate only at the margins. At one end of the spectrum is 
common legislation—ordinary, workaday uses of governmental powers. In putting public 
power into action, they inaugurate or adjust relations between the powers and institutions 
of the state and national government. At the other end of the spectrum are structural 
adjustments to the federal system in the form of constitutional amendments. The 
Fourteenth Amendment looms particularly large in this regard, as it was the first formal 
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FIG. 4.1: CONSTRUCTIONS OF THE STATE-FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP
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addition to national power since the ratification of the Constitution and couched this 
enhancement in the context of supervising state behavior. In between these extremes are 
all manner of actions that, in different ways to to different degrees, define the powers, 
purposes, and responsibilities of the two levels of government in the American federal 
system. Included in this range are framework legislation that regulates congressional 
procedures in certain areas (e.g., 1995 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act),  so-called 12
“super-statutes” (e.g, Civil Rights Act of 1964, Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act),  and constitutional rulings redefining the scope or location of governmental power 13
(e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland, Wickard v. Filburn, Obergefell v. Hodges). As the figure 
shows, there can be variations within each genre of political constructions, with some 
bringing about greater changes than others. Though constitutional rulings are chosen to 
demonstrate this variability, the same could be true of any of the constructions identified. 
Nonetheless, the relative positions of the constructions are intended to show where the 
average or exemplar instance of each might fall on the spectrum. 
 On a second dimension of variation, constructions of the state-federal relationship 
differ in how explicitly they define the relationships between state and federal powers, 
purposes, and institutions. Again, common legislation and structural adjustments can be 
 Elizabeth  Garrett  has  done  the  most  insightful  and  pertinent  work  on  this  issue.  See  especially 12
“Framework  Legislation  and  Federalism,”  83  Notre  Dame  Law  Review  1495  (2008).  See  also  “The 
Purposes of Framework Legislation,” 14 Journal of Contemporary Legal Issues, 717 (2005). 
 For an overview of such statutes and their relevance to the federal system, see William N. Eskridge, Jr. 13
and John A. Ferejohn, A Republic of Statutes: The New American Constitution  (Yale University Press, 
2010). Eskridge and Ferejohn present an earlier version of this argument in “Super-Statutes,” 50 Duke Law 
Journal 1215 (2001). For a critical engagement with this argument—one that contests the central premise 
that  super-statutes  affect  fundamental  change—see  Bruce  A.  Ackerman,  “Constitutional  Politics/
Constitutional Law,” 99 Yale Law Journal 453 (1989).
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taken to represent ends of the spectrum. The former often only implicitly define the state-
federal relationship because the consequences for state powers and institutions are not 
explicitly identified in the legislation. Structural adjustments, on the other hand, 
frequently specify the details of relationships and interactions between levels of 
government or identify the standards to which levels of government are to be held. 
Despite their variation in extent, constitutional rulings typically offer explicit and 
systematic treatments of the federal system, a result (in part) of the institutional logic and 
imperatives of the judiciary.  And while super-statutes have the potential to transform 14
the relationship between levels of government, often that effect—or its magnitude—can 
be the result of implementation rather than the expressed terms of the legislation. 
However, because there is considerable variation on this score—to say nothing of 
interpretive disagreements—Fig. 1 represents a possible range in the explicitness of such 
constructions. 
 Political constructions of the state-federal relationship do not occur in a vacuum. 
They are, rather, deeply embedded in contemporaneous political conditions and 
circumstances. Political constructions of the state-federal relationship both respond to and 
influence a range of contingent facts of politics and political life. Drawing on founding-
era debates, the theoretical framework developed in Chapter One identified a range of 
 For greater context, see my discussion of the institutional logic of the judiciary in Chapter Three. There I 14
attempt to distinguish how courts envision and approach the federal system in contrast with the political 
branches. In the course of doing so, I sketch a picture of the judicial function similar to the one presented 
here. 
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variables that influence the structure of the state-federal relationship.  More precisely, 15
these components of political life condition the scope and efficacy of political power in 
the federal system established by the Constitution. The purpose in the first chapter was to 
make the connection between the structure of the American federal system and the 
developmental and constructive processes it anticipates. As our purpose here is to 
examine one such constructive episode, we can take a further step and more formally 
identify and categorize the determinants of the state-federal relationship. These fall into 
two broad groups: political culture and administrative or governmental capacity. In the 
first category are four variables:  
(1) the personal influence possessed by each level of government 
(2) the attachment of the people to the governments that represent them 
(3) the posture of each government towards the other 
(4) the number and quality of connections between the people and their 
governments  
As a component of political culture, each of these variables bears on the distribution of 
powers between governmental levels—either facilitating or frustrating claims to or 
exercises of power. At the same time, each of these variables can serve as an indicator of 
the condition of the state-federal relationship, reflecting different facets of popular 
support for and attachment to each governmental level relative to the other. Turning to the 
second category, the domain of administration and governmental capacity, there are five 
variables:  
(1) the nature and degree of dependences of each government on the other 
(2) the powers vested in each government 
 The principal sources from which these determinants are drawn are Nos. 45 and 46 of The Federalist 15
(Jacob E. Cooke, ed.), which, in turn, were occasioned by the Anti-Federalist arguments also discussed in 
Chapter One. 
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(3) the number of individuals employed by each level of government 
(4) the extent of governmental positions and salaries 
(5) the governmental regulation of intimate matters  
As with the previous set of variables, each of these bears on the shape of the state-federal 
relationship. However, unlike determinants rooted in political culture, those grounded in 
administration and government capacity concern the practical ability of each 
governmental level to carry out particular actions. The effective use of governmental 
power requires the means to achieve the purposes of the underlying legislation. Absent 
sufficient power, an exertion of authority could be rendered nugatory; conversely, the 
possession of the requisite power can underwrite a credible threat or commitment to 
using it. 
 Recall that these considerations were identified by the advocates of the Constitution 
when they were pressed to explain why and how it would not lead to a consolidated 
government. Taken together, they comprise a set of critical variables that shape the state-
federal relationship. These are precisely the factors that legislators and executives—and 
not judges—are immediately responsive to in their interactions with the federal system. 
Put differently, the creation of public policy is influenced by each of these determinants 
in a way that the adjudication of law and official conduct is not. We expect legislators to 
be mindful of the sentiments of their constituents when considering an exertion of federal 
power. If they are not, they may not be legislators for long. Similarly, we expect federal 
policy to be shaped by the capacity of governing institutions. Proposals to solve social 
problems or structure economic exchange will, as a matter of course, be influenced by the 
resources under the control and tools at the disposal of governmental institutions. In a 
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different time and with different resources, proposals to address the same problem would 
look dramatically different. Policy regimes will build on existing resources, even as they 
can augment or repurpose those resources, changing the political and governing context 
for future actors.   16
 Perhaps the most salient characteristic of these determinants—what unites them 
despite their considerable diversity—is that they are contingent facts. They obtain not as 
a matter of natural or constitutional stipulation, but as a result of both decisions made 
pursuant to the Constitution and the responses of citizens to those decisions. In his 
exposition of these facets of the state-federal relationship, James Madison argued that 
they, in effect, define the compass of possibility for government action. After discussing 
these determinants in The Federalist No. 46, he explains that “it is only within a certain 
sphere, that the foederal [sic] power can, in the nature of things, be advantageously 
administered.”  It is the variables of political culture and administrative capacity just 17
identified that structure this sphere. However, as I argued in Chapter One, because these 
determinants aren’t established by law—constitutional or natural—“the nature of things” 
is bound to change. Indeed, in politics the nature of things is change. Each of the 
determinants identified in Publius’ defense of the federal system is liable to modulate, 
responding to changes in governance, popular evaluations of governmental performance, 
and events exogenous to politics. Public policy will change, popular attachments will 
 Though  it  will  not  be  pursued  here,  the  connection  between  this  line  of  reasoning  and  observed 16
developmental processes in American politics should be noted. For a particularly helpful overview, see 
Adam  Sheingate,  “Institutional  Dynamics  and  American  Political  Development,”  Annual  Review  of 
Political Science 17:461-477 (2013).
 The Federalist, 46:317.17
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shift, governmental capacity will vary—as this happens, the “sphere” in which federal 
power can be advantageously administered will similarly change. This, then, is precisely 
why the long New Deal moment, when considered not as a discrete legislative or judicial 
event but an extended and layered process of state building, presents such a fertile case 
study for the construction of the state-federal relationship. For during this period, each of 
the nine determinants identified above underwent significant change, bringing to the fore 
questions about the correspondence between contemporary circumstances and 
constitutional structures. It is against this backdrop that the Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations confronted the meaning of federalism in the age of modern 
administrative governance.  
The New Deal, World War II, and the American State 
 If there is a truism in twentieth century American political development, it is that the 
New Deal was an epochal phenomenon. “With the realignment of the 1930s,” Sidney 
Milkis and Jerome Mileur write, “the New Deal took the shape of a ‘regime’ that marked 
a critical departure in the governing principles, institutional arrangements, and policies 
that shaped American political life.”  Though the period is commonly divided into two 18
constituent parts (1933-1935 and 1935-1937) they are united by the common thread of a 
proactive central government whose energies were directed towards the stabilization and 
management of the economy, the regulation of the financial sector, and the provision of 
new and expanding social services. This spirit animated early New Deal programs like 
 Sidney Milkis and Jerome Mileur, “The New Deal, Then and Now,” in The New Deal and the Triumph of 18
Liberalism (University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), 2.
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the Emergency Banking Act, the Civilian Conservation Corps, and the Tennessee Valley 
Authority, as well as later programs, such as the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act, the 
National Labor Relations Act, and the Social Security Act. This legislative effusion set 
off scores of legal challenges that would, in time, redefine federal power. Perhaps the 
most popularly salient of these is the decision in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish (1937), 
the famous “switch in time that saved nine.” The importance of this decision, though, has 
less to do with the enhancement of federal regulatory authority than with the perceived 
end of the Court’s resistance to government intervention in the market and workplace.  19
More pertinent from the standpoint of federal power are the decisions in Stewart Machine 
Co. v. Davis, Helvering v. Davis, and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, each of which 
marked a break from the Court’s previous jurisprudence and an expansion of federal 
power to tax, spend, and regulate commerce. 
 The New Deal casts a long shadow over modern scholarship of American politics and 
constitutionalism, shaping everything from assessments of presidents  to notions of 20
constitutional change.  Its shade has nurtured the growth and development of the modern 21
 It warrants mention that the argument that Roosevelt’s court-packing plan was responsible for changing 19
the  Court’s  jurisprudence  has  been  subject  to  strong  criticism.  See,  for  example,  Barry  Cushman, 
Rethinking the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (Oxford University Press, 
1998).
 See, for example, Stephen Skowronek, The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership from John Adams to 20
Bill  Clinton  (Harvard  University  Press,  1997);  and  “Franklin  Roosevelt  and  the  Modern  Presidency,” 
Studies in American Political Development, 6:322-358 (1992). Roosevelt is also routinely ranked among 
the greatest presidents by political scientists and historians alike. See Nate Silver, “Contemplating Obama’s 
Place in History, Statistically,” New York Times, Jan. 23, 2013 (available at http://nyti.ms/1jctHw0); and 
Brandon Rottinghaus and Justin Vaughn, “New ranking of U.S. presidents puts Lincoln at No. 1, Obama at 
18,’ Washington Post, Feb. 16, 2015 (available at http://wapo.st/1WAnLNU). 
 The most influential work here is Bruce Ackerman’s We the People: Transformations (Belknap, 1998). 21
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state, and its academic reception reflects that legacy. As Morton Keller put it, “the New 
Deal…came to be the true watershed dividing the American political and governmental 
past from the regime under which we live today[.]”  Far more than just a period of 22
drastic political, legal, and social change, the New Deal has come to represent a national 
ethos about the proper role of government in society—“New Deal Liberalism.”  But its 23
shadow has also obscured both the significance and the relevance of subsequent events to 
assessments of American political and constitutional development. Foremost among those 
is, perhaps ironically, the Second World War. Within a decade of the passage of the first 
New Deal program—and within five years of the jurisprudential “revolution” of 1937—
the United States was engaged in total war. Prosecuting and ultimately winning the war 
entailed national mobilization that further expanded federal authority and capacity, 
indelibly changing the nature and operation of the national government. It is necessary, 
then, to view the development of the American state in this light. More specifically, we 
must take account of the fact that the New Deal was but one phase in the emergence of 
the modern administrative state. While New Deal precedents and programs crucially 
shaped the context of later decisions, subsequent developments left their own imprint on 
a federal government that would look drastically different at the end of the 1940s than it 
did at the end of the previous decade. What is of particular significance for constitutional 
development, the state building that occurred from 1933 through the end of the war 
touched on every determinant of the state-federal relationship discussed in the previous 
 Morton Keller, “The New Deal and Progressivism,” in The New Deal and the Triumph of Liberalism, ed. 22
Sidney M. Milkis and Jerome M. Mileur (University of Massachusetts Press, 2002), 315.
 See Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (Vintage, 1995).23
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section, setting the stage for an even more formal and wide-ranging transformation of the 
federal system than had occurred over the course of the New Deal. 
The second quarter of the twentieth century brought a transformation in American 
public finance.  Federal receipts totaled $2.9 billion in 1930, falling by nearly fifty 24
percent over the ensuring two years. But by 1940, that figure was $8.2 billion. As 
dramatic as this increase was, the next five years—spanning the build-up and duration of 
the war effort—were nothing short of revolutionary. Aided by the passage of the Revenue 
Acts of 1941 and 1942,  federal receipts surged from $8.2 billion in 1940 to $41.5 25
billion in 1945, increasing by roughly fifty percent or more annually between 1940 and 
1943. And while expenditures dropped from $73.6 billion to $40.4 billion between 1945 
and 1947, receipts held steady through the late 1940s. Thus, after fighting both 
depression and war, the federal government left the 1940s taking in thirteen times as 
much as it had when it entered the 1930s. Over the same period, its expenditures jumped 
even more, going from $1.7 billion to $26.4 billion. Table 4.1 summarizes this epochal 
transition, providing disaggregated figures by revenue sources and expenditure areas.  26
 Here I follow Bartholomew Sparrow’s use of “public finance” in his study of the influence of World War 24
II  on  the  American  state:  “‘Public  finance’…refers  to  how the  government  secures  its  funding,”  and 
includes tax policy, fiscal policy, and governmental borrowing. See From the Outside In: World War II and 
the American State (Princeton University Press, 1996), 99.
 The Revenue Act of 1941 permanently extended a range of taxes that had been increased the previous 25
year. Additionally, the Act raised both the corporate tax rate and the excess profits tax rate. The 1942 Act 
increased corporate tax rates and individual tax rates, imposed a “Victory tax,” modified the excess profits 
tax, and lowered the personal exemption amount. 
 Fig. A1 in Appendix A presents federal expenditures in this period alongside per capita expenditures. As 26
those figures demonstrate, while the population grew steadily over the course of these decades the increase 
in  expenditures  was  considerably  more  rapid.  This  trend,  then,  is  not  simply  the  result  of  growing 
population.
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This public finance transformation was part and parcel of the federal government’s 
increasing role in Americans’ day-to-day lives. Building on the institutional foundation 
bequeathed by the New Deal, changes in tax, fiscal, and public debt policies further 
extended the regulatory hand of the federal government. While it may be true, as 
Bartholomew Sparrow argues in his study of the effects of World War II on the American 
state, that forgone opportunities in the early 1940s reveal the possibility of an even more 
dirigiste state than that which emerged from the war, the federal government nonetheless 
left the war years victorious and operating at an unprecedented size and scope. 
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Table 4.1: Federal Government Receipts and Expenditures, 1930-1950
1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
Receipts (in billions) $2.9 $3.7 $8.2 $41.5 $48.8
     Personal taxes 1.0 0.6 1.0 18.6 17.4
     Production & import taxes 1.0 2.1 2.6 6.9 8.7
     Corporate income taxes 0.7 0.8 2.6 10.2 17.2
     Social insurance contributions 0.1 0.1 1.9 5.3 5.3
Expenditures (in billions) $3.0 $5.9 $9.2 $73.6 $47.0
     Defense consumption 1.0 1.0 1.9 60.9 19.0
     Non-defense consumption 0.7 1.3 3.2 2.0 4.9
     Social benefits 0.7 0.5 1.3 4.1 10.2
     State & local grants-in-aid 0.1 1.7 0.7 0.8 1.8
     Other transfer payments 0 0 0 0.3 3.6
     Interest payments 0.3 0.6 1.0 4.0 6.2
     Subsidies 0.2 0.8 1.0 1.6 1.2
Source:  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis.  Composite  data  drawn  from  Federal  Government  Current 
Receipts  and  Expenditures  (Table  3.2)  and  Government  Consumption  Expenditures  and  General 
Government Gross Output (Table 3.10.5). Last revised Mar. 25, 2016.
Within this public finance revolution is concealed another consequential shift. Not 
only did the magnitude of federal spending increase, but so did the form of this spending. 
New Deal programs relied heavily on grants-in-aid—sums of money transferred to the 
states and localities in exchange for their participation in national programs and, often, 
compliance with federal directives. This was largely due to the lack of central 
government capacity to fulfill the new responsibilities entailed by New Deal legislation 
paired with the increasing access to revenue brought about by the establishment, 
entrenchment, and expansion of the personal income tax (among other taxes). Between 
1930 and 1940, the number of grant-in-aid programs more than doubled, going from 15 
to 31. During this period, the amount of federal revenue transferred from the federal 
government to state and local governments increased from approximately $100 million in 
1930 to $700 million in 1940, hitting a high-water mark of $1.7 billion in 1935. But this 
amount remained virtually unchanged during the war years, staying between $600 and 
$800 million between 1941 and 1945. And yet, attesting to the relative independence of 
this category from other budgetary items, the size of these transfer payments actually 
increased during the drawdown between 1945 and 1947, when federal expenditures 
decreased precipitously. Figure 4.2 charts these developments in the context of state 
receipts during the period.  Between 1940 and 1950, the number of grant-in-aid 27
programs again doubled, with outlays for federal grants increasing from just under one 
 The data  for  Figure  4.2  is  drawn from the Bureau of  Economic Analysis,  State  and Local  Current 27
Receipts and Expenditures (Table 3.3) (rev. March 25, 2016).
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billion dollars to over two billion.  These figures suggest that, to the extent grants-in-aid 28
raised questions about the integrity of the federal system, the war did not exacerbate the 
concerns initially raised by New Deal programs in the 1930s. But by the same logic, they 
suggest that those concerns were primed to reemerge in the postwar years.  29
 The same trend of central government growth occurred as well in the area of 
government employment, here perhaps most clearly. The level of federal government 
employment had traditionally been less than state and local government employment 
during peacetime, a reflection of the historical scope and distribution of government 
activities in the United States. But, as Figure 4.3 makes clear, those figures crossed 
between 1935 and 1936 and federal employment would exceed state and local 
 See Table A1 in Appendix A for further details on these figures; and see Figure A1 for trends in state 28
receipts from 1929-2015. 
 For a modern articulation of this argument, accompanied by a history of these programs, see James L. 29
Buckley, Saving Congress from Itself: Emancipating the States and Empowering Their People (Encounter 
Books, 2014).
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Fig. 4.2: State and Local Government Receipts, 1929-1955
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employment until 1960.  It is a common practice to disaggregate defense from non-30
defense figures—whether in the area of expenditures or employment—on the 
presumption that war is the exception and not the rule and, as such, distorts rather than 
clarifies the phenomena under investigation.  Moreover, national defense is (by and 31
large) the prerogative of the national government and thus should not be used to 
comparatively assess government relations. (For these reasons, the disaggregated figures 
are reported in Figure 3.) However, for the present inquiry the defense figures are 
profoundly relevant. To the extent we are concerned about the standing of the federal 
government vis-à-vis the states, its reach into the lives of American citizens, and the 
distribution of powers across levels of government, national defense employment is as 
important an area of civil and political life as any other. Indeed, it may be an even more 
consequential area, for service in the national armed forces (or associated industries) has 
 The data for  Figure 4.3 is  drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis,  Full-Time and Part-Time 30
Employees by Industry (1929-1948, 1948-1969; Table 6.4A, 6.4B) (rev. August 6, 2015).
 But see Stephen M. Griffin, Long Wars and the Constitution (Harvard University Press, 2013).31
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Fig. 4.3: Government Employment, 1929-1955
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an affective dimension, constituting a deeply important connection between citizens and 
the federal government. For each enlisted man and every woman drawn into war 
production, there was a family and social group who had an intimate connection to and 
stake in the national cause; each federal job and paycheck contributed to the support of a 
family, a community, and an economy. Table 4.2 captures some of this picture, providing 
employment and compensation figures for both levels of government between 1930 and 
1950. As documented there, this period brought a reversal in the traditional employment 
discrepancy between levels of government.  
 As James Sparrow details in his study of the emergence of “big government” during 
World War II, the relationship between citizen and government ran both ways. 
Widespread service and, more broadly, participation in the war effort fueled the 
Table 4.2: Government Employment and Compensation, Selected Years 1930-1950
1930 1935 1940 1945 1950
Total Employment 
(thousands)
3,779 7,150 7,919 17,431 8,802
    Federal Government 1,034 2,209 4,652 14,258 4,603
         Non-military 649 1,813 3,859 2,956 2,055
         Military 385 396 793 11,302 2,548
     State & Local Government 2,745 4,941 3,265 3,173 4,199
Total Compensation 
(millions)
$5,686 $7,094 $9,453 $40,088 $27,069
     Federal Government 1,742 2,654 4,710 34,028 15,499
     State & Local Government 3,944 4,440 4,743 6,060 11,570
Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis, Data Archive: National Accounts (NIPA); Full-Time and Part-
Time Employees by Industry (Table 6.4A) and Compensation of Employees by Industry (Table 6.2A). Last 
revised Aug. 6, 2015.
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emergence of a postwar expectation of government support and assistance, a new 
political consciousness rooted in an “Americanism” cultivated during the war.  (In this 32
way, New Deal liberalism is refracted through, and thus inextricably bound up in, 
America’s experience in the war.) These are precisely the dimensions of political culture 
that were so important in the debate between Federalists and Anti-Federalists—popular 
attachment, confidence in government, and the government’s connections with citizens. 
And they were important because they constituted the social and cultural contexts in 
which the underdeterminate state-federal relationship would take shape. The political 
context of the state-federal relationship is constituted by the capacity—both absolute and 
relative—of the two levels of government. As the developments covered in this section 
demonstrate, the New Deal began and the Second World War extended an astonishing 
increase in the capacity of the federal government. These changes fundamentally altered 
the foundations of the federal system. But they had yet to be assessed in full.  
The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 
 While overt disputes over the structure of the federal system had been largely 
suppressed during the war, they quickly reemerged in the postwar years. With new vim 
and vigor, the same coalition of conservative Republicans and Democrats that had shaped 
but not defeated Roosevelt’s legislative initiatives a decade earlier began to question both 
the constitutionality and the desirability of the state that the New Deal and the World War 
had produced. While there are certainly important earlier events, the run-up to the 
 James  Sparrow,  Warfare  State:  World  War  II  Americans  and  the  Age  of  Big  Government  (Oxford 32
University Press, 2011), 3-4. 
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presidential election of 1948 provides a convenient starting point for understanding 
Dwight Eisenhower’s election in 1952 and the reassessment of the American federal 
system that he precipitated with the establishment of the Commission on 
Intergovernmental Relations (CIR). After providing a brief account of the political 
background and origins of the CIR, I evaluate the Commission’s Report, detailing how it 
sought to accommodate the constitutional commitment to federal governance to the 
development of state capacity that had occurred as a result of the New Deal and World 
War II. This reconstruction of federalism’s purposes and applications shifted the focus 
from legal constraints to the desiderata of good governance—efficient administration, 
responsive government, and self-rule. 
Postwar Politics 
 Having assumed office upon Roosevelt’s death in 1945, Harry Truman presided over 
the conclusion of the war in both the Pacific and Atlantic theaters. Military 
demobilization and the economic transitions it entailed quickly led to dislocation and 
unrest. Republicans capitalized on Truman’s tumbling popularity, reclaiming Congress 
for the first time since the New Deal in the 1946 midterm elections. Opposition on 
Capitol Hill stymied Truman’s “Fair Deal” agenda, which consisted of a range of 
proposals designed to entrench and extend New Deal programs. Moreover, in a break 
with precedents set by Roosevelt, Truman moved to enhance civil rights protections for 
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African Americans, advocating a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission and 
issuing an executive order to integrate the armed services.  33
 The emphasis on civil rights, embraced strongly in parts of the Democratic Party, 
sparked intense opposition from southern states and representatives, leading to a walkout 
by southern delegates at the 1948 Democratic National Convention and the formation of 
the States’ Rights Democratic Party (or Dixiecrats). In their party platform, the States’ 
Rights Party called for “a strict adherence to our Constitution and the avoidance of any 
invasion or destruction of the constitutional rights of the states and individuals.” 
Opposing “the totalitarian, centralized bureaucratic government and the police nation 
called for by the platforms adopted by the Democratic and Republican Conventions,”  34
the States Rights ticket of Strom Thurmond and Fielding Wright looked to stand athwart 
the changes in the state-federal relationship that had taken root over the past decade and a 
half. The Democratic and Republican Parties also expressed their positions on the federal 
system, with both affirming the necessity of continued state-federal participation in 
national programs. While Democrats advocated federal aid programs that were to be 
“administered by and under the control of the states,”  Republicans called for “restoring 35
 For the most explicit articulation of this agenda, see Harry S. Truman, “Annual Message to the Congress 33
on the State of the Union,” Jan. 5, 1949 (available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=13293). See 
also Executive Order 9981, July 26, 1948 (available at http://www.trumanlibrary.org/9981a.htm).
 “Platform of the States Rights Democratic Party,” Aug. 14,  1948, The American Presidency Project 34
(available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25851). 
 “Democratic Party Platform of 1948,” July 12, 1948, The American Presidency Project (available at 35
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=29599). 
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to America a working federalism.”  Though Truman would go on to convincingly defeat 36
the listless Republican candidate Thomas Dewey in the election, the Thurmond-Wright 
ticket managed to win four states, fueling a resistance to national authority that would 
reverberate throughout American politics for decades to come. 
 This, then, is some of the background for the 1952 election, which would bring to 
office the first Republican president since 1932. After refusing entreaties from Truman to 
run as a Democrat, Dwight D. Eisenhower, then president of Columbia University and 
former Supreme Commander of Allied Forces in Europe, would go on to secure the 
Republican nomination and defeat Adlai Stevenson in a landslide. Though no strong pro-
state candidate emerged during the election, the concern over state-federal relations 
persisted and Republicans pledged “a thorough reorganization of the Federal Government 
in accordance with the principles set forth in the report of the Hoover Commission.”  37
More specifically, they called for an “immediate study directed towards reallocation of 
fields of taxation between the Federal, State, and municipal governments so as to allow 
greater fiscal freedom to the States and municipalities, thus minimizing double taxation 
and enabling the various divisions of government to meet their obligations more 
efficiently.”  Eisenhower made good on these commitments in his 1953 State of the 38
Union address. After describing the challenges faced in the areas of social insurance, 
employment, education, civil rights, immigration, and consumer protection, he stated his 
 “Republican Party Platform of 1948,” June 21, 1948, The American Presidency Project (available at 36
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25836). 
 “Republican Party Platform of 1952,” July 7, 1952, The American Presidency Project (available at http://37
www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25837).
 Ibid.38
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intention to call for a commission to conduct “a thorough study of the proper relationship 
among Federal, State, and local programs.”   39
 On March 30, 1953, he sent to Congress a message to “recommend the enactment of 
legislation to establish a commission on governmental functions and fiscal resources to 
make a thorough study of grants-in-aid activities and the problems of finance and 
Federal-State relations which attend them.” Describing his vision for this commission, 
Eisenhower wrote, 
The maintenance of strong, well-ordered State and local governments is essential 
to our Federal system of government. Lines of authority must be clean and clear, 
the right areas of action for Federal and State Governments plainly defined. This 
is imperative for the efficient administration of governmental programs in the 
fields of health, education, social security, and other grants-in-aid areas. The 
manner in which best to accomplish these objectives, and to eliminate friction, 
duplication, and waste from Federal-State relations is therefore a major national 
problem.  40
By July, the Republican controlled Congress passed Public Law 109, establishing the 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (CIR).  Just a few years later, William 41
Anderson, who served as a presidential appointee on the Commission, would write that 
from the first it was unclear what precisely Congress intended the CIR to accomplish.  42
 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Annual Message to the Congress on the State of the Union,” Feb. 2, 1953.39
 “Commission on Governmental  Functions and Fiscal  Resources:  Message from the President  of  the 40
United  States,”  March  30,  1953,  Folder:  Information  and  Public  Relations—Speeches,  Lectures  and 
Statements, The President, Box 63, U.S. Commission on Intergovernmental Relations: Records, 1953-1955, 
A67-5, DDEL.
 The enabling legislation identifies how the Commission was to be structured, requiring a total of 25 41
members  assembled  from  presidential,  Senate,  and  House  appointments.  Though  I  don’t  discuss  the 
individuals who served on the Commission here, a list of its members is provided in Appendix B.
 William Anderson,  “The Commission on Intergovernmental  Relations and the United States Federal 42
System,” The Journal of Politics 18(2): 213-214 (May, 1956).
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Section 3 of the enabling legislation outlined the duties of the Commission, requiring a 
broad examination of “all of the present activities in which Federal aid is extended to 
State and local governments, the interrelationships of the financing of this aid, and the 
sources of the financing of governmental programs.”  But the same section directed the 43
Commission to “carry out the purposes of section 1,” which employed much more 
pointed language to describe the need for such a body. Raising the specter of federal 
encroachment on state interests protected by the Constitution, in addition to inefficiency 
and complexity, section 1 declared, “it is necessary to study the proper role of the Federal 
Government in relation to the States and their political subdivisions…to the end that 
these relations be clearly defined and the functions concerned may be allocated to their 
proper jurisdiction.”  44
 The language of jurisdictional clarity, separate governmental roles, and clear lines of 
authority are evocative of an understanding of the federal system closer to the one 
replaced by the New Deal than that inaugurated by it. And for good reason. The 
congressional debates over the enabling legislation reflect the sense, shared by both 
Republicans and Democrats, that the previous several years had brought about a change 
in government functions and constitutional law that threatened (their understanding of) 
the federal system established by the Constitution. Looming behind these debates, one 
can see the grievances and anxieties that the Dixiecrats had tapped into in 1948. 
Nonetheless, in Congress’ directions to the Commission, one can also see the recognition 
 Pub.  Law  109,  Sec.  3,  83rd  Congress,  approved  July  10,  1953;  reprinted  in  The  Commission  on 43
Intergovernmental Relations: A Report to the President for Transmittal to the Congress (June 1955), 282.
 Id., Sec. 1, 281.44
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that the role of the federal government had changed so significantly that there may be 
little hope of returning to a more limited scope of activity. The focus, then as it had been 
for critics of federal power throughout American history, was on managing the operations 
of the recently aggrandized federal government and claiming state power where possible 
on the margins, rather than seeking a root and branch rejection of the state that had 
developed during the New Deal and Second World War.  This ambivalence—the 45
opposition to some aspects of enhanced federal power paired with a commitment to or 
acceptance of its continued use—was evident throughout the Commission’s operation 
between 1953 and 1955, during which it undertook a thorough analysis of governmental 
functions and intergovernmental relations. And it is an ambivalence that shaped its 
assessment of American federalism. 
The Reconstruction of American Federalism 
 The most significant exception to this, of course, is the Civil War, in which the rejection of the federal 45
government’s authority led to secession and war. But this is an exception that proves, or at least illustrates, 
the rule. Time and again, politicians and jurists who favored state power have, upon gaining power at the 
national  level,  sought  to  stem the tide of  federal  power and manage its  use rather  than repudiating it 
wholesale.
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 In June of 1955, after occasionally tumultuous proceedings,  the Commission 46
released its report. At over 300 pages, it reflected the comprehensive scope and practical 
utility that the Commission’s chairman, Meyer Kestnbaum, sought to achieve.  The 47
report is broadly divided into two sections. The first provides an overview of the 
evolution of the federal system and a statement on the role of the states, followed by three 
chapters identifying general principles about the terms for cooperative relationships 
between government, the financial dimensions of the state-federal relationship, and 
federal grants-in-aid. The second part consists of twelve policy-specific chapters that 
evaluate national policy regimes and express the Commission’s recommendations. The 
 Though there isn’t space here to explore the many conflicts and challenges that arose over the course of 46
the  Commission’s  existence,  they  are  nonetheless  pertinent  to  the  political  context  in  which  its  work 
proceeded. Foremost among these episodes is the tenure of its original chairman, Clarence Manion. The 
former dean of Notre Dame Law School, Manion was a conservative firebrand who used his position to 
criticize much of the New Deal legacy and oppose what he saw as creeping socialism in postwar America. 
Manion resigned his  post  in February 1954 because of  what,  in the public estimation,  appeared to be 
disagreements  with  President  Eisenhower.  During  his  tenure,  Manion  had,  among  other  things,  given 
speeches attacking the Tennessee Valley Authority and supporting the Bricker Amendments, which would 
have  limited  presidential  authority  under  the  treaty  power.  Manion’s  initial  appointment,  service,  and 
eventual resignation provide valuable insights into how critics of national power viewed the purpose and 
potential of the CIR and, ultimately, what those hopes came to. See “Manion Ousted by White House as 
Head of Governmental Survey,” New York Times,  Feb. 18. 1954; and “Assails Administration: Manion 
Asserts Centralization Aids ‘Communist Scheme,’” New York Times,  Apr. 9, 1954. For a sense of how 
controversial Manion had become, see “Removal of Manion Demanded by A.D.A.,” New York Times, Oct. 
21, 1953.
During his tenure,  Manion attempted to bend the administration to his views of the importance and 
purpose of the Commission, going as far as proposing draft language to be included in the President’s 1954 
State of the Union message. See Elmer Staats, “Memorandum for The Honorable Bryce Harlow,” Dec. 30 
1953,  transmitting  “Proposed  Revision  of  Last  Paragraph,  Page  28,”  and  “Proposed  Revision  of  Last 
Paragraph, Page 30, Fourth Draft, State of the Union Message,” Folder: Information and Public Relations
—Speeches,  Lectures  and Statements,  The President,  Box 63,  U.S.  Commission on Intergovernmental 
Relations: Records, 1953-1955, A67-5, DDEL. For a flavor of the kinds of speeches Manion delivered 
while chairman, see “The Constitution is Your Business,” 65th Annual Convention of the National Paint, 
Varnish  & Lacquer  Association,”  Oct.  26,  1953.  Folder:  Information  and Public  Relations—Speeches, 
Lectures  and  Statements,  The  President,  Box  63,  U.S.  Commission  on  Intergovernmental  Relations: 
Records, 1953-1955, A67-5, DDEL.
 For the circumstances surrounding Kestnbaum’s appointment, see Joseph A. Loftus, “Chicagoan Named 47
to Head U.S. Board,” New York Times, Apr. 22, 1954.
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discussion here will focus on the first part, as that is where the bulk of the Commission’s 
critical and normative work was focused.  
 In his introduction, Kestnbaum outlines a number of themes that are developed 
throughout the balance of the report, three of which are of particular importance for 
present purposes. Together they constitute an understanding of the federal system 
consistent with the constitutional logic outlined above in Part I. First, he describes the 
underdeterminacy of the distribution of power, though without reference to constitutional 
design or the understanding of its architects. Here political experience and history are the 
guide: “Precise divisions of governmental activities need always to be considered in the 
light of varied and shifting circumstances; they need also to be viewed in the light of 
principles rooted in our history.”  Second, Kestnbaum draws attention to the significance 48
of public opinion and support in shaping the federal system, which in the discussion of 
the debate between Publius and the Anti-Federalists was elaborated under the heading of 
“attachment.” And just as was the case in The Federalist, the argument about attachment 
is intertwined with considerations of state capacity. Kestnbaum writes, 
As with all governmental institutions in our society, the basic purpose of the 
division of powers is to provide a climate that favors growth of the individual's 
material and spiritual potential. Power will not long rest with any government that 
cannot or will not make proper use of it for that end. Our system of federal 
government can be in proper balance, therefore, only when each level is effective 
and responsible.  49
 The  Commission  on  Intergovernmental  Relations:  A Report  to  the  President  for  Transmittal  to  the 48
Congress (June 1955) (hereinafter, Report), 5-6.
 Ibid, 4.49
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We encounter here a very Publian understanding of government: superior administration 
will attract popular confidence and support, and that will shape the division of powers.  50
Moreover, we are given a definition of the federal “balance” that is strikingly different 
from the definition frequently employed in federalism debates. More often than not, the 
“balance” imagery has been used to describe a putatively determinate constitutional 
division of powers between the national and state governments. Further, it is this 
“balance” that justifies judicial intervention; when the federal system becomes 
unbalanced, it is the job of the Court to step in and return it to equilibrium. Such an 
understanding is obviously in considerable tension with the constitutional logic of 
federalism described in Chapter One and, more importantly, in the CIR report. Eschewing 
legal definitions, the report defines the federal balance in terms of effectiveness and 
responsibility, considerations of administration and politics, respectively. This 
understanding of the standard against which the federal system should be measured is a 
defining feature of the Commission’s report and is an integral part of its reconstruction of 
the federal system.  
 Finally, the introduction closes with a summary statement of how civic 
responsibilities should be divided. Here Kestnbaum offered the conclusion of the whole 
Commission: 
Leave to private initiative all the functions that citizens can perform privately; use 
the level of government closest to the community for all public functions it can 
handle; utilize cooperative intergovernmental arrangements where appropriate to 
attain economical performance and popular approval; reserve National action for 
residual participation where State and local governments are not fully adequate, 
 See, for example, The Federalist Nos. 17 and 27. 50
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and for the continuing responsibilities that only the National Government can 
undertake. 
This is a definition of subsidiarity, which has a long history as an interpretation of 
American federalism.  It bears note, though, that there is an important difference 51
between the two. Whereas federalism describes a division between governments in a 
polity, subsidiarity adds a normative decision rule to that institutional structure that is 
used to allocate powers.  Put differently, it is easy to conceive of a federal system not 52
structured according to the principle of subsidiarity. Therefore, subsidiarity cannot be a 
necessary component of federalism. Furthermore, to the traditional definition of 
subsidiarity the Commission added a further step: intergovernmental relations. Instead of 
jumping straight from a lower to a higher level of government once the former can no 
longer “handle” a particular responsibility, an intervening level of participation between 
governments is inserted. Even as this step adds a further limit on (or qualification to) 
exclusive national power and authority, it also reaffirms the basic structure of cooperative 
governance that had become increasingly prominent since the New Deal. We see here 
once again the centrality of governmental capacity to the structure of the federal system. 
Once the decision is made to turn over a civic responsibility to government, the 
determination of which government—local, state, or national—will be responsible for 
 See “Part II: Constitutions, Federalism, and Subsidiarity,” in NOMOS LV: Federalism and Subsidiarity, 51
ed. James E. Fleming and Jacob T. Levy (NYU Press, 2014). 
 Elazar makes a similar argument to the one offered here, though he perhaps goes too far in asserting an 52
opposition  of  subsidiarity  and federalism.  See  Daniel  J.  Elazar,  “The United  States  and the  European 
Union: Models for Their Epochs,” in The Federal Vision: Legitimacy and Levels of Governance in the 
United  States  and  the  European  Union,  ed.  Nicolaidis  Kalypso  and  Robert  Howse  (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press,  2001).  See also Wayne J.  Norman, “Towards a Philosophy of Federalism,” in Group 
Rights, ed. Judith Baker (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994). 
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that activity is determined by ability or capacity, by which government can “handle” that 
activity. Ceteris paribus there is a preference for the lowest competent level of 
government, but the administrative focus identifies which conditions will determine the 
assignments of responsibilities. 
 The statement on subsidiarity anticipates an argument that runs throughout the report: 
given the capacity of the modern state and the demands of governance that had developed 
especially in recent years, “federal forbearance” is required. Forbearance is the conscious 
decision not to act,  a “prudent limitation of National responsibilities.”  “Where the 53
problem of our federal system once appeared to be one of creating sufficient strength and 
authority in the National Government,” the report asserts, “today contrary concerns have 
aroused anxiety. The National Government now has within its reach authority well 
beyond what it requires for ordinary use; forbearance in the exercise of this authority is 
essential if the federal balance is to be maintained.”  Put simply, federal forbearance is 54
necessary because the possibility to do otherwise is no longer a theoretical question but 
one that pervades day-to-day politics. With expanded financial resources, enhanced 
regulatory powers, and newfound popular support, the federal government was at risk of 
overextending and overreaching. Time and again in the report, the reader is told that 
federal authority is discretionary—the use of national power is a function of national 
politics, and constitutional limitations provide little comfort for anyone seeking to 
restrain the federal government or protect the states: 
 Report, 35.53
 Ibid, 34-35.54
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It is important that National powers be adequate to all truly national needs; it is 
also important that they do not jeopardize the proper functioning of the States. 
The former object is a matter of power and hence of constitutional law; the latter 
is primarily a matter of public policy.    55
The organs of the National Government determine what the Constitution permits 
the National Government to do and what it does not, subject to the ultimate 
consent of the people…In brief, the policymaking authorities of the National 
Government are for most purposes the arbiters of the federal system.  56
The National Government has therefore a double duty: to protect and promote the 
national interest by adopting such substantive policies as are necessary and proper 
under the powers delegated to the National Government; and to protect and 
promote the national interest in the preservation of the federal system.  57
Federal forbearance is the corollary of this argument. To be used well and effectively, 
discretionary power must be complemented by self-limitation. This, of course, was 
nothing new; at least on the understanding of the constitutional logic of federalism 
outlined here, federal power had always been discretionary. But while imprudent 
expansions and uses of power had always been possible, the capacity of the modern state 
made that threat considerably more potent, imperiling the vitality and, in time, continued 
existence of subnational governance.  58
 Here, then, is the crucial point in the Commission’s argument. Because federal power 
is discretionary and the stakes of poor or improper use of its power are now of such great 
 Ibid, 32 (emphasis added). 55
 Ibid, 59 (emphasis added). Note the similarity between the understanding of federalism offered here and 56
the “process” approach inaugurated by Herbert Wechsler, whose seminal article was published one year 
before the Commission’s report. See Wechsler, “The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The Role of the 
States  in  the Composition and Selection of  the National  Government,”  54 Columbia Law Review 543 
(1954).
 Ibid, 60.57
 See, for example, ibid, 59 and 67.58
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magnitude, debates over the proper allocation of power—over the nature of American 
federalism—must be addressed in terms of policy. Federalism should be conceived of as 
a matter of governance, and not principally as a matter of law. This change of focus 
entails a corresponding shift in responsibility from courts to legislatures and 
administrative agencies, with important roles to be played by representatives at both 
levels of government. The Commission’s statement in this connection bears quoting in 
full: 
Under our federal system, the division of responsibilities between the National 
Government and the States was once thought to be settled mainly in terms of 
power: either one level, or both, or neither, had the authority to move; and that 
was enough to settle their functions. Such a decision was usually one for the 
judiciary. Under current judicial doctrine, there are still limits on the coercive 
powers at both levels, but the National powers are broad and the possibilities by 
means of spending are still broader. The crucial questions now are questions of 
policy: Which level ought to move? Or should both? Or neither? What are the 
prudent and proper divisions of labor and responsibility between them? These are 
questions mainly for legislative judgment, and the criteria are chiefly political, 
economic, and administrative, rather than legal.  59
This is, in one sense, a strikingly different view of federalism than what we might be used 
to. Federalism is often portrayed as a constitutional question and not a question of 
governance. On this understanding, the relevant concerns are quite different. Instead of 
asking what should be done, we ask what must be done in light of constitutional meaning. 
We don’t think of constitutional possibilities, only constitutional requirements. And rather 
than seeking “prudent and proper divisions of labor,” we seek clear limits on the powers 
of one government or both.  
 Ibid, 33 (emphasis added).59
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 The shift from law to governance reorients all of these questions and, in so doing, 
returns to the constitutional logic of federalism. And in this sense, the Commission’s 
conception of federalism is strikingly familiar. It is built on the twin foundations of 
popular attachment and government capacity, looking to the Constitution to structure the 
operation of the federal system but not to script it. It should not be surprising that, after 
an era that saw such growth in central state capacity and the emergence of greater popular 
support for the national government, the specific articulation or application of the federal 
system—the division of powers and the relationship between governments—would 
change. The discrepancy between the details of the Commission’s suggestions, most 
notably their endorsement of cooperative relationships and continued grants-in-aid to the 
states, and earlier instantiations of the state-federal relationship is primarily a function of 
the difference between state capacity in the postwar period and in earlier periods of 
American history. Just as the federal system had influenced the New Deal legislation that 
decisively shaped the state that would emerge from the Second World War, so too did that 
political context shape the federal system. In taking stock of the tectonic shifts in popular 
support and government capacity that had occurred over the previous two decades, the 
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations aided in the reconstruction of American 
federalism, rationalizing the essential core of the New Deal state and articulating a vision 
of federal governance that was focused on exactly that—governance.     
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Conclusion 
 This dissertation is about the consequences of constitutional design. In one sense, it is 
about the particular consequences of specific design choices, namely those concerning 
the federal system established by the United States Constitution. But in another sense, it 
is about a feature of constitutional self-government in general, a phenomenon confronted 
by all polities that seek to put to paper a design for representative government. In The 
Federalist No. 37 Publius gave particularly poignant expression to this challenge, 
describing the obstacles that beset efforts to translate the objectives of constitutional 
governance into language with the crude instruments available to man: 
Experience has instructed us that no skill in the science of Government has yet 
been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its three great 
provinces, the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary; or even the privileges and 
powers of different Legislative branches…Besides the obscurity arising from the 
complexity of objects, and the imperfection of human faculties, the medium 
through which the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other, adds a fresh 
embarrassment…When the Almighty himself condescends to address mankind in 
their own language, his meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and 
doubtful, by the cloudy medium through which it is communicated.  1
 The Federalist, 37:235-237 (Madison).1
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This observation is about the reality of constitutional underdeterminacy, and not about the 
American Constitution in any exclusive sense. As is the case for many of Publius’s 
arguments in The Federalist, the subjects under consideration were those presented to all 
who sought to establish a constitution by “reflection and choice.”  The reality, and thus 2
the consequences, of constitutional underdeterminacy extend far beyond the provisions 
and history of the constitution examined here. But it is in the particularities of the 
American constitutional experience that one set of such consequences is clearly 
disclosed.   
 By way of reflection and conclusion, there are two closely related concepts that figure 
prominently in the foregoing analysis that merit further discussion: constitutional 
construction and constitutional logics. While the first of these is a fundamental 
component of my argument about the nature of American federalism, the second is an 
integral part of its development. On the account I have advanced, the underdeterminate 
structure of the federal system requires political actors to elaborate the state-federal 
relationship in the course of making public policy and pursuing the ends of constitutional 
governance. That is, it requires them to construct the state-federal relationship. Through 
these efforts, the meaning of American federalism is constructed, contested, and 
reconstructed—the recurring lifecycle of constitutional underdeterminacy. This 
constructive process, in turn, takes place in and through the institutions established by the 
Constitution. As a result, the developmental trajectories of the constitutional order bear 
the impress of the logics of the Constitution and its component institutions.  
 Id., 1:3 (Hamilton). 2
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 The concept of constitutional construction has its roots in the distinction between 
constitutional interpretation and constitutional construction.  In the traditional 3
formulation, the interpretation-construction distinction is clarified by reference to cases 
of vagueness (the presence of borderline cases) and ambiguity (the existence of multiple 
senses or meanings). While interpretation resolves instances of ambiguity, construction 
resolves cases of vagueness. Thus, in the context of this dissertation, “interpretation is the 
activity that aims at discovery of the linguistic meaning of the various articles and 
amendments that form the United States Constitution.”  The goal of constitutional 4
interpretation is the determination of the Constitution’s semantic content. Constitutional 
construction, in contrast, “gives legal effect to the semantic content of a legal text.”  This 5
distinction has been recently reinvigorated, and somewhat reoriented, by the work of 
Keith Whittington, whose two book-length studies focus on both the phenomenon of 
constitutional construction and instances of construction in and between the legislative, 
executive, and judicial branches.  For Whittington, constitutional construction is “the 6
 Lawrence B. Solum has offered perhaps the most perceptive and persuasive treatments of this 3
distinction. See especially “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,” Constitutional 
Commentary 27:95-118. For more of an applied treatment, see Solum’s coauthored piece with 
Tun-Jen Chiang “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction in Patent Law,” 123 Yale Law 
Journal 530 (2013), esp. 543-562.
 Solum, “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,” 100. 4
 Id., 103.5
 See Whittington, Constitutional Interpretation: Textual Meaning, Original Intent, and Judicial 6
Review (University of Kansas Press, 1999) and Constitutional Construction: Divided Powers and 
Constitutional Meaning (Harvard University Press, 1999). For a further application of the 
framework developed in Constitutional Construction, see “Dismantling the Modern State? The 
Changing Structural Foundations of Federalism,” Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly 
25:483-528 (1998). 
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method of elaborating constitutional meaning in [the] political realm.”  This definition 7
was offered, at least in part, as a corrective to the overly narrow focus on traditional 
“modalities” of constitutional interpretation.  Whittington’s argument invited observers to 8
see how constitutional constructions “elucidate the text in the interstices of discoverable, 
interpretive meaning, where the text is so broad or so underdeterminate as to be incapable 
of faithful but exhaustive reduction to legal rules.”  This was a salutary development, as 9
it pushed back against the court- and judge-centered focus that dominated much of the 
literature in constitutional theory, law, and history, providing a fuller and more accurate 
account of constitutional operation and meaning-making. 
 In the years since Whittington’s intervention, however, the lesson he urged seems not 
to have been learned. Much of the scholarship that picked up on his attempt to clarify the 
difference between interpretation and construction instead transposed the distinction 
(back) into the domain of the judiciary, disregarding or simply not addressing the roles 
played by non-judicial actors in the discovery and elaboration of constitutional 
meaning.  A leading voice in this movement is Randy Barnett, for whom the 10
interpretation-construction distinction presented a metric for evaluating the propriety of 
 Whittington, Constitutional Construction, 1.7
 The seminal articulation of these modalities—textual, historical, structural, prudential, doctrinal, 8
and ethical—is Philip Bobbitt’s Constitutional Fate: Theory of the Constitution (Oxford 
University Press, 1984). 
 Whittington, Constitutional Construction, 5.9
 This neglect was often benign, a function more of subfield preoccupations than overt dismissal. 10
The conjunction of two passages from Lawrence Solum’s treatment is instructive: “Because my 
own work on the interpretation-construction distinction occurs mostly in constitutional theory, I 
will use the text of the United States Constitution as an illustrative example…Although political 
construction and private construction are important, I want to focus on judicial construction of the 
Constitution for illustrative purposes.” Solum, “The Interpretation-Construction Distinction,” 101 
and 104. 
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judicial behavior.  While the domain of interpretation requires judicial resolution, 11
interpretation yields where semantic content runs out, and construction thus signals a 
different kind of judicial behavior, one that may justify greater scrutiny. The affirmation 
of construction as a legitimate judicial endeavor caused Barnett, among others, to go as 
far as to claim that the distinction is more fiction than fact. Reacting to the efforts of 
some to argue for a larger “zone of construction” in which judicial judgment must occur, 
Barnett has argued that “the labels are not important” and that interpretation and 
construction could actually be conceived of as two species of interpretation, which he 
calls “semantic interpretation” and “applicative interpretation.”  There is much more to 12
these arguments than what has been said here, but the description of these developments 
is sufficient to demonstrate the frequent dismissal of the broader focus on which 
Whittington insisted. 
 The debate about interpretation and construction, and the distinction between 
vagueness and ambiguity on which it traditionally rests, does not map neatly onto the 
account of the American federal system that I have developed over the course of this 
dissertation. But the arguments advanced here about constitutional underdeterminacy and 
the construction it anticipates can help buttress the interpretation-construction distinction 
and again emphasize the need to look not only to the judiciary but to the broader 
constitutional order in which it is embedded. Underdeterminacy is distinct from 
properties like ambiguity and vagueness and, accordingly, has a different relationship to 
 For example, see Laura A. Cisneros, “The Constitutional Interpretation/Construction 11
Distinction: A Useful Fiction,” Constitutional Commentary 27:71-93 (2010).
 Barnett, “Interpretation and Construction,” 34 Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy 65 12
(2011), 65.
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the interpretation-construction distinction. Indeed, at various points in this dissertation I 
have defined underdeterminacy in opposition to vagueness and ambiguity.  Risking the 13
confusion that often results from doubling down on academic jargon, it could be said that 
the federal system is unambiguously underdeterminate. Concluding that the Constitution 
does not fully specify the contours of the state-federal relationship, and as such defers 
further specification to the processes and actors established thereby, does not depend on 
contestable decisions between multiple senses of constitutional language. Nor is it quite 
accurate to say that underdeterminacy is the result of underlying linguistic vagueness, as 
the question of the proper or permissible state-federal relationship cannot be conclusively 
answered by reference to a point on a spectrum of constitutional meaning for stipulated 
provisions or terms.  
 Though a function of constitutional language, underdeterminacy is not principally 
linguistic but rather textual and institutional; it concerns the specification of offices, 
powers, and relationships that the Constitution leaves for subsequent determination and 
elaboration. It is, in a word, constitutional, in that it captures constitutionalism’s defining 
purpose of structuring the definition, location, and exercise of political power. While this 
dissertation has explored the phenomenon almost exclusively in the context of 
federalism, it sought also to show the relevance of underdeterminacy to the separation of 
powers. By contrasting the underdeterminacy of these two hallmarks of American 
constitutionalism, defining characteristics of the federal system came more clearly into 
view. Thus the responsive and power sharing relationships between branches of the 
 See Introduction, p. 6 note 11, and Chapter One, p. 44 note 13.13
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national government stand in stark relief to the completeness and independence of state 
and national governments. The former can give rise to positive benefits of deliberation 
and compromise, and through this process imbue government actions with the concerns 
of institutions structured to express the basic values of constitutionalism. The latter, on 
the other hand, produces claims of exclusive authority and political sovereignty, which in 
turn require the assertion of either national sovereignty or state prerogatives to resolve. 
This difference accounts for the need for a constitutional mechanism to resolve 
competing claims of sovereignty, claims that are themselves encouraged by the structure 
of the constitutional order.  
 My insistence on constitutional underdeterminacy and the construction it entails 
should not be understood as a categorical rebuke to the operation and claims of courts, 
though that impression may be forgiven.  While the analysis I present partakes of a 14
broader tradition of qualifying the interpretive claims of the Supreme Court, my central 
goal has been to demonstrate that, wittingly or otherwise, all branches of the national 
government engage in constitutional construction. In the case of the judiciary, this means 
that attempts to interpret the Constitution give rise to new understandings of the federal 
system, understandings that because of the underdeterminacy of the Constitution’s 
 My emphasis on the political elaboration of the state-federal relationship could appear, at a 14
very superficial level, similar to the political safeguards or process federalism arguments initially 
posed by Herbert Wechsler and further developed by, among others, Jesse Choper and Larry 
Kramer. In lieu of a comprehensive response to this characterization, it should be noted that those 
arguments were developed as efforts to identify and qualify the proper role of judges, principally 
the Supreme Court. My focus, and the focus of this dissertation, is not on the appropriate scope of 
judicial review but on the broader relationship between constitutional design and development. 
Though there are certainly consequences for judicial review, those have not been the subject of 
inquiry here. For a provisional exploration of these consequences, see Ewing, “Structure and 
Relationship in American Federalism,” 712-728.
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definition of the state-federal relationship are distinct from constitutional interpretation. 
Whereas Chapter Four addressed an episode of legislative and executive construction, 
Chapter Three revealed that such constructions can also result from iterated episodes of 
interpretation by the judiciary. By repeatedly seeking to provide determinacy to the 
underdeterminate state-federal relationship, the Supreme Court produced a logic of 
federalism that departed from the constitutional logic of federalism. While the latter is 
predicated on an openness to revision and change—to constitutional possibilities—the 
former entailed categorical distinctions between state and national power that served to 
minimize or eradicate underdeterminacy. This connection—between the determination of 
constitutional meaning and the operation of constitutional institutions—brings us to the 
second central concept of this dissertation: constitutional logics.  
 Constitutional logics figure prominently in the works of a small group of scholars for 
whom questions about constitutional meaning and development require conceptualizing 
and evaluating the constitutional system as a complex whole, as a constitutional order 
and enterprise.  Jeffrey Tulis has provided the most detailed definition, identifying three 15
features of a constitutional logic: “(1) the fundamental commitments, or constitutive 
dimensions, of political life, (2) the philosophic presuppositions of those commitments, 
and (3) the cultural, institutional, and policy implications of those commitments.”  At a 16
 See principally Jeffrey K. Tulis, The Rhetorical Presidency (Princeton University Press, 1987), 15
8 n. 9; and “On the State of Constitutional Theory,” Law & Social Inquiry 16(4):711-716 
(Autumn, 1991); Jeffrey K. Tulis and Nicole Mellow, “The Anti-Federal Appropriation,” 
American Political Thought 3(1):157-166; William F. Harris II, “Bonding Word and Polity: The 
Logic of American Constitutionalism,” American Political Science Review 76(1):34-45 (1982); 
and Sotirios Barber, On What the Constitution Means (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), 
156-159.
 Tulis, “On the State of Constitutional Theory,” 716.16
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more general level, constitutional logics can be thought of as the basic set of 
constitutional principles, along with the relevant theoretical assumptions and practical 
consequences of those principles. The focus of this dissertation has been the 
constitutional logic of federalism: (1) the principle of the Constitution’s underdeterminate 
division of power between levels of government, (2) the assumption that this 
underdeterminacy reflects a commitment to popular sovereignty as the ultimate 
foundation of political legitimacy, and (3) the practical consequence of contestation over 
the proper meaning of the state-federal relationship and, as a result, over the meaning of 
sovereignty in the constitutional order.  
 In the course of working out the development of this constitutional logic, it was 
necessary to identify the institutions through which this logic is promulgated. Hence, this 
dissertation has also emphasized institutional logics, which should be understood as 
particular, and often partial, manifestations (or applications) of constitutional logics. 
Once the premise about constitutional underdeterminacy is acknowledged, judicial claims 
about interpretation may appear to be more pretense than observation—an assertion of 
institutional prerogative rather than an argument about constitutional meaning. While 
there is a strong case to be made that this is at times true, it also risks stating the matter 
too strongly. As I’ve argued, the judiciary, like other governing institutions, has a 
distinctive perspective on questions of constitutional meaning. Moreover, the 
perspectives of the three branches of the national government are functions of the 
constitutional ends each is designed to vindicate. These ends I’ve summarized as the 
fundamental ends of liberal constitutionalism: popular will, general welfare, the rule of 
!248
law, individual rights, and national security. Because each of the three branches of the 
national government is structured to advance and give unique expression to a different 
end (while still being mindful of the others), inquiries into the elaboration of 
constitutional meaning must take account of the ways in which these institutional logics 
inflect the branches’ elaboration of constitutional meaning. 
 Taken together, constitutional construction and constitutional logics offer the tools fit 
for the analysis of our Constitution. As argued in Chapters One and Two, and as 
illustrated in Chapters Three and Four, the underdeterminacy of the federal system 
anticipates constitutional development. This development, in turn, is inflected by the 
institutional logics of the branches as they encounter questions of constitutional meaning 
and gives rise to constructions of the state-federal relationship. Such a posture towards 
American constitutional development requires first identifying the constitutional logics 
that define the polity’s fundamental commitments and then attending to the institutional 
logics that give life to those commitments. Only then can the distance traveled by “We 
the People” towards “a more perfect Union” be accurately charted. 
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Appendix A  1
 The data for the Appendix figures as follows: Figure A1 is drawn from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1
State and Local Government Current Receipts and Expenditures (Table 3.3) (rev. March 25, 2016); Figure 
A2  is  a  composite  of  the  Bureau  of  Economic  Analysis,  Federal  Government  Current  Receipts  and 
Expenditures (Table 3.2) (rev. March 25, 2016) and U.S. Census Bureau reports.
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Fig. A1: State and Local Government Receipts, 1929-2015
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Fig. A2: Per Capita Federal Government Expenditures, 
1929-1955
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Table A1: Federal Grants to States and Localities, Selected Years 1930-1960
1930 1940 1950 1960
Total Number 15 31 68 132
     Categorical grant 15 31 68 132
     Block grant 0 0 0 0
     General revenue sharing 0 0 0 0
Total Outlays (in millions) $100 $967 $2,212 $7,019
     Health 0 22 123 214
     Income security 1 271 1,123 2,635
     Ed., train., employ., & soc. serv. 22 238 484 525
     Transportation 76 165 429 2,999
     Community & regional devel. 0 0 0 109
     Other 1 271 53 537
Source: Congressional Research Service, Report 7-5700 (R40638), “Federal Grants to State and Local 
Governments: A Historical Perspective on Contemporary Issues,” 5-6 and 10-11 (Mar. 5, 2015).
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Appendix B 
MEMBERS OF THE COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS
CHAIRMEN
Clarence E. Manion (until Feb. 1954) Dean, Notre Dame Law School 
Meyer Kestnbaum (from Feb. 1954) * President, Hart, Schaffner & Marx
PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES 
William Anderson Professor, University of Minnesota
Lawrence A. Appley President, American Management Assoc.
John Battle Governor (D-VA)
John E. Burton Vice President, Cornell University 
Marion Bayard Folsom Undersecretary, Department of Treasury 
Charles P. Henderson Mayor, Youngstown (R-OH)
Oveta Culp Hobby Secretary, Dept. of Health, Education, and 
Welfare
Clark Kerr Chancellor, University of California
Sam Jones Governor (R-NE)
Alice K. Leopold Director, Women’s Bureau
Val Peterson Governor (R-NE)
Allan Shivers Governor (D-TX)
Dan Thornton Governor (R-CO)
SENATE APPOINTEES 
Sen. Guy Cordon † Texas (R)
Sen. Robert Hendrickson † New Jersey (R)
Sen. Clyde R. Hoey † South Carolina (D)
Sen. Hubert H. Humphrey Minnesota (D)
Sen. Andrew F. Schoeppel Kansas (R)
HOUSE APPOINTEES
Rep. John D. Dingell Michigan (D) 
Rep. James I. Dolliver Iowa (R)
Rep. Brooks Hays Arkansas (D)
Rep. Harold Ostertag New York (R)
Rep. Noah M. Mason * Illinois (R)
REPLACEMENTS 
Sen. Alan Bible Nevada (D)
Sen. John Marshall Butler Maryland (R)
Rep. Angie Goodwin Massachusetts (R)
Sen. Wayne L. Morse Oregon (I)
Notes: * Resigned from Commission. † Left office prior to conclusion of Commission’s work.  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